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ABSTRACT 
 
Democracy is a form of governance that allows for the flourishing of human 
potentiality. Unfortunately, democracy has become less of a means of governance and 
more of a rhetorical device to secure the consent of the people to be ruled by the elite 
few. Thus the current study seeks to disrupt this hegemonic means of control through an 
explication of authentic governance and democracy in order to demonstrate that the 
current manifestations of governance associated with democracy are inauthentic. To 
begin, authentic democracy –direct or as it is constituted here, rhetorical democracy– can 
foster a citizenry of active and empowered participants who express their public wills 
through rhetorical engagements so as to generate a collective will productive of a 
collectively binding decision that is reflective of a societal common good. To achieve this 
end, the foundation of the communicative process is set up as being inherently rhetorical 
and fundamental for the establishment and continuance of the symbolic orders generative 
of society’s macro- and micro-cultures. Next, engagement of these symbolic orders 
through democratic rhetoric is necessary for authentic governance to be actualized. 
Democratic rhetoric posits a new way of understanding and employing invention for 
rhetorical engagements concerning public problems, as well as constructing a new notion 
of rhetorical accountability. It is in one’s participation in the collectively binding 
decision-making process of a rhetorical democracy, which necessitates inventing through 
 iii 
the symbolic orders of others, that the educative and transformative power of rhetoric is 
facilitated and realized. Additionally, this study reconceptualizes ideology as primarily a 
sense-making system that provides a method for critical ideological analysis of both 
Athenian democracy and American governance. Democratic rhetoric hinges upon the 
citizenry’s ability to participate as empowered, functional equals – core ideological 
constructs of Athenian democracy – in the collectively binding decision-making process. 
Finally, to facilitate the possibility of democratic rhetoric within governance the current 
research constructs the possible means, functions and structures, for enacting a rhetorical 
democracy within the contemporary political context. The implications of this 
investigation into meaningful symbol systems, culture, rhetoric, ideology, and democracy 
and the subsequent theory building will prove to be fruitful within the contexts discussed 
here and in many others. 
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I think by far the most important bill in our whole code is that for the diffusion of 
knowledge among the people. No other sure foundation can be devised, for the 
preservation of freedom and happiness.  
…Preach, my dear Sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish & improve the law 
for educating the common people.  
Let our countrymen know … that the tax which will be paid for this purpose is not 
more than the thousandth part of what will be paid to kings, priests & nobles who 
will rise up among us if we leave the people in ignorance 
 –Jefferson (1786), Thomas Jefferson: Writings  
  
 
 
 
 
 2 
CHAPTER ONE: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY? 
 
We claim to be the greatest democratic people in the world, and democracy 
means, first of all, that we can govern ourselves.  
–Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents 
Democracy in America is a mirage… 
Just like a mirage shimmering on the horizon of a hot, dry desert promises the 
relief of cool waters, democracy in America extends the hope of sovereignty, liberty, and 
equality; empowering the people to embrace life and pursue happiness through self-rule:  
 A mirage provides direction and structures action, but it never fulfills 
expectations.  
 A mirage is unsatisfying in that while it “appears real or possible”1 it is 
merely an illusion.  
 A mirage ends in disillusionment. 
And yet an actual pool of cool water does revive a weary and thirsty traveler just as the 
authentic “object” of democracy empowers, enlightens, transforms, and activates a 
citizenry to embody a way of life that “materialize[s]” the “creation of … human 
being[s]” who “exists and lives in and through the unity of … the love and ‘practice’ of 
                                                 
1
 Oxford American Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus, 3rd ed., s.v. “Mirage.” 
3 
beauty, the love and ‘practice’ of wisdom, the care and responsibility for the common 
good.”2 Behind the illusion of the mirage is the actuality of what it appears to be. 
Democracy was a practice of the American people prior to the American 
Revolution; a practice interrupted by the process of securing ratification of the 
Constitution. During this interruption the Federalists, framers of the Constitution, excited 
“a passion of jealousy in the People against themselves,”3 so that they became “dupes of 
artful manoeuvres, & made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging chains for 
themselves.”4 Bound by chains the people believed that they could not truly govern 
themselves and accepted an argument John Adams articulated well in 1776 that “the first 
necessary step” to govern an “extensive country”  should be to “depute power from the 
many to a few of the most wise and good.”5 Following the establishment of the Union the 
people awoke from their jealousy to the ideas, ideals, and merits of democracy as if from 
a deep slumber and “demophilia, the love of the demos,”6 –the people– reemerged on the 
American political stage, driving alterations to Federal and State governance.  
                                                 
2
 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in political 
philosophy, ed. David Ames (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 123. 
 
3
 Plain Truth [pseud.], “On Democracy,” The Independent Chronicle, July18, 
1803. 
 
4
 Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: Library of America, 
1984), 1064. 
 
5
 John Adams, The Portable John Adams, ed. John Patrick Diggins (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2004), 235. 
 
6
 Jeremy Engels, “Demophilia: A Discursive Counter to Demophilia in the Early 
Republic,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97, no. 2 (May 2011): 132. 
4 
Ever since, woven throughout the words of the Presidents, democracy and its 
ideals have been employed symbolically to win and maintain the consent of the people. 
With Thomas Jefferson begins a parade of presidential associations with democracy: “We 
of the United States … are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats.”7 Over and 
over again the presidents have inculcated in the people the belief, as John Quincy Adams 
(1825-1829) stated in his inaugural address, that “our political creed is … that the will of 
the people is the source and the happiness of the people, the end of all legitimate 
government upon earth”;8 or as William Henry Harrison (1841) declared that because 
“the broad foundation upon which our Constitution rests being the people – a breath of 
theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it – it can be assigned to 
none of the great divisions of government but to that of democracy”;9 or in the august 
language of Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865), “government of the people, by the people, 
for the people.”10 
                                                 
7
 Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1385. 
 
8
 John Quincy Adams, “Inaugural Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 2, ed. James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 862.  
 
9
 William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address “Inaugural Address,” in A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 4, ed. James Daniel 
Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 1861. 
 
10
 Abraham Lincoln, “Facsimile – Lincoln’s Original Draft of Gettysburg 
Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, ed. 
James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 
1897), 3401. 
5 
Not only has the American government been continually portrayed as democratic, 
even as “…the sample democracy of the world,”11 –Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921)– but 
the values and ideals of democracy are said to be American as well. For “a great 
democracy like ours,” claimed Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), “a democracy based 
upon the principles of orderly liberty, can be perpetuated only if in the heart of ordinary 
citizens there dwells a keen sense of righteousness, and justice.”12 The nation, 
admonished Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), “continue[s] to offer” citizens “hope, 
liberty and justice which have always prevailed in this great democracy of ours.”13 
America is a nation in “search for freedom”14 –Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)– and which 
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) argued “champions peace that enshrines liberty, democratic 
rights, and dignity for every individual.”15 While democracy, which John F. Kennedy 
(1961-1963) said is founded upon “the right to fair representation and to have each vote 
                                                 
11
 Woodrow Wilson, “Eighth Annual Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 27, ed. James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 8883. 
 
12
 Theodore Roosevelt, “Proclamation 776 - Thanksgiving Day,” in The American 
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=72436&st=democracy&st1=#axzz1NDyjLU52 (accessed on 
20 July, 2013).  
 
13
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Greeting to New Citizens,” in The American 
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15953 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).  
 
14
 Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals: ‘The 
Malaise Speech’,” in The American Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and 
Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32596 (accessed on 20 July, 
2013). 
 
15
 Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State 
of the Union,” in The American Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard 
Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38069 (accessed on 20 July, 2013). 
6 
count equally,”16 is perpetually posited to define and describe the American political 
system, George W. Bush (2001-2009) claimed it is also essential for identification as a 
citizen: “What makes us Americans is a shared belief in democracy and liberty.”17 The 
American ideology of democracy is so well established and accepted that when Barrack 
Obama (2009-present) claims that “power rests not with those of us in elected office, but 
with the people we have the privilege to serve”18 American citizens believe that the claim 
is justified. The long socio-historical legacy inculcated by Presidents, Federal and State 
politicians, educators, and the common citizen confirms that America is rhetorically 
constructed as a government that was originally framed and continues to embody 
democratic ideals. And who could blame the American citizenry since ideologically 
democracy is American, even if in American governance democracy is only a mirage.  
The rich rhetoric of the Presidents provides a glimpse into the ideological links 
that comprise the American articulation of democracy: The will of the people is 
represented through elected officials, who derive their power from the people, in order to 
ensure that citizens’ rights to liberty, justice, and equality as established in the 
Constitution of the United States are protected. Left out of this conspectus of American 
                                                 
16
 John F. Kennedy, “The President's News Conference,” in The American 
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8573 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).  
 
17
 George Bush, “President Bush Delivers Commencement Address at Miami 
Dade College,” in The White House: President George W. Bush, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070428-3.html (accessed on 20 July, 
2013).  
 
18
 Barrak Obama, “Press Conference by the President,” in The White House: 
President Barack Obama, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-
conference-pre, (accessed on 20 July, 2013). 
7 
democratic ideology is an orientation rooted deeply in the revolutionary and the 
Constitutional periods of American history that has strongly influenced the rhetoric of the 
Presidents. Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), identified this orientation during his inaugural 
address when he asserted that “our Government” is “worth defending” when “it secures 
… the rights of person and of property.”19 One hundred and thirty four years later, while 
addressing the Free University of Berlin, John F. Kennedy explicitly made the same 
linkage when he stated: “economic well-being and democracy must go hand in hand.”20 
Consequently, the ideal of protecting property or securing economic well-being is an 
important characteristic of American governance.  
Democracy is a not just an idea, it is a composite of ideas, sentiments, values, 
material practices, institutions, and artifacts. Democracy is an ideology and the 
ideological rhetoric of democracy calls forth for a certain structuring of individual and 
collective life. As an ideology, democracy is constitutive of individual identities, subject 
positions, practices, institutions, and even life pursuits. The rhetoric of democracy veils 
the nature of governance in America, convincing the people that in America it is they 
who self-govern: obviously this is an assertion fraught with strong implications for how 
the American citizenry can engage the system of governance through which society is 
ruled. While it is important to make this assertion clear to position the foundational 
perspective related to what is to follow, in order to problematize democracy in America it 
                                                 
19
 Andrew Jackson, “Inaugural Address,” in The American Presidency Project, 
eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 
25810 (accessed on 20 July, 2013). 
 
20
 John F. Kennedy, “Address at the Free University of Berlin,” in The American 
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9310 (accessed on 20 July, 2013). 
8 
is not necessary to hold that it is a mirage or even a veil that is productive of the power of 
the few over the many. For the fact that democracy is perceived as being “thin”21 and is 
experienced by the citizenry as inauthentic provides sufficient grounds from which to 
launch an inquiry into democracy and American governance.    
Authentic Democracy and Democratic Inauthenticity: A Sketch 
Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of Citizens 
should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to obey. 
 –James Madison, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates 
Today democracy is plagued by a crisis of meaning. Even understanding why 
democracy is experienced as inauthentic is an exercise in near futility due to the many 
various forms of governments that have claimed it as a label to legitimize their right to 
rule. In the current climate in which democracy has lost its coherence by becoming 
“wonderfully elastic”;22 to understand it when it has come to mean anything, as noted by 
Robert Dahl, “yet a term that means anything means nothing. And so it has become with 
‘democracy,’ which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as 
a vague endorsement of a popular idea”23 it is necessary to briefly define authentic 
democracy to understand why people, even though, as Susan Pharr, Robert Putnam and 
                                                 
21
 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 132. 
 
22
 Ellen Meiksin Wood, “Democracy: An idea of ambiguous ancestry,” in 
Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, eds. J. Peter 
Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 66. 
 
23
 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), 2. 
9 
Russell Dalton claim, their belief in its values and aspirations is “higher than ever,”24 are 
experiencing it as inauthentic. 
Authenticity, according to Martin Heidegger, is to “take hold of [one’s self] in its 
own way”;25 or in other words, to live the truth of one’s essential being, which includes 
realizing the possibilities of one’s potentialities.26 Translating and applying Heidegger’s 
idea of authentic being to an authentic experience of democracy would dictate that 
democratic governance needs to actualize an experience of its essential ideological 
implications. When actualities violate these constitutive and generative implications, 
those living under the ideology experience dissonance and relate to the experience of the 
ideology as inauthentic. Fundamentally democracy involves rhetoric as the primary 
means for engaging with other citizens in consideration of how to self-rule (democratic 
rhetoric) and necessitates institutional spaces in which the people enact rhetorically their 
democratic power (rhetorical democracy). Democratic rhetoric historically flourished 
first, more than two and a half millennia ago upon the shores of the Aegean Sea in the 
rhetorical democracy of ancient Athens. Consequently, as democratic governance moves 
away from the Athenian ideal –direct democracy– the people are not able to know if (1) 
their will will frame the collectively binding decision-making agenda, (2) that their will is 
                                                 
24
 Susan J. Pharr, Robert D.  Putnam, and  Russell J. Dalton, “Trouble in the 
Advanced Democracies? A Quarter-Century of Declining Confidence,” Journal of 
Democracy 11, no. 2 (April 2000): 9.  
 
25
 Martin Heidegger, Time and Being, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: HarperOne, 1962), 167. 
 
26
 Susan Zickmund, “Deliberation, Phronesis, and Authenticity: Heidegger’s 
Early Conception of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 40, no. 4 (December 2007): 
407-408. 
10 
considered in the decision-making process, and (3) that their will will be constitutive of 
laws that will be enforced. This lack of knowledge, generative of a lack of faith in the 
democratic process, undermines the very foundations that legitimizes democratic rule. 
Without this knowledge and faith the perception and experience of democracy as 
inauthentic flourishes and the citizenry withdraws their commitment to the system and 
practice of governance. The authenticity deficit of the democratic process is a result of a 
power deficit of the people; due to their functional exclusion from the ongoing 
collectively binding decision-making process. This power deficit is justified through a 
lack of faith in the capacities of the people, which has led to a system of governance that 
constrains the participation and power of the people to ensure the means of governance 
avoids certain ends.  
Democracy “at its core,” claims John Gastil, has not shifted from what it meant 
for its first practitioners, the ancient Athenians, “self-rule, rule by all.”27 As a revered 
word and political system for many in the world today, especially for those who believe 
that its principles have been reified in their governing practices, not only does democracy 
“promise that those who call upon the law and those whom the law calls upon are also its 
authors” but it additionally, Darrin Hicks argues, “refers to a particular institutional 
arrangement for making binding political decisions.”28 While democracy’s conceptual 
core is the people’s ability and right to self-rule, it has fostered an ideology representative 
of a web of related ideals, beliefs, values, practices and institutions. Certainly the 
                                                 
27
 John Gastil, Political Communication and Deliberation (Los Angeles: Sage 
Publication, 2008), 5. 
 
28
 Darrin Hicks, “The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy,” Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 5, no. 2 (June 2002): 229. 
11 
tradition of democracy, as Samuel Freeman states, assumes that its citizens are not only 
free, equal, self-governing and “subject only to laws that they have accepted,” but that 
society’s common good is pursued through public debate that opens the collectively 
binding decision-making process to public scrutiny and criticism.
29
 Robert Dahl argues 
that democracy exhibits characteristics that enables the citizenry, inclusive of society’s 
adult members, means for “effective participation … voting equality … control of the 
agenda” and produces within them an “enlightened understanding” of societal issues.30 
Embedding these traditional concepts and distinguishing characteristics into the structure 
of a governing apparatus certainly is necessary for democratic governance and yet they 
are not sufficient for enlivening government to be democratic if the people are not 
empowered, as engaged participants, for self-rule. Democracy is conceptually and 
experientially inauthentic when a people are functionally without the power to self-rule; 
be the authors of the laws under which they live. 
Democratic governance fundamentally entails an institutionalization of a free 
people’s power through equal participation in the decision-making processes that result 
in cooperative acts necessary to resolve public problems. This empowerment is at the 
heart of that which is denied the people through the institutional arrangements of 
contemporary systems of democratic governance. Chantal Mouffe makes this point when 
she claims that “the dominant tendency” for “envisaging democracy” today considers 
                                                 
29
 Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A sympathetic comment, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 29, no. 4 (October 2000): 417. 
 
30
 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy, 37-38. 
12 
“popular sovereignty … to be obsolete”31 even though without it a government denies  
that which is “central” to the “democratic imaginary.”32 The belief that “popular assent”33 
is the qualitative equivalency to democratic self-rule instills a false sense of 
empowerment in the people when their public institutions actually entail a process that 
has less to do with the people ruling and more with whom shall rule over them. 
Consequently, even though the people are the admitted source of political power it is 
often forgotten that since they entrust their power to a select few –representatives– their 
power and right to self-rule has been delegated to those they have authorized to govern in 
their place.  
In consideration of this question about democratic inauthenticity Sheldon Wolin 
points to the affects of institutionalization. He argues that what “mark[s] the attenuation 
of democracy” is the moment when governance “become[s] specialized, regularized, and 
administrative in character and quality.”34 Institutionalization embeds “routinization, 
professionalization, and the loss of spontaneity”35 and therefore it “depends on the 
ritualization of the behavior of both rulers and ruled to enable the formal functions of the 
                                                 
31
 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 3-4. 
 
32
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 4. 
 
33
 Stephen Macedo, Democracy at Risk: How political choices undermine citizen 
participation and what we can do about it (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2005), 13. 
 
34
 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: 
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state … to be conducted on a continuing basis.”36 The problem with his argument is that 
it is not that institutionalization concretizes certain ritualized behaviors as much as it is 
the behaviors that the current manifestations of democracy institutionalize. In spite of this 
concern, the insights of Wolin are productive regarding the institutional arrangements of 
representative democracy in two ways. First, to be successful within a field heavily 
dominated by routine an individual has to master its ins and outs and in doing so systemic 
innovation has to be suppressed. Allowing innovation to flourish introduces 
unfamiliarity, dislodges the routine and thereby diminishes the power and position 
attained by those who have acquired superior system knowledge and skills. Second, as 
the institutions of representative democracy have become more administrative and 
professionalized, collectively binding decision-making migrates from the local context 
and the “vagaries of local preferences” where substantial differences can emerge across 
the national landscape to centralized spaces so that, as Michael Sandel argues, the 
collectively binding decisions are made effective for all of those ruled.
37
 When this 
happens the people, typically distant from the decision-making process in both place and 
power, experience a “sense of powerlessness” as they are left outside of the political 
process.
38
 In other words, contemporary democratic governance privileges individual 
citizens who have knowledge of and power within a government that is fundamentally 
and functionally set apart from the people. As such, attempts by the people to assert their 
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power and right to self-rule is filtered through a form of democratic governance that is 
institutionally aligned to mitigate their ability to rule. Therefore, due to the seductive 
influence of institutional power, even when the people are desirous of significant change 
in the political realm, the status quo is perpetuated by the political elite. When the status 
quo is maintained it demonstrates the power of the institutional elites and impotency of 
the people’s power for actual self-governance. 
The ideology of governance that drives representative democracies and its 
institutions is one that results in either the people not being the authors of or not 
participating in authoring society’s laws. Referring to nations that exhibit the current 
institutional arrangements commonly associated with democracy, Iris Marion Young 
contends that they are “for the most part only thinly democratic.”39 In representative 
forms of democratic governance the power of the people has been restricted to their 
occasional acts of voting. As Hannah Arendt argues, “the old adage, ‘All power resides in 
the people,’ is true only for the day of election.”40 Yet, even this claim is misleading as 
the power of the people’s vote is limited within the governing apparatuses of 
representative democracy. At one level the infrequency of this political expression and its 
ineffectualness for producing both desired collectively binding decisions and systemic 
changes serves to convince the people that their votes typically only alters political actors 
instead of the political acts those actors repeatedly (re)produce. These recurrent results 
lead the people to withdraw from the public realm, since, as Morris Rosenberg has 
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shown, “people tend to be motivated to action only if they feel that this action leads to the 
desired goal.”41 If the desired goal is viewed as unlikely, then “the individual feels that 
even if he were active, the political results he desires would probably not come to pass” 
and “there is consequently no point in doing anything.”42 Therefore Benjamin Barber’s 
claim that the people “are apathetic because they are powerless, not powerless because 
they are apathetic”43 becomes a powerful indictment of the current means of American 
democratic governance. 
The institutions of governance in representative democracies constrain, if not 
effectively eradicate, the spaces in which the people can meaningfully participate in the 
public realm where collectively binding decision-making transpires. Arendt claims that 
through the Constitution the people were “given all power” even though “there was no 
space established for them” to be “citizens.”44 Relegated to occasional acts of simply 
casting votes “citizens,” as Young states, “never need to leave their own private and 
parochial pursuits and recognize their fellows in a public setting to address one another 
about their collective.”45 In this political arrangement, Arendt posits that, citizens can be 
citizens without “an opportunity to engage in those activities of ‘expressing, discussing 
                                                 
41
 Morris Rosenberg, “Some Determinants of Political Apathy,” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly 18, no. 4 (December 1954): 354.  
 
42
 Rosenberg, Some Determinants of Political Apathy, 354. 
 
43
 Barber, Strong Democracy, 272. 
 
44
 Arendt, On Revolution, 256. 
 
45
 Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative 
Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 126. 
16 
and deciding’ which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom.”46 Instead of having 
to rhetorically engage in deliberate forums, over a public problem with those likeminded 
or not, a citizen can simply vote, “regardless of how ignorant or selfish [s/he] may be in 
casting [his or her] ballots in the privacy of the ballot box.”47 Without a space in which 
the people collectively decide what cooperative act(s) will lead to the common good, 
following Carroll Arnold insights, the citizenry does not have to “stand with”48 their 
“symbolic acts” and thereby risk their community standing by:  
declar[ing], clarify[ing], obscur[ing], or otherwise signal[ing] to those who see 
and/or hear, [their] intelligence, … intentions toward those to whom [they are] 
relating … integrity …capacity to relate … to others, … or … want of these.49  
Certainly people speak their opinions, but typically they speak into forums in which their 
words have little or no meaning. Speaking past each other they do not have to respond to 
the content of what anyone else has said because the impetus to have to actually engage 
others through a democratic rhetoric is nonexistent.  
In the end, the people have no reason to either listen to or learn about how their 
proposed solutions will impact the lives of fellow societal members. In other words, the 
secrecy of the voting booth deprives the people of the opportunity to and necessity of 
troubling their own personal preferences by considering the preferences of others through 
a direct, embodied and empowered contestation of their ideas. Their opinions and 
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arguments, supportive of their preferences, need not be tested nor refined for they have 
neither the space where their words and reputations are risked through meaningful 
deliberation with oppositional voices nor the space where their power is personal, 
immediate and effective. Lacking such a space to enact their power for self-rule –to 
discuss/debate, decide and do– the people withdraw from the process of self-governance.  
Democracy in principle and practice, must afford the people, the citizenry of 
society, an institutionalized agonal space in which they can participate in the “political 
struggles”50 of society. For citizens to be motivated to act in the democratic process their 
voices must “have authoritative standing” so that, as Mark Warren contends, they can 
“speak on behalf of their own experiences and interests” and offer “responses to the 
cognitive content of claims, challenges, and arguments of others.”51 In other words, for 
decision-making processes that intend collectively binding decisions to be perceived as 
fair and authentic the voice of those affected by the decisions must be, not only heard, but 
viewed as having an equal influence on the process. Robert Folger and his associates 
have referred to this phenomenon as the voice effect.
52
 According to Folger and his 
colleagues, the opportunity to express one’s voice is advantageous for a couple of 
reasons. On one hand, when people are able to communicate their experiences, 
knowledge, thoughts, and opinions –voice– into a decision-making process the procedure 
                                                 
50
 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 6. 
 
51
 Mark E. Warren, “Deliberative Democracy and Authority,” American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 50. 
 
52
 E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kaufer, and P. Christopher Earley, “Voice, Control and 
Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59, no. 5 (November 1990): 952. 
18 
and resulting decision are more likely to be superior to decisions arrived at through a 
process that does not allow for participant contributions.
53
 The decision-making process 
consequently, is enhanced through an increase of information that is brought to bear upon 
the decision. In addition, by having a voice in the process the procedure is judged to be 
fairer by a participant since s/he “at least has a chance to defend his/her position and 
present his/her side of the issue.”54 Thus, when individuals have the opportunity to speak 
into and have equal influence on a decision-making process they typically deem that 
process and its outcomes to be more legitimate. 
The ability to have a voice in the decision-making process has even further 
reaching consequences. Not only does the voice effect relate to the perception that 
decision-making outcomes are fairer, in that participants “believe that voice will help 
them control … outcomes,” but, Allan Lind, Ruth Kaufer and Christopher Earley argue, 
it also stimulates the view that they “are valued, full-fledged members of the group 
enacting the procedure.”55 In other words, as Darrin Hicks and his associates found, the 
voice effect positively impacts a participant’s perspective of the process, arrived at 
outcomes –or “structural conditions”– and how s/he experiences the process –or 
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“relational judgments.”56 This in turn has positive effects on participation –individuals 
are more apt to contribute to the process
57– and the implementation of the decision.58 
While the voice effect leads to positive fairness judgments regarding the decision-
making processes and outcomes the inverse has also been shown to be true. There is an 
interrelationship between “deficits in … structural conditions” and “negative relational 
judgments”59 in that when participants perceive that either is true the other is held as well. 
When this occurs people are denied their voice in a decision-making process, which leads 
the participants to “perceive the process as [being] unfair.”60 For instance, Hicks and his 
colleagues found that individuals, who believe that their participation in a decision-
making process is being exploited through manipulation by those in authority or 
influential positions, are liable to withdraw from the process.
61
 
Democratic inauthenticity exhibits a pattern wherein the citizenry, denied a space 
for rhetorical engagement, is not able to embody their power for self-rule through voicing 
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their positions equally and effectively within the democratic decision-making process. 
The people, who have the right to produce collectively binding agreements that lead to 
cooperative actions they are ultimately responsible for, need spaces within the political 
sphere to interact, decide and act with their equals. Through ideological implications, 
productive of systemic, procedural limitations embedded into the heart of representative 
democracy, the positive consequences of voice effects are diminished and/or lost. 
Deficient of meaningful spaces for the people to actually embody citizenship and their 
power to self-rule, the democratic process is judged to be unfair, which in turn facilitates 
the people’s withdrawal from the very spaces that afford them with limited opportunities 
to speak into governance. When citizens believe that their voice is denied or has limited 
affects, they abandon the democratic process, which results in democracy losing its 
legitimacy –authenticity– as a means of governance. 
To reinvigorate democracy, governance needs to provide citizens with 
opportunities for direct participation within the collectively binding decision-making 
process. To do so, the institutions of governance need to incorporate spaces where, 
harkening back to democracy’s conceptual core of self-rule, the people can actually 
engage with one another to formulate solutions to public problems that are then 
implemented for the good of their communities. By looking back to the ancient 
Athenians, it is possible to imagine the imperative institutional frameworks necessary to 
deepen and make more authentic the democratic experience. Athenian democracy, 
referred to today as a direct democracy, while considered to be the birthplace of 
democratic ideology and governance, has not and is not considered as a feasible model 
for governance. As such, numerous scholars and political actors, past and current, have 
21 
directed a number of potent criticisms toward direct democracy. Before proceeding to 
arguments for the necessity of democratic rhetoric, institutionalized in rhetorical 
democracy, that provides spaces for direct, collective decision-making these critiques 
must be addressed. 
Critiquing the Critiques of Direct Democracy 
Democracy that calls for the direct participation of the citizenry, like that found in 
ancient Athens, has suffered a number of criticisms about its functional and ethical 
practicability. Thomas Paine noted that “as … democracies increased in population, and 
the territory extended, the simple democratical form became unwieldy and 
impracticable.”62 Contemporary criticisms of direct democracy still acknowledge these 
functional disadvantages and have added a number of others. Two further functional 
concerns holding direct democracy as untenable involve time costs and a lack of 
sufficient infrastructure. Time costs posit that the duration needed to conduct an assembly 
–gathering of citizens to make collectively binding decisions– is too demanding for 
contemporary, modern societies.
63
 The infrastructure concern, building from Paine’s 
argument, claims that due to large populations and high urban density it is not feasible to 
provide the necessary functional space to allow all to participate in a face-to-face 
context.
64
 These practical concerns led Young to claim: “Democratic politics must 
respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of people related to one another 
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through democratic institutions.”65 The ethical critiques claim that time costs could 
impinge upon a citizens’ freedom to be a nonparticipant;66 that direct democratic 
procedures and participation favor extroverts over introverts;
67
 that citizenship in 
previous direct democracies were narrowly exclusive
68
 and that their homologous societal 
composition is not translatable to today’s heterogeneous society;69 and that direct 
democratic processes might produce faulty collectively binding agreements, built upon 
poor justifications.
70
 
Pushing Beyond Limitations of Nature and Structure 
It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be 
governed on democratical principles. 
–Centinel, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates 
While full answers to a number of these critiques will emerge throughout the 
development of the arguments for democratic rhetoric and rhetorical democracy, initial 
responses are warranted. Creative institutional programming and design has the 
potentiality to rectify population, scope and infrastructure limitations. To pare away the 
functional concern related to time cost and its ethical correlative requires a two part 
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answer. Functionally time is finite and thus one’s various pursuits present a person with 
competing life concerns. Ethically the time commitment necessary for participation in an 
assembly could interfere with the earning, production, and distribution potential of 
participants.
71
 Functionally, the effects of time costs can be mitigated by distributing 
participation across the spectrum of the citizenry, which would equalize its effects on the 
private potential of societal members as well as the democratic benefits. Regarding the 
ethical concern it should be noted that it rests upon a particular notion of citizenship that 
essentially constricts equality to the private realm and includes a freedom from politics.
72
 
An alternative perspective that shatters this divide that privileges the few over the many 
holds that to be a citizen is implicative of empowered participation within the collectively 
binding decision-making process. In this view, citizenship obligates its members to 
actively engage in the democratic process. Being empowered to act –to have ownership 
of their own self-rule– citizens are responsible for their public and collective wellbeing. 
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Being too Fearful to Rule 
Courage … does not gratify our individual sense of vitality but is demanded of us 
by the very nature of the public realm. …Courage liberates men from their worry 
about life for the freedom of the world.
73
 
 –Hannah Arendt, The Portable Hannah Arendt 
In a direct democracy it is certainly true, as Majid Behrouzi contends, that public 
communication apprehension or even introversion “could have disempowering and 
alienating effects”74 and yet this perspective offers a narrow view on the opportunities 
afforded one by direct participation in the democratic process. The value of participation 
is not limited to the possibility of a personal public address, as it also empowers citizens 
to learn, listen and influence familiar others. For instance, by being an engaged citizen, 
empowered to participate in collectively binding decision-making processes, individuals 
at the minimum benefit from the experience of direct democracy by: (1) the learning that 
occurs through exposure to expert knowledge throughout the preparation and deliberation 
phases; (2) the listening skills they develop as they process the arguments presented for 
or against a proposed policy during the deliberative phase, which in turn enlarges the 
participants understanding of the issue and the lived experiences of others; and (3) the 
possibility for improved influential engagements with familiar others before and after 
participating in an assembly, as being participants better equips these citizens to support 
their positions persuasively through the focused learning they glean from the expert 
knowledge made available and experiential understanding gained through their direct 
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participation. In addition, throughout the process an introvert can discuss the subject they 
are to assist in deciding with those others with whom they are comfortable.  
To act in the public realm politically, no matter one’s level of communication 
apprehension involves the virtue of courage. Being empowered to engage in collectively 
binding decision-making processes that will affect the good of one’s community, which 
“existed before us and is meant to outlast our lives in it,” requires “by the very nature of 
the public realm,” according the Arendt, a citizen who pushes through one’s personal fear 
and worry.
75
 For individuals who experience elevated apprehension through their 
participation as a citizen their engagement requires an act of courage. Courage is also 
needed for an extrovert to appear before one’s community to publically propose a 
solution to a public problem, which exposes him or her to “the widest possible 
publicity”76 and consequently means that s/he risks his or her own reputation in speaking. 
With “the world at stake,”77 the cost of citizenship in democracy obliges citizens, those 
affected by public decisions that lead to public acts which respond to public problems, to 
fulfill their duty and roles by contributing the knowledge they have gained through their 
lived experiences. Acting in an assembly requires all types of individuals who can enact 
differing roles and ultimately strengthen the decision-making process through their own 
unique life experiences and learning. As a consequence, both introverts and extroverts are 
necessary and significant for arriving at collective decisions most likely to lead to a 
satisfactory end. By making the process meaningful through providing institutional space 
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for all citizens, introverts and extroverts, to enact their power to self-rule through one 
participatory means or another, will only serve to strengthen, not only the democratic 
experience and governance, but also each community member’s courage to be and act as 
citizens.  
Difference Necessitates a Place for Public Appearance 
When you are with Athenians, it’s easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are 
with Lacedaemonians.  
–Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
The ethical critique concerning exclusion centers on the constricted scope of 
citizenship found in direct democracies like ancient Athens. A simple response is that 
while contemporary democracies “are more generous and respectful”78 when judged 
according to contemporary values of inclusivity, this argument is “counterproductive” as 
a means to invalidate the benefits of direct democracy
79
 since the very American 
constitutional securities honored by most and “fundamental to modern democracy,” as 
Josiah Ober argues, would suffer under this critique as they too were composed prior to 
the “abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage.”80 Robert Dahl notes, “only two 
‘democratic’ countries – New Zealand and Australia – had extended the suffrage to 
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woman in national elections before the 1920s.” 81 The value of full inclusivity, which still 
allows for limited exclusions, has been a very recent political development.
82
 As such, 
exclusions to citizenships, from Athens to America, are based on societal and political 
norms that are generative of determinations for the legal statuses that define a citizen. 
How narrow or broad citizenship is constructed then is not predicated on the system of 
governance, but on the societal values that drive its framing.  
The more potentially potent argument, derived from the exclusivity of Athenian 
direct democracy, is that by restricting who is empowered to participate in governance its 
decisional space is made more agonal due to its homogeneity and therefore making it less 
functional for a heterogeneous society. In an agonal political arena, homologous citizens, 
sharing similar “morals,” aspire to “excellence” as they appear among “peers” to 
“compet[e] for recognition, precedence and acclaim.”83 In the “essentially porous” and 
plural nature of today’s political context the “public space”84 seems to be more 
heterogeneous then the public space in which the direct democracies of the past thrived. 
In a heterogeneous political context, instead of seeking excellence, actors pursue victory 
for their private interests or the consolidation of their support base.  
Consideration of Athens’ homogeneity is based on their cultural similarity, which 
served as a common ground for facilitating the formulation of satisfying solutions to 
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address public problems. While Athens did exclude “the majority of the population – 
women, slaves, and resident aliens,” it could not really be classified as homologous –
sharing similar characteristics, perspectives, and principles– as its public space for 
political decision-making was accepting and productive of difference. For instance, 
Athens incorporated difference through the varied economic standing of its actual 
participators. This means that the property exclusion that largely defined American 
criteria for citizenship at its founding, which was thought to ensure the values influential 
within the collectively binding decision-making process, were non-existent.
85
 Plato gives 
a glimpse into the diversity of the Athenian Assembly, writing that “a builder or equally 
well a blacksmith or a shoemaker, merchant or ship owner, rich or poor, of good family 
or none”86 all participated in addressing their fellow citizens and in deciding solutions to 
public problems. Each standpoint, representative of differing societal groups, as will be 
argued later, is productive of distinct perspectives. Athenians believed that all citizens, no 
matter their means of livelihood were “competent to make political judgments.”87 
Considering the previous response alongside the fact that ten percent or more of the 
Athenian population
88
 was empowered as citizens who could truly influence the agenda-
setting, policy making and administration of the polity and that an assembly generally 
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contained upwards of six thousand plus decision-makers for each round of collectively 
binding decisions made
89
 the homogeneity argument loses much of its strength.
90
 
Heterogeneity, even more than homogeneity, necessitates the “‘associational’” 
space afforded by democracy so that the citizenry can congregate publically with their 
differences to participate in a way productive of power, freedom and transformation.
91
 
The problem is that one space, considered to be predominately similar, is where 
difference is allowed to flourish and made productive through engaged participation and 
the other space features difference that drives a perceived need to secure public, political 
decision-making from the possible volatility of the citizenry, arising from their 
conflicting private interests. “All human activities,” Arendt reminds, “are conditioned by 
the fact that men live together”92 and yet when a citizenry is allowed to develop public 
opinions in private, within their private circles, there is a tendency for them to only bring 
their private “moods”93 or interests to bear on public problems. By “ventur[ing] into the 
public realm,” that the engaged participation of direct democracy provides, “one exposes 
oneself to the light of the public.”94 In such an arena, the pressure of public exposure 
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pushes one to justify his or her private interests. John Stuart Mill argues that “the 
participation of the private citizen … in public functions” moves one  
to weigh interest not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by 
another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and 
maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good.
95
  
When a citizen transitions out of the private realm into the public realm to present his or 
her claims, s/he “is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their 
benefit to be for his benefit.”96 An environment that fosters ongoing “active exposure to 
public forms of deliberation” in which one’s reputation is risked, Niewenburg claims, 
“may sustain a sincere concern for the common good.”97 Individuals who have to appear 
in public, with other citizens, to deliberate over common public concerns, are motivated 
to transform their appeals supporting their proposals from private interests into public 
ones to which the public will respond. 
Such a political space can only be found in democratic institutions inclusive of a 
citizenry who are equally empowered and free to fully act in the creation of public 
policies. Building from Arendt’s contention that, “freedom always implies freedom of 
dissent,”98 it could be proposed that a political space that values freedom is also a space 
that is productive of substantial political difference. One only has to peruse the debates 
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that transpired in the Athenian Assembly over the course of its history to appreciate its 
lack of homogeneity during its deliberations and its accommodation of difference.  
Democracies whose citizens are not empowered to act upon public problems within a 
public decisional space are the ones in which its constituents typically “have… lost much 
of their power”99 and suffer a deficit of participation. Consequently, a porous and plural 
democracy needs, not only an associational arena, but also an agonal one where the 
democratic practice of an empowered, inclusive citizenry actualizes freedom through 
their pursuit of common goods, mutuality, and provisional collectively binding decisions.  
Democratic Dangers: Athenian Judgment Nearly Gone Awry 
Give people some significant power and they will quickly appreciate the need for 
knowledge, but foist knowledge on them without giving them responsibility and 
they will display only indifference.  
–Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
An initial reply to the concern regarding poor decisions and justifications 
acknowledges that history is replete with governments of all dispositions and forms 
making unjust decisions based on faulty reasoning. A more productive response, counters 
the reasoning the critique is based on. Opponents of direct democracy argue that citizens 
should submit to a protective guardianship of individuals who have superior deliberative 
capacities and knowledge even though such a political arrangement voids the people’s 
individual equality, liberty and power. In addition to depriving the people of their 
inalienable rights for self-rule, this argument does not fully appreciate the value of 
situated reasoning and judgment required in the decisional process that governance 
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entails. Instead it contends that since the decisions made through public deliberations 
based on a lack of or low quality knowledge and resulting in those decisions likely being 
judged as being unjust, governance should be relegated to those citizens deemed to have 
superior knowledge. A rebuttal of this critique begins with an examination of a particular 
instance found in the history of Athens’ Assembly.  
During the Peloponnesian War between the Spartans and Athenians, a dire 
judgment was arrived at by the Athenians concerning a rogue ally. The story originates 
with a sentence of death; a sentence that had to be a heavy weight to carry. It had to be 
even more so since the messengers had to row a warship, or trireme, one hundred and 
eighty-five miles to deliver the orders
100
. After the Athenians suppressed the elite led 
Mytilenaean rebellion on the island of Lebos the citizens of Athens assembled to decide 
the fate of the rebels. With “6,000 to 7,000 voters crammed onto the rocky Pynx”101 the 
Athenians decided “in their state of anger” to kill “every adult male …and to enslave the 
children and women”102 of Mytilene. Once the decision was arrived at the trireme was 
launched to deliver the verdict.  
Thucydides’ account of these events does not end there, as the very next day the 
Athenians hesitated in their decision. Once the popular sentiment of the people was 
known, another Assembly was held in which their previous collectively binding decision 
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was debated. In the end the Athenians, listening to the arguments of Diodotus, decided to 
rescind the previous day’s verdict and order, mandating that the general populace of 
Mytilene was to be spared.
103
 Rowing day and night, rotating their eating and sleeping 
along the way, a second Athenian trireme arrived at Mytilene just in time to avert “the 
slaughter.”104 The initial decision is the very type of unjust outcome, arrived at through a 
knowledge deficit, that demonstrates the concerns opponents raise to dismiss the self-rule 
of the people. The answer to the critique though is also found, in part, here as well. 
During his speech, Diodotus, argued: 
I have no criticism of those who have proposed a review of our decision about the 
Mytilenaens, and no sympathy with those who object to multiple debates on 
issues of major importance. … Anyone who contends that words should not be 
the school of action is either a fool or an interested party – a fool, if he thinks 
there can be any other way of elucidating a future which is not self-evident.
105
 
In this portion of his speech he defends the people’s prudence in calling for a second 
Assembly to revisit the previous day’s decision. His opposition, voiced by Cleon, 
desirous of the execution order being carried out, attempted first to challenge the wisdom 
of even meeting again. Out of Diodotus’ rebuttal to this opposition emerged three means 
for responding to the current critique that the people are not knowledgeable enough to 
rule. In his words they are: 
1. elucidating a future which is not self-evident 
2. multiple debates on issues 
3. proposed … review of … [a] decision 
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or in contemporary terms 
 
1. decision-makers need superior knowledge to account for the contingency 
of the future 
2. collectively binding decisions are provisional 
3. decisions are subjected to oversight by an umpire body 
The fact is that every system of governance has to demonstrate that the knowledge it 
draws from is sufficient for making just and effective or satisfactory decisions. It is only 
in direct democracy that the citizenry actually provides the knowledge that guides 
decisions about what will best serve their own collective interests and common good. It is 
also, in part, through superior knowledge known and constituted by the people that their 
right to govern themselves is justified.  
The People as a Repository of Superior Knowledge 
For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet 
together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually 
but collectively,  just as a feast to which many contribute  is better than a dinner 
provided out of a single purse. 
–Aristotle, Politics 
 
While governance involves the execution of collectively binding decisions and a 
process for determining whether or not those decisions are just, its central function is 
found in deliberation and legislation of collective actions that end in societal goods. As 
the ancient Athenians knew, the legislation leading to cooperative acts is not grounded in 
certainty, but probability, since human knowledge is unable to guarantee future 
outcomes. The best that the citizenry can hope to obtain through its collectively binding 
decision-making process are judgments, productive of decisions that adhere to a morality 
of justice and result in the desired ends. In spite of its inadequacy, it is knowledge that 
35 
provides the resources upon which the decision-making process of governance is 
dependent. To possess superior knowledge would allow one to account for the widest 
range of variables impinging upon a public problem in order to guide the decision-
making process to a policy that would most likely produce a just and satisfactory 
collectively binding decision. Consequently, a claim emerges that those citizens endowed 
with superior knowledge should be afforded an authoritative position within the creation 
of collectively binding decisions; a claim to which democracy responds with the 
collected, distributive knowledge of the people. 
The debate between Cleon and Diodotus provides a historical reference, from 
which to judge if it is possible for a people, as citizens, to meet the knowledge 
requirements for governing well. Gathered together, the Athenians made a judgment, not 
about the guilt of the Mylitenes, for that was confirmed through the act of rebellion, but 
about what course of action they should take in response to best secure their continuing 
preeminence and ability to rule over their empire. After the decision was initially made, 
the resolve of their anger faded and they were faced with a decision that had not 
adequately weighed possible future consequences resulting from such ill-treatment of an 
ally lead into revolt by a few. In effect, they awoke to the realization and concern that, as 
Benjamin Barber claims, collectively binding decisions address “those realms where truth 
is not – or is not yet – known”106 in that they had not deliberated sufficiently to project 
how this public action would be interpreted across their empire. Their deliberations then 
needed to evaluate not only their own State’s instrumental capabilities but also which 
means would most likely result in a desirable end, productive of their common good. The 
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quality of their reasoning together and their judgments depended upon their knowledge of 
both their means and what the citizenry would accept as a satisfactory end.  It is this need 
for knowledge necessary for arriving at just political judgments that drives the anti-
democratic concern and critique about whether or not the citizenry has the requisite 
knowledge to make such judgments. Without this knowledge the self-rule of the people in 
general cannot be justified. 
The “anti-democratic” claim, that the one or few possess superior knowledge 
“relevant to all spheres of activity which make up the larger political sphere of a society,” 
fuels the critique that select individuals, acting as society’s guardians, are the only ones 
who “should rule.”107 In support of this argument some advocates for a system of 
governance other than democracy fashion their critique too strongly and thus open it up 
to a simple response. For instance, when Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that 
a “direct assembly” might not produce the “best laws,” “public policies” or “deliberative 
justifications”108 their contention is undeniable, simply because it is true that any 
collectively binding decision-making body is susceptible to such errors. The question 
really centers on if the people actually possess the political knowledge collectively 
binding decision-making requires so that, as Thomas Cronin argues, “the quality of our 
laws and constitutions … [do not] suffer.”109 Without knowing the necessary requisite 
information, having focused attention and demonstrating a capacity to “understand [the] 
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technical issues” involved, too many of the citizenry would “simply be confused”110 to 
generate quality decisions. 
In addressing this criticism, Michael Saward argues that the knowledge necessary 
for producing quality collectively binding decisions “requires a mix” of superior 
“knowledge of both means and ends”111 or what he refers to as contingent and non-
contingent knowledge.  When proposals to remedy a public problem are innovative, 
before making a collectively binding decision the participants need to know if the 
differing proposals can feasibly be attained. On the other hand proposals founded on 
existing solutions can potentially lead to further decisions about the best means to bring 
those proposals to fruition. In both cases, “contingent superior knowledge,” which 
concerns the “technical means to a given end,”112 is necessary. In the instance of the 
Athenian’s first ruling on the Mytilenaean insurrection the Assembly might have 
requested deliberation about the best means to deliver the order, how to carry out the 
execution order and who would sell the women and children and profit from the 
transaction. Or perhaps, the trierarchs –captains– of several triremes might have been 
called in, to provide the Assembly with the information needed for the citizens to make a 
determination as to which ship and crew was most prepared and rested to undertake the 
arduous task of speedily rowing to Mytilene in order to rescind the decree of execution 
and slavery. As captains of their own ships their specific and specialized expertise could 
inform the Athenian Assembly of the likely success or failure of the new decree reaching 
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Mytilene in time. Consequently, an individual with contingent superior knowledge has 
expertise in a particular field of specialization, affording its possessor a level of authority 
to posit whether or not an end is achievable. Expertise, limited to a particular field, then 
allows one to “only make limited claims”113 regarding “what is the most effective way to 
realize [a] particular goal.”114 In other words, an individual with superior contingent 
knowledge realistically can only authoritatively advise an assembly regarding the “limited 
sphere of conduct” in which his or her “body of knowledge is appropriate.”115 Superior 
knowledge that is contingent upon technical expertise then “is widely accepted and 
acceptable” when restricted to “how to achieve a certain state of affairs that are given as 
desirable,”116 but is not sufficient to wrest away from the people their power for self-rule.  
Beyond the inadequacy that the limitations of specialization creates for superior 
contingent knowledge, Kenneth Burke, notes that the motives of technical experts 
provides an impediment to any claim that they could provide a  primary basis for 
collectively binding decisions.
117
  Concerned with how to accomplish a task an expert is 
not motivated to consider how the accomplishment will be a “participant in a wider 
contexts of motives.”118 The “morality” of a “technical expert requires only that he apply 
himself to his task as effectively as possible” without regard as to “what the new force 
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might mean, as released into a social texture emotionally and intellectually.”119 Even 
when the affect on a particular social texture is considered, the depths of a technical 
expert’s inquiry likely will extend only so far as to develop reasoning that justify the 
endeavor. Still lacking would be an investigation into how the implications of a pursued 
end would infiltrate and link to the lives and livelihood of others within society and 
beyond. In other words, these experts seek to complete tasks without asking how the 
outcome relates to and impacts societal members in general. So while collectively 
binding decisions typically warrant inclusion of superior contingent knowledge for 
ascertaining the means to an innovative end or the application of a previously employed 
end to a new context it is not the primary knowledge necessary for governance. 
In linking collectively binding decisions to the morality of motives Burke 
provides a window into the knowledge upon which the decision-making process in 
governance –the political arena of the public realm– fundamentally rests. Political 
decisions, involve, as Mark Warren contends, “factual issues [that] are intermingled with 
normative and expressive issues,”120 and therefore should be informed by contingent 
knowledge, but ultimately are formed through what Saward calls non-contingent 
knowledge. This knowledge, according to Benjamin Barber, flows out of a particular 
“context of history and experience” that provides the ground from which decisions about 
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“a future realm of common action”121 are made. Saward frames this knowledge as “a type 
of moral knowledge” that identifies “the right end to pursue.”122 Morality is implicated in 
public problems, for they pose public questions about what end has the greatest potential 
to actualize the community good –what is the good for the community. 
The debate between Diodotus and Cleon during the second Assembly, over the 
fate of the Mytilenaeans, demonstrates the differing moral ground that formed their 
respective opposing interests and arguments. Cleon, concerned that to change course 
would “display a weakness which spells danger,” held that the true and good principles to 
follow were of “domination based on force”123 and retributive justice based on 
“vengeance.”124 Certainly Cleon shared Diodotus’ motivation to formulate a path that 
resulted in “the good of [the] … city” being realized, but Diodotus desired to achieve the 
Athenian’s “future security” through an “opposite conclusion” that maximized their 
“practical advantage.”125 For Diodotus a policy that punished rebels, whether they 
surrender early or late, with such a penalty would only strengthen the resolve of any 
future revolutionaries. With no hope of mercy, they would “make thorough preparations” 
and “hold out to the very last under siege.”126 In doing so, the Athenians’ financial 
expenditures would increase due to the extended reclamation campaign, their victory 
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would return a vanquished and “ruined city” and as such they would “los[e] all 
subsequent revenue from”127 future reparations and tribute its people would have 
provided. Further, Diodotus argued that by judging the innocent –the common people– 
the same as the guilty –the oligarchy– the Athenians would force common people to 
wholeheartedly embrace elite led rebellions as their only hope for survival.
128
 
Preservation of financial solvency and the utility of “tolerat[ing] injustice”129 to secure 
future strategic ends provided the moral grounds upon which he built his arguments that 
supported a reprieve for the common people of Mytilene. These “moral choices,”130 
expressed through the judgments and arguments of Cleon and Diodutus, are reflective, as 
well as productive, of their conflicting interests. 
While a citizenry typically shares in a common cultural context their lived 
experiences facilitate different shades of morality and interests “dependent upon [their] 
social understandings” and “social interests.”131 These interests, Saward suggests, are 
constituted and vary according to societal members’ “distinct sphere[s] of activity.”132 
Each individual, never occupying just a single sphere, exhibiting “a bundle of 
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overlapping and sometimes conflicting concerns,”133 put under the necessity of choice 
negotiates his or her interlocking interests in order to judge which should be privileged in 
the decision-making process. The importance and necessity of this insight is captured in 
Montaigne’s aphorism that “the birth, increase, and augmentation of every thing, is the 
alteration and corruption of another.”134 In other words, public decisions commit societal 
resources and obligate its members to particular collective actions, directing those 
resources and members away from their other interests and potentialities. A collectively 
binding decision institutionalizes through choice, action and the application of 
community resources certain interests, privileging and validating them over others. Those 
interests passed over therefore are deemed less significant in the particular instance and 
possibly for future public problems. Consequently, the knowledge required to make and 
justify a collectively binding decision needs to account for the varied interests of 
society’s distinct spheres, the individual processes that influence interest selection and 
relevant technical expertise. 
The finite knowledge of a person, even those with superior capacities, is not able 
to sufficiently comprehend the breadth of perspectives encompassed by citizens to justify 
ruling over or in place of the people. A single individual’s knowledge of the “world in its 
full reality” is inadequate since “the world only shows and reveals itself” through a 
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“standpoint” that “corresponds to” and “determine[s]” his or her “perspective.”135 
Knowledge of the world, Arendt contends, begins with a recognition that it is:  
something shared by many people, lies between them, separates and links them, 
showing itself differently to each and comprehensible only to the extent that many 
people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one 
another, over against one another.
136
  
The world as constituted and construed through the complexity of human spheres of 
activities and individual standpoints then is a phenomenon that stands against the 
capacity of an individual or a select few to know what a citizenry will deem as an 
appropriate end that addresses even a particular public problem. As a result, without this 
knowledge the rule of the one or the few cannot be justified. It is only the citizens, 
collectively constituting the non-contingent knowledge of appropriate ends necessary to 
judge between conflicting proposals for collectively binding decisions, deliberating 
concurrently together, who are endowed with means to most effectively rule justly.
137
 
Not only are the people, collectively deliberating, the only true source for superior 
non-contingent knowledge, but it is through their empowered engagement in the 
collectively binding decision-making process that the quality of contingent and non-
contingent knowledge is enhanced. Regarding contingent knowledge, technical expertise 
about advocated means is furthered when users can relate their experience with similar 
previous endeavors or their perspectives on the functionality of innovative proposals. 
Aristotle argued this point persuasively through three simple examples:  
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the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user … of the 
house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge 
better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than 
the cook.
138
 
To extend Aristotle’s insight through the contribution of Burke, previously noted, a 
technical expert can become focused on making an innovation functional within the 
narrow parameters of its operative design without considering its applicability once put 
into play in a context that can include instruments, variables, or uses outside its posited 
constraints. Citizens, who have to live through the means gestating the end and the end 
once birthed, in democracy are empowered to convey to those with superior contingent 
knowledge how, when, and where their means might suffer from an oversight or a lack of 
contextual knowledge.  
Both contingent and non-contingent knowledge are strengthened through the 
empowered participation of the citizenry due to the flattening of the political power 
hierarchy. In a democratic assembly individual citizens are equal peers in regards to their 
rights, responsibilities and privileges. Warren argues that when an institutional design 
employs a multilayered hierarchy in which greater power is held by those individuals in 
privileged positions “the incentive for subordinates to use their information 
strategically”139 is intensified. In equalizing the power relations between citizens, 
democracy “encourage[s] cooperative relations” and “enhances flows of reliable 
information.”140 With the advantage of withholding relevant information mitigated 
decision-makers, confronted with a public problem, necessitating a public response 
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through collective, cooperative behaviors will be more likely to make collectively 
binding decisions that reflect the full extent of the collective knowledge existent within 
the actual, affected community.  
The non-contingent knowledge of the people, expressive of multiple perspectives 
revealed through their “speaking with one another”141 strengthens the decision-making 
process. At a practical level, the space of a democratic assembly in which participants are 
allowed to freely express and exchange information, Warren states, “can serve” as a place 
“to pool information, and pooled information should result in better decisions.”142 Even 
more significant, Arendt argues, is that through addressing others over against one 
another “the world ... emerge[s]”143 as individuals conceive of their embedded 
experiences; thereby revealing, constituting and transforming their knowledge of a 
particular context. By publicizing one’s knowledge and interests about a particular 
problem, citizens who operate from a differing sphere of activity add to their 
understanding of the world in general and the affects of a current or proposed collectively 
binding decision. Additionally, if knowledge is authored in a past then and there to be 
applied to a future then and there and that knowledge is not commonly known, it is 
through the process of talking publically –turning focused attention on to an unattended 
then and there– that calls forth the knowledge and transforms it into an attended to here 
and now. In talking to others knowledge of the world does emerge for its participants and 
as it emerges empowered citizens can (re)shape it through their communication and the 
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collective acts that they sanction. Consequently, what is deemed an appropriate end to a 
particular, public problem is not just known more thoroughly by the people; knowledge 
about just and sufficient means and ends is generated through their coming together to 
talk as empowered citizens. 
The dynamic nature of collectively binding decisions that address public problems 
through future cooperative acts are best informed by the knowledge of the people. Yet 
even in a democracy that empowers the people as citizens for self-rule cannot draw upon 
sufficient knowledge to guarantee future outcomes.  As Thomas Jefferson claimed, the 
people cannot “be all, and always, well informed.”144 To ensure the capacity of the 
people to make good decisions and correct poor ones that led to negative outcomes 
Jefferson argued that the people simply needed to be “inform[ed] of their discretion by 
education.”145 The best means of educating the citizenry for any knowledge they lack 
about a particular problem or concerning governance in general is best supplied through 
actual participation in the decision-making process. For Jefferson there was no substitute 
for actual engaged participation, as he noted that for himself “forty years of experience in 
government [was] worth a century of book-reading.”146 Experience teaches participants 
what they should and need to know, allowing them to focus their attention and concern 
on areas that will yield productive results and while avoiding wasteful diversions. By 
including the citizenry in the sphere of activity of self-rule, following Saward and Burke, 
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their interests and motives will change to include a pursuit of knowledge relevant for 
engaged participation as well. Benjamin Barber makes this claim, stating that 
“knowledge and the quest for knowledge tend to follow rather than precede political 
engagement.”147 Therefore the best way to educate the people, in matters even in which 
their knowledge is lacking, is through their empowered and engaged participation in 
actually making collectively binding decisions.  
Without the public, political space necessitated by direct democracy there should 
be no surprise in the people’s indifference and knowledge deficit. This claim is not new 
or novel, for even Plato, a witness of the Athenian Assembly, argued that “the soul 
acquires knowledge and is kept going and improved by learning and practice” and that 
through “inactivity, dullness, and neglect of exercise, it learns nothing and forgets what it 
has learned.”148 The ignorance of the people then is not a deficit that empowers the few to 
wrest governance away from the people, but indicates a deficit by the government in the 
discharge of its duties to ensure the public good.
149
 Governing society requires 
knowledge of the means (contingent) and ends (non-contingent) to justly and 
satisfactorily address public problems. This knowledge can be either acquired by the 
people through consultation with those who have relevant, specialized expertise or is 
constituted, secured and applied most thoroughly when the collected, distributive 
knowledge (non-contingent) of the people emerges through a collectively binding 
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decision-making process. When the people are empowered to self-rule they are motivated 
to be well informed and when well informed, Jefferson argued, “they can be trusted with 
their own government; that, whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, 
they may be relied on to set them to rights.”150 Consequently, it is the knowledge of the 
people that is sufficient for self-rule and arguments that contend that the one or the few 
have superior knowledge, which should elevate their authority within the governance of 
society, are arguments that are ultimately meant to only maintain the rule of the one or 
the few over the many. 
The Impermanency of Democratic Decisions 
Democracy is for the living, and the living are always democratically empowered 
to change their founding democratic constitution.  
–Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
Another justification for direct democracy is that the collectively binding 
decisions making process of an assembly that generates policies are or should be 
considered provisional. Extolling the merits of democracy, Josiah Ober, pointed out that 
“among democracy’s virtues is revisability – the potential of the political regime to 
rethink and to reform itself.”151 For instance, due to the dynamic nature of political 
contexts, a decision reached through deliberation that was justifiable at one point in time 
might lose it backing in the future or might be deemed untenable and unjust once 
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enacted.
152
 The story about Mytilene portrays this need well when the Athenians, 
recognizing the weight of their previous decision, choose to revisit its value. Certainly, 
the “aim” of an assembly’s deliberation rightly should be “a justifiable decision”; yet this 
goal “does not presuppose that the decision … will in fact be justified.”153 In advocating 
for deliberative democracy, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, contend that 
democratic decision-making should be revisable and consequently its moral principles 
and political policies should be held as provisional.
154
 
“Provisionality – openness to change over time –”155 is founded in reasoning that 
entails two arguments about political policymaking. First, as was highlighted in the 
response to the criticism about knowledge, political decision-making is imperfect in that 
it addresses possibilities entangled with future exigencies. Also, due to the conflictual 
nature of political decision-making most collectively binding decisions are not likely to 
be consensual and therefore those citizens who advocate for an alternative policy will be 
“more likely to accept [the ruling] if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify 
it in the future.”156 These two reasons for a provisional principle indicate that a 
democracy should be both morally provisional in that its principles invite revision in 
response to new or new interpretations of philosophical insights or empirical 
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discoveries
157
 and politically provisional since its policies should be “open to actual 
reconsideration and revision at a future time.”158 Diodotus assumed both of these claims 
during his speech before the Athenian Assembly. In his response to Cleon, who 
advocated for total annihilation claimed “that imperfect laws kept valid give greater 
strength to a city than good laws unenforced,”159 he argued that the decree should be 
revised so as to not “judg[e] the offenders by the strict letter of the law” but by 
“restrict[ing] the blame [for the rebellion] as narrowly as possible.”160 In doing so, 
Diodotus contended for a particular moral interpretation of how to apply the law and for a 
revision of the resolution to destroy the Mytilenaens.  
Ober’s revisibility and Gutmann and Thompson’s provisionality, reflect what 
John Dryzek, holds to be “at least part of what it means to be a democrat.”161 He argues 
that “the practice of effective listening has to be central to any discursive democracy”162 
and through listening to others a democratic citizenry should “be open to challenges of 
[their] interpretations.”163 Democratic deliberation, according to Gutmann and 
Thompson, much like could be found in an assembly, should engage in an ongoing 
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interaction “in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the 
basis of the criticism.”164 In Athens, claims Ober, “the willingness to contemplate change 
may be regarded as an innate characteristic of democratic political culture.”165 It is upon 
this “capacity for nondestructive political change”166  that the next response to the 
criticisms of knowledge and justice rests. 
Oversight of Democratic Decisions that is Accountable to the People 
And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, That they that are at controversie, submit 
their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.
167
 
–Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
wealth Ecclesiasticall or Civill 
If a local assembly’s collectively binding decision is found to be wanting, as 
demonstrated in the Athenian case, a higher order of functionary or a higher gradation of 
authority would be able to determine that the policy should be reconsidered prior to 
implementation. John Stuart Mill alludes to this contention, using the representative 
model, when he contended that “experience is daily forcing upon the public a conviction 
of the necessity of having at least inspectors appointed by the general government, to see 
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that the local officers do their duty.”168 The general government or the greater republics, 
in Jeffersonian terms, would therefore serve as an umpire for the elementary republics. 
The idea of the umpire is instructive for initiating an instrumental means of constructing a 
third response to criticism that direct democracy can lead to unjust policies. John Locke 
claimed: 
And thus all private judgement of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules; indifferent, and the 
same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the 
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any 
members of that society….169 
Gerald Gaus, drawing from Hobbes, Locke, and Kant
170
 posits that when a decision-
making process breaks down due to conflicting judgments based on private reasons about 
a future course (policy), an umpire can provide a means to continue forward by applying 
public reasoning.
171
 The umpire, working from laws established prior to the rendering of 
a judgment,
172
 deliberates on the particular circumstance in order to arrive at a resolution. 
The parties in conflict accept the umpire’s ruling “as being in authority, not an 
authority.”173 Consequently, the conflicting parties’ agreement to abide by the umpire’s 
decision does not imply that their private reasoning or belief was not valid in general, but 
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was invalidated in the particular public case.
174
 If the members of the community/society 
begin to suspect that the umpire continually makes rulings that seem to not follow the 
pre-established laws the community can remove the umpire from his or her position.
175
 
While this oversight function of the umpire, supposes an individual in the role of 
“ARBITRATOR,”176 it does not necessarily have to fall to a single judge.  
In the case of the Athenian Assembly’s initial judgment concerning the 
Mytilenaens there was not necessarily a conventional political body to provide oversight. 
Instead, after the decision was made and the first trireme was launched, the people acted 
as an umpire body, calling for the Assembly to reevaluate the deadly decision. The 
Athenians, acting in accord with their position as an empowered people, reconvened the 
Assembly so that the decision could be weighed through additional deliberation and 
debate. Fortunately for the people of Mytilene, the Athenian decision-making process 
arrived at a different conclusion and the crew of the second trireme was able to deliver 
the reprieve in time.  
In contemporary terms, overlaying the umpire model of policy oversight onto 
Jefferson’s system of republics, a higher gradation of authority could also fulfill this 
function. The higher authority, deliberating on the decision would then determine and 
publicize why and how the collectively binding decision of the assembly fell short. In 
addition, if the ruling determined that the policy was unjust, the power vested in the 
umpire body could only send the judgment back to the Assembly for reconsideration. 
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These deliberations of the umpire body would produce two key benefits. First, the 
deliberations could serve as intellectual, epistemological and generative resources for the 
assembly to consider prior to and during the subsequent meeting(s) just as the 
deliberations of that assembly could have been instructive to members of the umpire 
body. The publicized public reasoning of the umpire body could function as a means of 
expanding the scope of knowledge the assembly considers in its decision-making process, 
thereby likely acting in a transformative, educational role for the community. In addition, 
the decision to send back the Assembly’s initial policy would make visible the character 
of the umpire body’s members and its individual members’ interpretation of the law. If an 
assembly’s collectively binding decisions are continually invalidated, the people would 
have empirical and epistemological evidence that the representatives of the umpire body 
should be returned to the status of common citizen. 
Conclusion 
Singularly and in total these critiques of direct democracy have exerted a strong 
influence over considerations of its viability as a means for contemporary governance. 
For successive generations these criticisms have been employed to deny the people their 
right to self-rule and preserve the few in positions of power. While the responses 
provided here offer rebuttals to these arguments further reasoning still needs to be 
presented to establish the need for incorporation of direct democracy into the institutional 
structure of contemporary governance. In order to defend what many would consider to 
be radical conceptual and institutional changes a number of arguments will need to be 
explicated in the remaining chapters. The arguments presented will outline conceptual 
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and institutional justifications for what will be referred to as democratic rhetoric and 
democratic rhetoric.  
Dissertation Chapter Summaries 
In the following chapter, justifications for authentic democracy are given. For 
governance to be considered authentic it must recognize and be derived from the nature 
of human beings and society. In a state of nature individuals live according to the strength 
of their capacities and inherently enjoy certain liberties. These capacities and liberties can 
serve to separate and position human beings as opponents through the struggle for status 
and power. Individual human beings experience a drive to close the space between them 
through identifications that are made possible through the use of language. Coming 
together individuals, seeking to secure their own goods and the good life, establishes 
society, which then must be governed. Laying the foundational characteristics for 
authentic governance through this line of exploration, it is concluded that authentic 
democracy is the only form of governance able to meet these criteria.  
Chapter Three develops the democratic rhetoric project. Building off of the 
characteristics of human nature and society the core criteria of authentic governance and 
democracy is explicated. The foundations of rhetoric are developed with particular 
attention paid to the process of invention. As a communicative event the nature of 
symbolic meaning and its architecture are explained through macro-culture as well as 
through habitus and communication communities is explained. From these insights 
characteristics of democratic rhetoric are generated, which is then followed by a 
discussion of its outcomes.  
56 
Chapter Four explicates ideology and a method for ideological analysis prior to 
providing an application to ancient Athenian democratic ideology. Ideology as another 
level of the cultural meaning system is defined and extended into a method for critical 
analysis of different cultural phenomena. Ideologies are proposed to be useful as means 
for distinguishing differences across macro- and micro-cultures. The method is then 
employed to demarcate the core constructs of ancient Athenian democracy, which is 
shown to provide a strong connection to the characteristics required by authentic 
governance.  
Chapter Five extends the ideological analysis by investigating the ideology of 
American governance, particularly at the time of the founders and framers. As the 
analysis is developed the distinctions from it and authentic governance are highlighted 
establishing American governance as falling short of authenticity. The veil of democracy, 
used to legitimize American governance is lifted and critiqued. The discussion then 
continues and ends by addressing and critiquing contemporary scholarly accounts of 
democracy. 
The final chapter provides a brief review of authentic governance and democratic 
rhetoric as a means to set up the criteria for the development of a rhetorical democracy. 
The Athenian material manifestations –practices, performances, institutions, and 
infrastructures– of their ideology of democracy are then developed as a model for 
application into the contemporary urban setting. This model is then argued to be a 
feasible means for providing the people –citizenry– with an authentic means of 
governance.
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CHAPTER TWO: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AUTHENTIC DEMOCRACY  
 
Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is … his work. It is this 
work, it is the system of human activities, which defines and determines the circle 
of “humanity.” Language, myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents, 
the various sectors of this circle. 
 
–Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human 
Culture 
 
Introduction: Justifications for Authentic Democracy 
Philosophical musings about what form governance should take is deeply rooted 
in perspectives about human nature and existence. The importance of this claim is found 
in the reply of Glaucon to Socrates. Socrates stated that “governments vary as the 
dispositions of men vary” to which Glaucon replied that “States are as the men are, they 
grow out of human characters.”177 To effectively govern an individual, knowing his or 
her nature informs the types of institutional designs necessary. Knowledge of character 
and its influence is aptly summarized by Michael Sandel:  
For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor 
command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices and conduct. It 
draws me closer to some and more distant from others; it makes some aims more 
appropriate, others less so.
178
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Present day political philosophers have rich, historical resources to draw upon when they 
conceptualize the character or nature of human beings. To posit the character of an 
authentic democracy, it is necessary to develop an understanding of human nature and 
existence as they relate to society, citizenship, and the decisional process in the public or 
political realm.  
Human Nature and Existence 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) articulated a similar 
ideology about the core of human nature and existence in relation to humanity’s 
aspirations and need for common governance. Their base assumption is reflected in 
Goethe’s poetic phrase: “Yet it is inborn in every man that his feeling should press 
upward and forward.”179 In the Leviathan, Hobbes, contends that prior to common 
governance humanity exists in a state of nature and in that state, “nature hath made men 
… equall, in the faculties of body, and mind.”180 As such when two individuals realize 
that they both desire the same thing, which cannot be mutually possessed, they end up 
being adversaries.
181
 This state of equality imposes upon these two contestants, desirous 
of the same end, a need to resort to “force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men [so 
that one] can” in vain attempt “secure himselfe”182 and possessions. Having a nature, 
shaped by fear, resulting from an inability to achieve a sense of security in one’s person 
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and property, human beings become antagonistic, conditioned to be in a state of war.
183
 
For Hobbes, this “nature of War” creates an incessant reality that forms within human 
nature a “known disposition”184 that is predicated on “the naturall Passions of men.”185 
Under the “continuall feare, and danger of violent death” two facts emerge. First, since 
the possibility “for Industry” is impractical, the possibilities for “culture”, trade, large 
scale infrastructure, scientific discovery, an “account of Time”, the “Arts … Letters … 
[and] Society”186 are void. In addition, without society “nothing can be Unjust” and 
therefore “the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have … no place.”187 To 
survive, according to Hobbes, the virtues of “Force and Fraud” become virtuous.188 In 
turn this inability of human beings who are unable to rise above their equality, fear, and 
state of war suffer a life that is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”189 Human 
nature and existence then is defined by fear, a desire for security, and is malleable to the 
state one is thrust into by contingency of birth.  
Locke posits no less of a dire vision of human nature shaped by the state of 
nature. Human beings possess “liberty” to pursue “whatsoever [one] thinks fit for the 
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preservation of himself and others.”190 This liberty or “law common to them all” unites 
humanity into “one community,”191 a community that is fractured through the 
“corruption, and viciousness of degenerate men.”192 Based on the common law to do as 
each see fit, Locke argues that human beings hold another liberty, found in their “power 
to punish … crimes committed against that law.”193 Human beings, in this account, 
naturally seek the preservation of their own person and that of affiliated others. When the 
common law is transgressed, individuals possess the power to remedy the situation 
through punishing the violator(s). Human nature and existence is found in and the fear of 
loss of the two liberties: (1) the power to pursue one’s desired ends and (2) the power to 
punish degenerates who violate the first liberty.  
While in Locke’s view, nature provides for a primal law that all humanity is 
subject to and consequently establishes a basis from which to conceive of a notion of just 
and unjust acts, he still presents a perspective of human nature and existence that 
overlaps with the one offered by Hobbes. The picture of human nature and existence that 
both have passed on is one in which human beings, being equal and constituting one 
community, formed by the travails rendered in the state of nature and through a want for 
security or the preservation of the liberty to pursue necessities, are divided from one 
another driven by fear of loss at the hands of competitors or the corrupted. For Locke 
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justice is obtained through the power to punish and even though in Hobbes’ formulation, 
(in)justice cannot exist, humanity is ultimately compelled to create a common power in 
order to establish a means to obtain justice.  
A more positive conception of human nature and existence, that reaches back to 
ancient Athens, challenges the primacy of the one presented by Hobbes and Locke. This 
tradition, prominently brought forth in the work of Aristotle, also finds representation in 
the words of Goethe: “it is only in ceaseless activity that man is himself.”194 Blaise Pascal 
made a similar claim about human nature and existence when he wrote that “our nature 
consists in movement; absolute rest is death.”195 To what end is this ceaseless activity or 
movement oriented toward. For in truth, Goethe and Pascal could be alluding to the 
dangerous inclinations that Hobbes and Locke claim define human nature and existence 
and yet the point to focus on is that within human nature there is a proclivity for action.  
Through the gift of nature, human beings are “endowed with … speech” and due 
to this endowment they “set forth the expedient and inexpedient … the just and the 
unjust.”196 Due to this capacity to communicate through language, people can come 
together to decide upon pursuits that are conceived as advantageous for the individual 
and common just goods. Upon this reasoning Aristotle claimed that human beings are “a 
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political animal.”197 In other words, human nature and existence, through the power of 
speech, is oriented towards an active creation of community.  
Kenneth Burke seems to follow this line of thought as he constructs his idea of 
human nature and existence. Humans, overlap fundamentally in that they exist as 
individuated beings. He argues that due to the “‘principle of individuation’ … we are 
born and die one by one, with certain pleasures and pains experienced immediately, 
bodily, and not identically experienceable by others.”198 Division “is a universal fact” 199 
that for all of humanity originates at conception and “is gradually developed during 
gestation.”200 Through division humanity experiences physical and cognitive 
separateness; meaning that one person cannot directly experience another’s sensations201 
or even transfer one’s own thought through the mediation of communication into the 
mind of another. In a state of division human beings are, reflecting Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, dependent on the mediation of their gift of language and speech to narrow 
the gaps between them. The first definition of human beings then, for Burke, is that they 
are “symbol-using animals.”202 Instead of being driven by fear though, the state of 
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division and the ability to communicate, provide individuals with a motivation and means 
to rectify the state of “segregation” through acts of “congregation.”203 In order to 
overcome their division, individuals rhetorically attempt to persuade other’s to join 
together in some type of common affiliation. Consequently, as rhetoric is concerned with 
rectifying division, it is through rhetoric that one attempts to influence others to bridge 
the divide and find communion.
204
 The fountainhead of all rhetorical attempts then is 
division and the remedy for division comes through a proclamation of the need for 
“unity.”205 
Division produces a deep sense of loss in people, so much so that individuals 
suffer from a “yearning for unity”206 that is fulfilled through identifying with others. 
What is at the center of this loss though? If the nature of human beings, in the first 
instance and actual lived experience is division and individuation, then as the nature state, 
what could be lost? To lose a thing implies previous possession. A possible response, 
following Burke’s reasoning and yet contrary to his position that division begins at 
conception, would be to acknowledge that at conception until birth, a mother and child 
are united through a symbiotic relationship and that human existence within nature relies 
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upon sexual union to produce its own continuation. In this formulation unity becomes the 
first instance, division the actual lived experience, only occasionally interrupted in part 
through congress between a man and woman and completely when sexual union is 
productive of a new life. 
In this formulation, division then, which is the natural state of lived existence for 
individuals, is an unnatural state of being for any sort of congregation. Burke’s notions of 
how to engender a sense of unity or congregation rest upon the rhetoric of identification. 
When one person recognizes, acknowledges or assumes that s/he identifies with another 
then s/he is persuaded to join together with another.
207
 The process of identification, at its 
core, is to perceive about a belief, attitude, judgment, interest, and/or an act a point of 
unity between two or more people. Being persuaded, the individual now shares a similar 
motivation in regards to that which the two (or more) identify.  This process of eliciting 
identification rests upon Burke’s ideas about substance –one’s essence– and 
consubstantiation, meaning to “unite in one common substance or nature.”208 
“Consubstantiality” he argued, “either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way 
of life,” because “substance … is an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in 
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that 
make them consubstantial.”209 Consequently, since humanity is divided and yet driven to 
rectify their separateness, men and women are attuned to acting-together through 
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identification. The human drive to eliminate division, for Burke, then is a powerful 
intrinsic human attribute and motivation. It is through both, division and identification, 
which Burke’s notions of human nature and existence emerge and provides support for 
Aristotle’s contention that human beings actively pursue cooperative and common 
community.  
Another characteristic of human nature and existence, framed by Goethe’s phrase, 
ceaseless activity, alluded to in Burke’s definition of consubstantiality, is at the forefront 
of thought in Hannah Arendt’s work. Through acting in and upon the world individuals 
find a “treasure … that is composed of two interconnected parts.”210 Within an act people 
remove “all masks” and “create … public space … between themselves where freedom 
[can] appear.”211 These goods, the unveiling of self, creation of public space, and the 
appearance of freedom come into play, due to “the fact that man is a being endowed with 
the gift of action.”212 Arendt contends that there is a relationship between action, 
ultimately realized in the realm of politics, and freedom. To be able to act and engage in 
politics one must be free.
213
 Extending her argument, the nature of the relationship must 
be reciprocal in that to be free one also must be able to act and therefore engage in the 
political. Through this trinity of human “capabilities and potentialities,”214 a foundation 
                                                 
210
 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political 
Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 4. 
 
211
 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 4. 
 
212
 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 144. 
 
213
 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 144-145. 
 
 66 
upon human nature and existence is constructed that supports Aristotle’s claim that 
human beings are political animals. 
Human nature and existence in the negative conceptualizations of Hobbes and 
Locke and in the positive, explicated through the ideas of Aristotle, Burke and Arendt, 
should not be viewed as standing in opposition to each other. Instead, each makes 
particular points about human nature and existence, their emphasis providing a basis from 
which to build further claims about humanity, experience, and society. As will become 
evident, to focus on the negative conception is productive of a certain vision and type of 
society and its governance. The same holds true to the productive capabilities of the 
positive conception. These claims seem to follow Glaucon’s assertion about the character 
of the people of a State shaping its character, and yet it diverges from his claim in that it 
is not the character of a State’s citizenry, but the assessment of the citizen’s nature and 
existence by those with the power to influence the design and character of the State. To 
move beyond this either/or, it is important to hold the implications of both. 
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From Nature to Society 
The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial 
choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited level 
of the material and intellectual culture. The choice … anticipates specific modes 
of transforming and utilizing man and nature and rejects other modes. It is one 
‘project’ of realization among others. But once the project has become operative 
in the basic institutions and relations, it tends to become exclusive and to 
determine the development of the society as a whole. ...As the project unfolds, it 
shapes the entire universe of discourse and action…. 
–Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society 
 
Progression from a brutish, solitary existence to one in which individuals join 
together in a society of others occurs, according to Hobbes, when people recognize that 
the only way to secure “their own preservation, and … a … more contented life” is to 
submit to a “visible Power” that will “keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of 
punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of 
Nature.”215 Necessary to instituting covenants that instigate the formation of a 
“COMMON-WEALTH … that great LEVIATHAN,” is “to erect such a Common 
Power” that protects people and possession from dispossession either through force or 
deception.
216
  A common power, in which the people “conferre all the power and strength 
… reduce all their Wills,” is established when a form of governance is chosen to wield 
the collective power and will of those in society. Consequently, once empowered the 
judgment of the one or few becomes the ground from which “Act[s] … concerne[d with] 
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the Common Peace and Safetie”217 or “the Common Benefit”218 are justified and 
“SOVERAIGNE.”219  
Without this power the benefits of “Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in 
summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to”220 and all the fruits of industry could 
not be obtained, maintained, or made secure. Ruling through “the Sword” is required, in 
Hobbes view, in order to limit the “naturall Passions” that lead to “Partiality, Pride, 
Revenge, and the like.”221 Constrained by fear of punishment individuals, who under the 
state of nature were able to resort to their “own strength and art”222 now must turn to the 
covenant and the Sovereign for justice. For the preservation of society it is also important 
that the common power respond to the internal threats of the ambitious, those who 
“thinke themselves wiser … abler to govern, …[and] better than the rest,” because if not 
checked they will “bring … Distraction and Civill warre.”223 The organization of society 
then, is a scheme of self and communal protection by deputing power and submitting to 
the will of the one or the few.  
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Impellent of this construction is Hobbes’ view of human nature and existence that 
primarily emphasized the equality, power, fear, and security of the individual. In the state 
of society, individuals relinquish their equality, exhibited in their power and will, 
imbuing one or the few with the right to rule over them through an “Artificiall”224 
covenant. By doing so, the people transform their natural state in order to enable a 
collective in which industry and its goods can flourish. This transformation from 
freedom, secures their persons and possessions, at the cost of making them “Subjects” of 
the ruler(s).
225
 The nature of society and common-wealth, consequently, is one that is also 
defined by fear, power, security, and is composed a collective of individuals who 
hierarchically are positioned as ruler(s) or subjects.  
While Hobbes prioritizes equality and fear, Locke’s vision of the nature of society 
rests upon liberty and fear. Individuals, in the state of nature, are the masters of their own 
domain and yet they willing “part with freedom” and “give up [their] empire” to secure 
their property –“lives, liberties, and estates.”226 Failing to do so subjects one’s property 
and the “enjoyment of … [each] very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of 
others.”227 For Locke, the “chief end … [for] uniting into commonwealths … is the 
preservation of [one’s] property.”228 In other words, motivating individuals toward 
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forfeiture of their own self-rule, is the ruin or fear of losing the property gained in and 
through nature’s liberty.  
In uniting in a commonwealth people secure two distinct advantages. The first 
remedies the lack endemic to the second liberty found in the state of nature. When 
lacking sufficient “power”229 to punish the unjust, who violate the common “law of 
nature” through self-interest or “ignoran[ce],” individuals desire “an established …law, 
received and allowed by common consent”230 that can be enforced by “a known and 
indifferent judge.”231 By consenting to an established law and yielding to an indifferent 
judge, individuals gain a “sanctuary ... [for] the preservation of their property.”232 
Instituting a law that the collective of individuals agree to also supplies reasoning for “the 
original right and rise of both the legislature and executive power.”233 The judge, found 
in the legislature and executive, are to be constrained by “standing laws, promulgated and 
known to the people”234 and his, her, or their end is the preservation of “the peace, safety, 
and public good of the people”235 or “the common good.”236 The collective, in which 
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individual power and liberty are given up, also provides for the attainment and enjoyment 
of the “many conveniences from the labour, assistance, and society of others”; secured by 
the “whole strength”237 of the community. Thus, an individual motivated in large part 
through fear, willing cedes a portion of his or her power and liberty, to shield the 
remaining portion by consenting and assenting to the rule of others. 
Stripping bare the nature of society from the particularities of Hobbes and 
Locke’s visions, it is possible to posit a tentative essence of society. Both conceptualize 
certain grounds and ends that serve as a lighthouse to guide the justifications for their 
reasoning about society. Hobbes argues that society exists for the protection of persons 
and possessions, while Locke claims that it primarily remedies a lack of power and 
secures benefits. What lies behind these views is the belief that the impetus of society is 
its ability to accomplish something beyond the scope of the power and ability of 
individuated individuals. The nature or essence of society then is to secure an end beyond 
the reach of the one that is made possible at the juncture of a collective of individuals and 
their power to act in the world. Working from a difference in emphasis, society does not 
necessarily have to build toward security driven by fear, but rather alternatively it can 
prioritize human and societal potentiality through the power to act.  
This second tradition begins to take shape through the words of Aristotle. “The 
purpose of a state,” he claimed, is accomplished when individuals, who do not 
necessarily “require one another’s help,” still “desire to live together” due to their 
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“common interests” in reaching a “measure of well-being.”238 He also claimed that, 
“every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in 
order to obtain that which they think good.”239 As such, community, society and its 
necessary governance moves beyond the preservation of “life only” to the facilitation of 
“a good life.”240 Just what a good life is, as Aristotle indicates, is an impetus for and is 
contingent on the community and societal members’ deliberations. In order to deliberate 
and make these types of decisions there must be a space for members to talk to each other 
and in which they are empowered so that their talk is influential and effective.  
Arendt, following this tradition, which was also inspirational for American 
revolutionary thought and spirit, argues that societal members, to obtain a good life, must 
have the means to realize their freedom or public happiness. Framing her notion of the 
nature of society, germane to this tradition, was summarized well when she wrote:  
…the actual content of political life – [consists] of the joy and the gratification 
that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and 
appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, 
thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something 
entirely new.
241
  
In this view, society is emergent from the potentiality inherent in human beings being 
together, identifying with one another and their shared ends through their ability to 
participate with each other in acts and communication. “To act, in its most general 
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sense,” Arendt claims, “means to take an initiative.”242 Since human existence is typified 
by an “otherness and distinction [that] become[s] uniqueness” initiating an act means that 
an individual is acting within a “human plurality”243 that is embedded in a historical and 
present “web of human relationships … woven by … deeds and words.”244 To realize this 
human potential for action within society then also necessitates that members must be 
empowered to act politically in order to freely form associations and governance. 
Freedom, according to Arendt, is not limited to the liberty to do what one sees fit 
in areas not constrained by the law, but also includes the means for the people to engage 
in their “share of public business.”245 To participate in “the discussions, the deliberations, 
and the making of decisions,”246 productive of the scope of governmental or “public 
power,” does not only secure individual freedom, but it also fosters public happiness 
individually and collectively.
247
 The liberty “to think and to speak” not only consent and 
assent, but also “difference …[through] free discussion,” according to Jefferson, had the 
power to transform public disturbances into a “horizon more bright and serene.”248 
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“Every country,” in which there is such freedom of thought and discussion, is, as he 
described America, a “happy country.”249 
Thomas Jefferson learned the importance of public freedom or happiness from the 
American experiences in self-rule prior to and during the revolution.
250
 The founders 
certainly knew that happiness lay in the private domain, but they also learned, according 
to Arendt, “that men ... could not be altogether ‘happy’ if their happiness was located and 
enjoyed only in private life.”251  An expression of this knowledge is found in Jefferson’s 
inclusion of the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence, in recognition 
that happiness was to be found in the freedom and power to pursue both private and 
public goods.
252
 Flying in the face of received “conventions,” the founders, in Arendt’s 
reading, discounted the beliefs that participation in the government was “a burden” and 
that “happiness was not located in the public realm.”253 Consequently, when John Adams 
claimed that “the happiness of society is the end of government”254 the conclusion should 
be that government must be restricted from infringing upon freedom and thereby 
happiness in the private domain, as well as empowering the citizenry to be full 
participators in the public or political domain.  
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Before preceding two possible objections to this tradition need to be addressed. 
The notion of happiness, private and public, is not one of a telos or a utilitarian objective 
that justifies as just collectively binding decisions on the grounds that it is productive of 
happiness. As in the enactment of liberty in the private realm, in which happiness results 
from one’s choices and acting on opportunities to realize one’s private goals, public 
freedom or happiness emerges out of being empowered and engaged in attending to one’s 
share of public business. This happiness is intrinsic to the process and wells up in the 
participants as they realize their identification with a community of others. Additionally, 
this tradition diverges from a notion that society is merely a collective of individuals. 
Instead it posits that through the power to act publically, societal members develop and 
share in, not a collective pursuant of goals that prosper individual ends, but a community 
which is formulative of individual and community identity and its ends are those that 
realize both the private and public well-being of its members.  
To be a participator in the public domain means that societal members who 
engage in the “realm of politics” address “the ultimate political problem … of action.”255 
As Benjamin Barber argues, “to be political is thus to be free with a vengeance – …under 
an ineluctable pressure to act, and to act with deliberation and responsibility as well.”256 
To be free involves being able to act politically. Accordingly, acting in freedom “must 
ensue from forethought and deliberation, from free and conscious choice.”257 This 
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necessitates opportunities to listen, discuss and debate with one another about the policy 
options available in order for participates to know, understand, judge and decide between 
the alternatives. The scope of actions that are within the purview of politics are those acts 
“of we,”258 where the divided I finds that s/he can identify with another or even the many. 
As such a political act should be constrained “to action that is both undertaken by a 
public and intended to have public consequences.”259 What is public and what is private 
are questions to which answers are contingent and should be delimited through the 
political acts of an engaged and empowered participatory citizenry.
260
 Engagement at this 
level with one’s community and society through the political means of “doing (or not 
doing), making (or not making) …changes the environment, or affects the world in some 
material way.”261 It also transforms the public space from “a way of life” into “a way of 
living” that is constructive of “mutual advantage” and an “advantage of [societal 
member’s] mutuality.”262 Living in community, when societal members are empowered 
to participate through making choices about public acts, are able to sanction and carry out 
those acts, is beneficial for the individual, as well as the community as a whole.  
This can be seen when considering that a society, at a primary level, is a 
community of people, not a collective of individuals, who want to live together to achieve 
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their common interests. As such, citizens need to be able “to make credible commitments 
to one another … for mutual gain.”263 In making credible commitments individual 
“differences and conflicts”264 are not effaced, but are, in part, resources that draw the 
community together as its members, transformed through the process into citizens, 
partake in deciding how to meet those challenges. Association within a community is 
primarily enabled through the capacity of human beings to communicate and since the 
community is composed of individuals that approach life and governance from different 
positions and perspectives, this plurality necessitates a particular type of communication. 
According to Carolyn R. Miller, it is the “rhetorical dimension of speech-deliberation 
about human actions” that engenders the possibility of “community life.”265 A “rhetorical 
community,” embodied through “the continuing opportunity – the forum – for debate, 
discussion, dialogue, dispute”266 provides the experience of “common rule-making and 
negotiating procedures”267 through which the citizenry and community is constituted. 
Society in this tradition is one that posits the community as being constituted and 
constitutive. In this perspective societal members constitute their communities through 
direct participation in the decision-making process and in turn deliberating with others is 
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constitutive of the individual’s identity as a citizen.268 As a constitutive circle, in which 
the individual is empowered to act and constitute the community and empowered 
participation in the community influences the constitution of the individual, the 
community then, according to Michael Sandel “describes not just what they have as 
fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary 
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of 
their identity.”269 The constitutive power of this relationship takes into account that the 
self is a historical construct brought forth through unique encounters with the world and 
others. Each citizen brings to the community an individuated point of reference, thereby 
creating a dynamic tension between the influence of the individual uptake of experience 
and the constitutive influence of his or her experience in a community of others. Instead 
of remaining in a state of division, interrupted by private moments of identification, the 
community then becomes a resource for working through division to produce ongoing 
means for consubstantiality. From this perspective, the community is “both pluralist and 
normative,” functioning through a “dynamic interaction” that is “mutually 
constitutive”270 of community and its citizenry. 
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Citizenship 
I believe that the question of political identity is crucial and that the attempt to 
construct ‘citizens’’ identities is one of the important tasks of democratic politics. 
–Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political 
An individual can be a member of a society or a community without being a 
citizen. Citizenship moves a societal member from being a subject to that of an active 
participant who is engaged in the workings of the political and thereby public realm. 
Arendt argues that “the world” is what “lies between people” and this “in-between”271 
has been severely diminished as people have withdrawn from the public realm. The 
pulling back from the public realm she claims is due to the belief that freedom entails a 
“freedom from politics.”272 By retreating from their role in politics, individuals have lost 
one of their primary means of enacting the in-between, where an illumination of human 
nature and existence, the nature of society, and the diversity, unity, and creativity that 
humanity is possible of is generated. The loss is in essence the space in which individuals 
discover and realize the bonds of their association with their fellow human beings.
273
 In 
conceiving the world and the political as a creation of the in-between that emerges when 
people engage with each other it is possible to understand that citizenship is an identity, 
like “every identity is relational.”274 It is in “the way we define” this relationship 
                                                 
271
 Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 4. 
 
272
 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 4. 
 
273
 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 5. 
 
274
 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 2. 
 80 
indicated in “citizenship” that is strongly constituent of “the kind of society and political 
community”275 that its members labor under or actively engage in. The characteristics 
associated with citizenship are productive of who is considered to be a citizen and as a 
form “of collective identifications”; not only constitutive of “a ‘we’” but also, as noted by 
Chantel Mouffe, a “delimitation … a ‘them’.”276 Citizenship is an exclusive domain that 
is indicative of who rules society, those subjected to their rule, and those others outside of 
its particular societal boundaries and scope of power.  
To distinguish the characteristics of a citizen is or should be, it is fruitful to first 
describe what a citizen is not. An individual who lives “under the law” of a society 
insofar as “the force of its law extends” and partakes of the “privileges and protection of 
it”277 is merely a denizen of that society and a subject of its governance. “Subjects” 
according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “extol the public tranquility … [and] prefer [the] 
security of possessions,” since they desire the benefits they can acquire, rather than what 
they can give to society.
278
 They are, in Barber’s estimation, “free-riders” who “act 
exclusively out of self-interest.”279 These individuals are “not taken into consultation” 
and have no or little voice when “the arbiters of their destiny”280 make collectively 
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binding decisions. Subjects and even denizens are not citizens in that they withdraw or 
are excluded from the public realm and political space that facilitate the constitution of 
the in-between, the we, freedom and therefore public happiness.  
On the other hand, a citizen, while a subject and denizen, acts in the public realm 
by employing his or her capacities toward making the collectively binding decisions 
under which s/he lives. “They understand that their freedom,” as Barber contends, “is a 
consequence of their participation in the making and acting out of common decisions.”281 
A citizen, as noted by Aristotle, is a person who “should know how to govern … and how 
to obey like”282 one who is free. Citizenship also entails a “continuous 
acknowledgement” of one’s “obligation” to “an ensemble of practices”283 and a “set of 
political principles … freedom and equality for all.”284 When individuals, “recognize the 
authority of such principles and the rules in which they are embodied,” they proactively 
engage in constituting the “political judgement and … actions” and “identity”285 
necessary to be citizens. It is through “actually entering into … by positive 
engagement”286 the ensemble of political practices that the “practical discipline” 
                                                                                                                                                 
280
 Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, 254. 
 
281
 Barber, Strong Democracy, 179. 
 
282
 Aristotle, Politics, 109. 
 
283
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 95. 
 
284
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 65. 
 
285
 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 65-66. 
 
286
 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 74. 
 82 
necessary for “the character”287 of citizenship becomes generative of an identification as 
a citizen. Consequently, citizens are members of society who actively engage the public 
and political realm, willing an order of society toward community generated common 
goods through the production of and agreement with the collectively binding decisions 
under which they choose to live. 
Will a World into Being 
To will is to create a world or to bring about events in a, world, and this act entails 
(and thus defines) power – the ability to create or modify reality. 
–Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
To be constituted by and to constitute something in the world, one has to act in 
the world. Preceding an act, the will is either engaged to direct what a person will will to 
be and be done within the particular concern under consideration. Whether an individual 
has time to process his or her will prior to the decisional event or one acts within the 
moment the will is involved. In the case in which time is permitted the development of 
the will is allowed to be inquisitive and reflective, whereas in the moment the will must 
draw from previous, like instances. In an authentic democracy, citizens processing the 
“common good,” actualize the “public” where “citizens com[e] together to talk about 
collective problems.”288 By talking together, especially in the political frame, citizens act 
as creative beings, “creat[ing] … visions [that] are provisional” and propositional of 
                                                 
287
 Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, 254. 
 
288
 Young, Communication and the Other, 121.  
 83 
imaginary, “shared consequences.”289 Transitioning talk from vision to, as Barber argues, 
“decision converts [its] promise into reality and compels [citizens] to give irrevocable 
shape and life”290 to the vision. A vision and decision call for a “will”291 and a “way to 
willing common actions”292 that aspires to bring into being a reality conceived of and 
shared by the citizenry.  
When a collection of individuals come together to form a community they bring 
with them differences of opinion about how they will govern. Their judgments about how 
they govern, act upon their common world, arises from what they will to be in their 
world. Difference in social location, power relations, and relational development and 
connections in heterogeneous, as well as homogenous, communities implicate the use of 
rhetoric. Rhetoric, in part, is a communicative resource that brings these individual 
together in order for them to identify the character and responsibilities of citizenship and 
as citizens. From difference individuals privilege certain influences over others, resulting 
in a plurality within the decision-making space constituted in-between citizens. To arrive 
at a collectively binding decision, citizens must decide which possibility has the most 
potentiality to promote the common good. Common good, meaning here that which 
advances a good that is beneficial to the community; not as an abstract good that favors 
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the common, but a concrete good that might just as likely advantage a segment of the 
community to further its identification with and as part of the community; not as an end 
in of itself, but inherent in a process that includes free, equal, engaged, and empowered 
participation by the citizenry. To decide on a collectively binding decision 
democratically, persuasion provides rhetorical parameters that guide citizens’ 
communicative participation. Mark Warren refers to three conditions that this “dynamic” 
engagement espouses and rewards. When individuals present their arguments they need 
to: 
1. “appeal to common or coinciding interests or norms” 
2. foster a favorable evaluation of one’s credibility in relation to claims and 
evidence  
3. inspire a perception of goodwill toward the community293  
A citizen presenting his or her argument for a vision of the community in a decisional 
space can only deceptively appear to meet these conditions for a time since the 
appearance of the person and the argument transpires publically. The capability to 
influence the community therefore can be limited or even negated when an individual 
does not consistently project a character and proposed collectively binding decision that 
the community recognizes as common, credible, and grounded in goodwill over the short 
and long-term.
294
 In acting within these conditions and providing profitable proposals, 
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whether accepted or not, will “increase future [capabilities] for influence.”295 The will of 
the community and of its citizens, then is a rhetorical result.  
Rhetoric and political deliberation, which is also rhetorical, gains significance in 
the democratic process, in that both are “transform[ative of individual] preferences 
according to public-minded ends.”296 Constitutive and transformative affects are a 
consequence of “coordinat[ing] action [that] requires … share[d and held] interpretations 
of facts, norms, and intentions.”297 These interpretative resources are made and refined 
through a public intercourse
298
 that is generative of “public seeing and political 
judgment.”299 By being able to interact with and influence one another, citizens engage in 
evaluating and selecting from a “myriad [of] visions that compete for the common 
will.”300 To will, is not the same as “‘I prefer’ or ‘I want’,”301 in that will is productive of 
a judgment that brings into existence a common experience now and for the future.  
From Locke’s perspective, while in a state of nature, an individual’s will is the 
impetus behind his or her decision as to what s/he determines to pursue according to the 
first liberty. Within a collective the individuated individual wills are aggregated, 
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generally with the majority will guiding collective ends. In a community, its collectively 
binding decisions are not an act of discovery, but are generated through public will.
302
 
Rousseau’s contention was that the “act of association” is creative of a “unity,” 
productive of the association’s “common self, its life, and its will.303 Standing in the 
place of the individuated individuals’ wills, the collective transforms into and replaces 
individual wills with that of a public body.
304
 In a community, since difference is, in part, 
constitutive of the need to learn about and deliberate on proposed or existing common 
goods, Locke’s view is too weak due to its reliance on self-interest while Rousseau’s is 
too strong as it negates difference. An alternative view, that addresses a scheme that 
includes private and public wills, which in turn produces a collective will, is advocated 
by contemporary theorist Majid Behrouzi. 
Behrouzi holds that as a citizen, “the individual is a public person with public 
interests, as well as a holder of a set of views and conceptions on the matters of the 
‘common good’.”305 Awareness of a common issue is demonstrative of private and public 
concerns and interests that are learned through “general and formal education,”306 as well 
as the individual’s active engagement in society and with its members. Once a person 
becomes “committed, and willing, to ‘act’ on” an issue, his or her private wills transform 
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into “‘public wills’.”307 If citizens are empowered to participate and act in the collectively 
binding decision-making process, then through rhetorical engagement the community 
attends and decides to “‘co-join’ [their] wills” into a “‘collected wills’.”308 Able to 
provide consequential input, one’s public will in the decisional scheme affords citizens 
the ability to enact their “sovereignty.”309 Additionally, this process serves to legitimate 
the decision and motivate citizens to support and live by decisions for (non)advocates.
310
  
An issue that becomes a public problematic, open to public discussion, orients an 
individual “to that issue through both, his or her, private and public wills311 While the 
wills are not mutually exclusive as they “may or may not be in harmony” and their “inter-
connections”312 might or might not be known they are distinguished through their relation 
to what is considered the “good [for] the public.”313 A private will is a representative of a 
person’s individual desires and judgments about a particular situation that s/he does not 
want to express in a public forum. In making public a will that relates to political 
“issues,” the citizen identifies his or her “criteria” for making the judgment, as well as 
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what s/he “wills to be actualized”314 through advancing his or her suggested potential 
collectively binding decision. In other words, a public will proposes ways that the 
community should pursue the common good, thereby if chosen instituting individual and 
common responsibilities.
315
 Formulated in and through public interaction, public wills are 
malleable and susceptible to change.
316
 “Public wills” then according to Behrouzi, are 
“expressions of considered and reflected-upon judgements.”317 After a particular public 
will or a combination of multiple public wills is accepted by the community a “‘collective 
will’”318 is produced. 
To explicate the difference and relationship between private, public and collective 
wills Plato’s account of Socrates trial provides fruitful examples. When Socrates, “‘that 
wise man’,”319 was charged with leading the youth of Athens astray by teaching them to 
challenge their received traditions and religion, along with a sundry of other violations, 
he based his defense on his public and private wills. In his attempt to obtain an acquittal, 
Socrates had to convince the jury that his view relating to the charges was the correct 
perspective. Besides the necessary challenge of the prosecution’s evidence, he 
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endeavored to convince the jury via his public will. Arguing that while he was “pleading 
on [his] own behalf,” he also claimed that he was “really pleading on [theirs]” in order 
“to save [the Athenians] from misusing the gift of God by condemning [him].” Socrates 
asserted that he was god’s gift to Athens in that through “the greatest possible service” he 
could provide, he had become in words and deeds their conscience. Throughout his life 
he had continually attempted “to persuade each [one] not to think more of practical 
advantages then of his mental and moral well-being, or in general … of well-being in the 
case of the state or of anything else.”320 The jury unmoved by his defense sided with his 
accusers.
321
 Convicted of the crimes, Socrates had the opportunity to persuade the jury to 
sentence him to some other punishment than the called for death penalty. In an 
expression of his private will, “I am convinced that I never wrong anyone 
intentionally,”322 he offered his opinion of innocence and therefore he should not be 
subject to any sanction. The jury, not swayed by his arguments, agreed with his accusers 
and one month later had him executed.
323
 Prior to the trial the members of the jury, all 
male Athenian citizens, had either met or heard about the influence and character of 
Socrates.
324
 From these experiences and knowledge, many of the jury members likely 
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entered their role with a priori opinions about his guilt or innocence. Through, the likely 
public discussions leading up to the trial about its merits and possible outcome, along 
with the evidence and statements made by both sides during the trial, the jury members 
formed their public wills. In rendering their judgment of his guilt and then passing 
sentence, their private and public wills constituted the collective will of Athens.  
In rendering their decision about the fate of Socrates the jury came to a judgment 
about his guilt and a decision about how to implement that decision. Behind the judgment 
and decision were the public wills of the individual jurymen and through their vote they 
determined and expressed what they collectively willed the world to be; one in which 
Socrates no longer could trouble them and their community. To bring this willed world 
into existence the jurymen had a will guiding their choice, the will to decide, the will to 
abide by the decision, and the will to see the decision acted upon. Barber posits that “if 
common decision is the test of common talk, then common action is the test of common 
decision. Common work is a community doing together what it has envisioned and willed 
together.”325 To will and act in the world the Athenian had to be empowered to come to 
their decision and be able to render is an actuality. As such, the citizens had to be agents 
in the constitution of their world.  
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To Act in the World 
…in all political questions ... only questions of power come into play: “what one 
can do” is the first question, what one ought to do is only a secondary 
consideration. 
–Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power 
Or is it? To act in the world, to will the world as one possibility, amongst a sea of 
options, relies upon the human “faculty by which the self comes by its ends”326 or 
agency. Countering the insights of Nietzsche, Pascal’s assessment of the will is related to 
one’s beliefs. What we believe as “true or false” is a matter “by which we judge them.”327 
His argument is that as we evaluate “the qualities” of something “our will likes one 
aspect more than another.”328 That which the “mind … does not care to see” the will 
“deflects”329 one from considering. The mind then is drawn to what remains, or that 
“preferred by the will,”330 and an individual then makes his or her judgment accordingly. 
If beliefs are generative of our acts in the world, then the will while limiting is directive 
of self-reflection that then produces the judgments leading to action. Pascal’s view of the 
will is definitely productive for understanding how individuals come to act in the world 
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but a more penetrating analysis, providing deeper distinction, is necessary to develop a 
thorough understanding of human agency. 
Michael Sandel provides a framework for understanding the constitutive elements 
of one’s agency and for building a sense of agency of a citizen. In review, he offers a 
prevalent perspective of agency, which he follows with a richer, deeper, and more 
productive view.  He constructs agency as residing in two possible faculties: willing and 
self-reflection. Willing involves the ability of a person, or self, to choose between 
possible desired outcomes, or ends, while reflection occurs through discovery.
331
 In each 
case, agency serves as a remedy for a particular type of disempowerment. When agency 
is conceived as willing the “self is disempowered because [it is] detached from its ends”; 
in reflection it “is disempowered because [it is] undifferentiated from its end.”332 In other 
words, willing is an enactment of power to bridge the gulf between the known self, 
antecedent to life and societal goals, in order to decide and act towards a chosen, certain 
end. In reflection, a person’s understanding of ends is constitutive of his or her self-
understanding. By reflecting on the connection between ends and self, a person creates 
distance between the two in order to empower the self to consider the value of the end for 
its own constitution. In this sense a person “achieves self-command” by “making the 
self”333 an object, thereby enabling a “survey [of] its various attachments … [in order to] 
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acknowledge [the object’s] respective claims.”334 In doing so, the ends is caused to lessen 
or relinquish its constitutive power over the self so that a person can determine what ends 
(and its correlated, sundry attachments) it desires to be self-constitutive. 
While Sandel’s construct of agency as an unencumbered self, posits a divide 
between willing and self-reflection, the divide is not necessary. Agency is not an 
either/or, as Sandel attests to when he (re)envisions agency as an encumbered self –“Will 
alone is not enough”335– but a both/and. As a both/and agency is a product of self-
reflection, distancing the self from ends, and then an act of willing or a choice to “reverse 
the drifting apart of self and ends by restoring a certain continuity between them.”336 The 
subject or ends are open questions that are answered through the process of living, 
judging, and acting. In life, human beings are embedded in a historical association or 
society of others, and when the openness of an indeterminacy or a question confronts that 
society of self and others, the person contingently answers the questions of Who am I? 
and What ends should be pursued? through the working of one’s agency: reflection and 
willing. The contingency of this openness for self and ends does not exist free of 
constraints in that both, the self and ends, are embedded: The history of Selfs and Ends, 
of the self and ends, the authority of culturally and socially accounted for and discounted 
possibilities, and interrelationships with others contending with the question provides a 
powerful effectual frame to contextualize who one can be(come) and what one can do. 
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Due to humanity’s embeddedness, agency through self-reflection cannot be a complete 
withdrawal in thought from the community of others. Consequently, the self that reflects 
on its ends is not nor can be an actual antecedent to the person’s life and society goals. 
Joining the self in its reflection are the voices of others who have influenced the ongoing 
construction of the self and therefore speak into the consideration of what ends a person 
decides to esteem and act upon.
337
 Even though the process of self-reflection is a process 
of (re)visitation, action necessitates a movement away from contemplation to willing, 
which leads toward a moment of decision.
338
 Agency, here takes the result of self-
reflection and transforms its determinations into a willing of what ends to pursue and how 
to achieve that particular possibility.  
Conclusion: Fostering the Flourishing of Humanity 
The nature of humanity and their existence exhibit a particular disposition that 
provides the foundation for authentic governance. Out of this disposition should emerge 
the form of governance that fosters the flourishing of humanity. Authentic democracy 
would provide the people with a means to transform their natural liberties –to pursue 
individual ends and punish impediment of those ends– through language into common, 
just pursuits and benefits. Humanity experiences a compulsion to overcome their natural 
state of division through the creation of identification between one another. When 
individuals do so, they construct and constitute a shared will and world that forms 
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communion and community between them. In building society, individuals agree to live 
under a common power, but the nature and function of this power can either rob societal 
members of their means of participation and public happiness or it can provide the space 
for its realization. To be active participants –to be citizens who are agents that move from 
individual, private wills to a collective will– necessitates authentic democracy: a 
democracy that, facilitating the people’s interactions, achieves their empowerment and 
thereby enables their self-rule. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC PROJECT 
 
…democracy is a project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary 
citizens, that is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings through the 
self-discovery of common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them.  
–Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy and Difference 
Introduction: Justifications for Authentic Democracy 
Knowing the general character of human beings and humanity’s reasons for 
associating with each other is beneficial in constructing governance of individuals in 
society. Understanding how symbolic orders are productive of communication codes that 
are indicative of a people’s webs of significance or culture, addressed here, provides 
guidance for how an authentic system of governance should be constructed. This 
knowledge and understanding can be employed for the common good or the good of the 
few. Authentic governance implements this knowledge and understanding in ways that 
maximize the potentialities of societal members as citizens. For Bryan Garsten “a polity’s 
institutional structure influences the type of political activity”339 open for its citizenry 
while Mouffe desires “a mode of political association” that suggests “the idea of 
commonality” and establishes relational bonds “among the participants in the 
association.”340 Institutional structures and modes of political association, through their 
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“rules and prescribed norms of conduct”341 facilitate and constitute the identities and 
activities possible. These structures and norms, inculcate within a citizenry certain 
political expectations based on habits of behavior. People, argues Pascal, follow their 
habits formed through continual, repetitive behavior warranted by the institutions and 
norms they partake of in their lived experience.
342
 Authentic governance then is one that 
institutionalizes political potentialities of ordinary citizens in a particular way that aligns 
with character of human beings and their political association. How the associated 
individuals of a society constitutes its governance –its institutions, actors, and 
cooperative acts– are constituted through the nature of their associations; since in part 
individuals constitute and are constituted through the nature of their associations, how a 
society’s political space is concretized affects how the citizenry engages in the productive 
process of will formation and is empowered to choose and act collectively in the world. 
Authentic Governance 
…a state is a community of freemen… 
…a political society exists for the sake of noble actions… 
…who has the power to take part in the … administration of any state is …  
a citizen of that state … a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of 
life. 
 
–Aristotle, Politics 
Any form of governance that provides the institutional structure, norms, and 
habits of a political association should be grounded in the character of human beings and 
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community in order to establish those habits, norms and structure. Building from the 
exposition provided above about human nature and existence, society, citizenship, will, 
and agency authentic governance should acknowledge, enable, and have the potentiality 
to achieve the characteristics noted. Authentic governance then is generative of a 
collectively binding decision-making space in which: 
1. functional equality is fostered and flourishes in order to equalize the 
inequalities created through differing capacities and resources  
2. the liberty of individuals to choose the ends they desire and pursue the acts 
they believe will lead to those ends is maximized 
3. citizens are empowered to be world-builders who can express their public 
wills in negotiations with others to secure their own persons, property, and 
a collective will  
4. identification with others bridges the diversity of societal plurality through 
rhetorical engagements pursuant of common goods, feeding back into a 
constitutive circle productive of community identification and 
5. the citizenry’s public happiness is secured through their constitution as 
engaged participators in self-rule 
The specificity of these claims is significant for they are productive of the parameter for 
the actualization of equality, liberty, power, identification, and public happiness with 
governance. It is possible to succinctly summarize these claims of acknowledgement, 
enablement, and achievement: Authentic governance necessitates that individuals are 
 99 
free, equal and empowered actors who can collectively constitute their existence in 
society and its goods.  
Such reduction to core concepts or succinct summary though leaves a gap in the 
breadth and depth of interpretation that could be productive of governance that would not 
be authentic. Neither, would it not necessarily distinguish parameters through which 
possible forms of governance could be invalidated as inauthentic. For instance, Aristotle 
claims that the three basic forms by which governance is secured, “the one, or the few, or 
the many,”343 can only be evaluated as authentic from a rich understanding of authentic 
governance. A government of one or the few violates equality, power and public 
happiness, but could be said to enable and perhaps even achieve a sense of liberty and 
identification for its subjects. Whereas, it is only in the governance of the many that 
acknowledgment, engagement, and the potentiality for the achievement of equality; 
liberty; empowerment found in reflection, will, agency, acts, and security; identification 
constituted out of difference, common goods, and collectively binding decision-making; 
as well as public happiness through engaged participation that authentic self-rule is 
actualized. 
Authentic Governance is Democratic Governance 
Authentic governance, found only in the self-rule of the many, brings democracy 
back to the foreground, “for democracy is said to be” claimed Aristotle, “the government 
of the many.”344 Unlike for Aristotle, democracy is no longer a singularity, but over the 
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centuries since it flourishing in ancient Athens, it has become, in Dahl’s words, an 
amalgam of elements that do not fully cohere.”345 Today the experience of democracy is 
filtered through a fusion with other philosophical and political elements, so that its 
variants are now called “modern democracy, pluralist democracy, constitutional 
democracy, liberal democracy”346 to which could be added representative democracy, 
participatory democracy
347
 and deliberative democracy
348
 to name a few versions. In 
each, democracy has been modified in order to make it more palatable for the sensibilities 
of the times and “the party on top.”349 Democracy, as a political community, is an 
expression of “the bonds securing men’s mutual respect [and] … bonds of necessity.”350 
Pascal argued that community bonds are “maintained by [an] imagination”351 that project 
a certain conception of power through which a particular version of governance is 
accepted. How democracy is conceived and enacted then reflects a vision of power and 
who and how it is to be enacted. With the imagined authentic governance presented 
above serving as the grounds for an authentic conception of democracy, authentic 
democracy too must be envisioned in a particular way. 
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Central to the “political condition,” according to Barber, is “the absence of an 
independent ground for judgment.”352 The questions that trouble a political community 
are those rooted in issues that cause conflict within society. Difference driving divergent 
private and public wills creates a space between the citizenry “where truth is not – or is 
not yet – known,”353 so that conflict emerges about what collective will, productive of 
collectively binding decisions, the community should act upon. Conflict in democracy, 
Mouffe claims, serves an “integrative role” since it “calls for a confrontation between 
democratic positions, and … requires a real debate about possible alternatives.”354 The 
political realm of democracy consequently, must provide a space in which citizens are 
free, equal, and empowered to constitute a collective will and collective binding 
decisions. Barber argues that “politics” in a strong democracy includes “the art of 
engaging strangers in talk and of stimulating in them an artificial kinship.”355 While he 
develops a democratic program that favors talk, the constitutive nature of the political 
community, privileges a particular type of talk, rhetoric. As such, authentic democracy is 
a rhetorical democracy in which a democratic rhetoric is practiced.  
Compelling the necessity for governance are public problems productive of the 
need for collectively binding decisions that endeavor toward solutions representative of 
the common good. Central to a public problem is an ambiguity confronting the 
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community or a contention dividing the people. A public problem is a unique type of 
problem in that its impact is perceived to have some significance for the association of 
the people. A public problem is one that impedes the ability of the people to realize 
equality, liberty, power, community, and/or their happiness. Public problems, like “every 
human problem” as Frantz Fanon points out, “must be considered from the standpoint of 
time.”356 As such, a public problem needs to be understood also as contextualized and 
particular. A public problem is always already contextualized or situated in time and 
space –historically, culturally and socially– and it is this particular contextualization that 
shapes the citizenry’s desire to address the problem collectively, their determination of 
the common good in relation to it, and how they can achieve that common good for the 
community.  
A public problem is particular in that as a problem it is peculiar to the citizenry 
and their historical, cultural, and social composition; making its members uniquely 
qualified to decide how to address it publically. As an ambiguity, a contextualized 
particular can be veiled in three ways. First, the citizenry does not consider a 
contextualized particular problematic and therefore it needs to be made present to their 
awareness before public attention is deemed warranted; like a whistleblower bringing to 
light that which is meant to be hidden from public view. It is also possible that due to the 
plurality of the citizenry, most may consider its significance as not meriting public action, 
while for certain citizens the public nature of the contextualized particular is 
unquestionable; an example would be when a policy, like standardized testing, privileges 
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the success of certain groups over that of others. In the final instance of ambiguity the 
contextualized particular is known as a public problem that necessitates public attention 
and cooperative action, but the possibilities for how the public should proceed are 
unknown, thus potential policies must be generated and brought to light for these 
generally emergent and unique problems; for instance, the discussions of President 
Kennedy’s advisors to generate responses to the Cuban missile crisis. In regards to 
contention, the citizenry’s attention might very well be riveted on the contextualized 
particular but they are conflicted over what collectively binding decision actualizes a 
collective will representative of their individuated public wills. In democratic rhetoric the 
citizen considers his or her relation to the contextualized particular, the citizenry’s 
interpretation of it, and/or the sources of contention between them to inform his or her 
use of rhetoric. Thus, engagement of a public point of ambiguity or contention is limited 
structurally, primarily through the mediating influence of persuasive communication. 
Foundation of Rhetoric for Democratic Rhetoric 
Communicative acts that entreat a citizen to consider his or her private or public 
will, influential of the formation of a collective will, and constitutive of a collectively 
binding decision addressing a particular concern, are rhetorical engagements within a 
rhetorical event. A citizen’s rhetorical engagement within a rhetorical event seeks to 
modify a particular ambiguity or contention that is embedded in the community, in order 
to alter its reality in accord with his or her desire.
357
 These claims rest upon a particular 
meaning for rhetoric and are related to specific ways for and contexts in which rhetoric is 
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employed. Over the millenniums rhetoric has taken on many meanings and yet at its 
center is the conception that it is both the “the means of persuasion”358 –the how to 
engage an audience of others– and the “art of persuasion.”359 As an art its foundational 
purpose is “to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents”360 through the 
employment of symbols as “a mode of altering reality.”361  Its power to alter reality 
begins with how it instigates a shift in the way individuals relate to reality through what it 
foregrounds, what it highlights as needing attention.  
In “soliciting attention” it simultaneously creates an opening “by driving a wedge 
between subject and object”362 and attempts to establish the presence of a particular 
persuasive appeal by “isolat[ing] it”363 from competing appeals. When focused on a 
public problem, rhetoric addresses “in ways appropriate to a particular public in a 
particular situation”364 possible futures for directing the citizenry “either to do or not do 
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something”365 through specific proposals. An individual who commits to presenting his 
or her solution to a contextualized particular reveals his or her understanding of the 
public problem in question. As Michael Hyde argues:  
Rhetoric offers an interpretative understanding of this world; it articulates and 
thus makes explicit something about how people are faring (‘dwelling’) in their 
everyday relationships with things and with others and how they might think and 
act in order to understand better and perhaps improve a particular situation.
366
  
Through rhetorical engagements, communicated in the presence of an audience, an 
individual attends to “the practical consequences – the meanings to persons involved – of 
the human relations”; in that the “one who speaks rhetorically chooses to inaugurate and 
to try to sustain until attainment of a purpose a series of events in human relations.”367 As 
such, rhetoric is always relational, constituting relationships through the maintenance of 
existent connections and/or establishing new connections and bonds with (un)familiar 
others.  
Rhetoric establishes and distinguishes the nature of the relationship between the 
individual engaging in a rhetorical engagement and an audience through its 
acknowledgment of their presence as participants. “Acknowledgment,” Hyde contends, 
“is a conscious act of creation that marks an origin, a beginning, an opening in space-time 
where people can feel at home as they dwell, deliberate, and know together.”368 Rhetoric 
here functions democratically through naming the addressed participants as members of 
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the community and holders of either positions of congruity, neutrality or conflict.
369
 
Acknowledgement indicates: a new beginning; the dignity of the others as equal, free and 
empowered actors;
370
 a relationship and potentiality for positioning and transforming the 
nature of the relationship;
371
 and who is included in the collectively binding decision-
making process. On the other hand, the lack of acknowledgment within rhetorical, 
democratic engagement also is telling, turning its positive potentialities into negatives. 
Through acknowledgment’s power individuals or groups can initiate a rhetorical 
engagement of others, generative of a hospitable or hostile space that is conducive of 
either authentic or inauthentic democracy. Through these attributes, directing attention 
and acknowledging others, rhetoric can subtly or radically alter a person’s perception of 
reality.  
The capacity of rhetoric to alter reality reaches its culmination in bringing people 
to a decision or judgment regarding a probable and provisional satisfactory solution for a 
contextualized particular.
372
 Poetically describing rhetoric, Burke argued that it “is par 
excellence the region of the Scramble.”373 When divided individuals, recognize a societal 
need they attempt to persuade one another of the merits of one means to meet that need 
over another. In the scramble of a political clash, rhetoric attends to and is the means “of 
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persuasive speech.”374 During a rhetorical engagement, to persuade a citizenry of the 
merits of one proposal over others, an individual needs to create an actual or perceived 
sense of identification.   
Identification is a joining of citizens’ interests375 by foregrounding similarities and 
providing a “bridge”376 across difference. It is through rhetoric that identification bonds 
individuals together through similar attitudes that lead to cooperative acts. At the heart of 
identification are the ideas of substance and consubstantiality. “Substance,” according to 
Burke: “was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together [consubstantiality]; and in 
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that 
make them consubstantial.”377 In essence, then identification is rooted in a belief that the 
proposal an individual advocates presents a common way of acting in the world, based on 
the common interests shared by the citizenry. It is the purpose of rhetoric to “lead to 
decisions.”378 Thus, for a citizenry to be empowered to act equally and freely democracy 
needs to enable rhetorical engagement between its citizens and a particular conflict so 
that they can persuade one another, up the point of decision, as to which course of action 
to follow related to a contextualized particular. 
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For Lloyd Bitzer the contextualized particular functions as an exigence –“some 
specific condition or situation”379 considered “an imperfection marked by urgency”– and 
is that “which invites utterance”380 or rhetorical engagement. In the art of rhetoric, as in 
any art, a contextualized particular, stimulant of a citizen’s attention, appears to the 
individual “demand[ing] … effective power.” 381 This agrees with Quintilian’s position 
that rhetoric addresses “the subjects that come before”382  it and its “material … is 
everything that may come before [it] for discussion.”383 Yet, while appearance or 
demands are important for securing attention, it is one’s perception that constitutes the 
interpretation of the contextualized particular that drives if and how one will attend to it. 
Perception and interpretation guides the citizen’s attention as to “what [one] believe[s] 
she / he [i]s responding to, why, and in conversation with whom.”384 It is in the tension 
between, not only the questions of “what is to be modified” and “who is to be 
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addressed,”385 but also why the contextualized particular is being addressed and to what 
end that structures a particular employment of the rhetoric.  
Whether a citizen who, through the investigation of the rhetorical art and 
technique, is consider competent or as lacking s/he employs the rhetorical complex, 
which is inherent to any use of rhetoric. Before proceeding to an explication of the 
rhetorical complex the question of competency merits a brief discussion. Competency in 
rhetoric comes through honing one’s skills in its principles and practice, and while formal 
inquiry can lead to excellence, “ordinary people” through “random” forays “or … 
practice” –recognizing causality (this appeal has lead to a good affect whereas this has 
not)– constitute a “habit”386 of rhetorical competence. This is seen early on in the 
rhetorical engagements of a child. Desirous of a particular end, the child builds a 
repertoire of rhetorical skill, when confronted with a failed attempt at procuring the end, 
through continual fresh attempts to arrive at success until the end is finally attained. 
Certainly there is slippage, due to proficiency of recalling related successful attempts and 
contextual factors, but those causes achieving the goal with consistency build a 
systematic understanding of competent rhetorical appeals. These competent appeals, 
exhibit an ideological component, as the sanctioning agent carries into the rhetorical 
engagement a particular set of beliefs about how to judge and act in light of the request. 
The sanctioning agent’s response is informed and shaped by the relevant ideological 
beliefs s/he or they hold. Therefore to produce a favorable result, a citizen through 
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rhetorical engagement must structure his or her rhetorical appeal to address the 
expectations found in the ideological environment; an environment constructed through 
the communication within one’s greater and familiar social worlds.  
The components of any rhetorical appeal, commonly referred to as the five canons 
of rhetoric, involves “Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery.”387 The 
tradition term canons can create a silo(ing) affect or impression and so here the phrase 
rhetorical complex will be employed instead as a means to emphasize the 
interconnections between the canons. Every (in)competent public rhetorical engagement 
accesses these components either through the preparation or performance of the message. 
In short: 
 Invention “is the devising of the matter … [to] make the case convincing.” 
 Arrangement addresses the organizational structure of the message.  
 Style involves “adapt[ing]” the appeal of the message to the rhetorical 
situation. 
 Memory is now implicative of any technological tool used to assist in 
remembrance.  
 Delivery refers to how a message and its persuasive appeal is conveyed to 
an audience.
388
  
In democratic rhetoric, each aspect of the rhetorical complex has significance for a 
citizen’s rhetorical engagement of the citizenry in relation to a contextualized particular. 
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What one is to argue (invention), how the argument is to be formed (arrangement) and 
articulated (style) and conveyed (memory and delivery) flow out of the process of 
invention. For it is not just in what one chooses to advocate that invention resides, but its 
effects in how to arrange one’s points, how to stylize those points through their 
articulation and delivery in order to facilitate their best chance for a full hearing and 
consideration, also should be felt and realized. Consequently, invention’s critical role and 
potentiality in the process of rhetorical engagement that warrants deeper analysis in order 
to further explicate the nature of democratic rhetoric. 
Invention is a multifaceted process that takes one through two phases of 
deliberation; distinguished from each other in that the first phase seeks to narrow 
preference to an end desired and the second orients the end to existent conditions for 
public evaluation. Put more simply, the first phase relates to one’s private will, whereas 
the second is productive of the public will. It is in the thought of John Dewey on ends and 
deliberation that the process of invention is grandly elucidated. Through a little free play 
in the interpretative process it becomes possible to appropriate his insights in these areas 
in order to apply them to a rhetorical frame. 
Invention first needs to be understood in light of the paradoxical nature of an end 
or aim. Dewey succinctly claims “that an end is a device of intelligence in guiding action, 
instrumental to freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies.”389 An end is 
an aim through which a present act is imaginatively “thrown back upon itself” in 
deliberation to discover ways of acting in the “present” according to means that “would 
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afford satisfaction.”390 The paradox is that an end provides deliberation with both a point 
of closure and “turning points in activity.”391 Both are found in “terminals of 
deliberation”392 that act as an end –“directive stimuli to present choice”393– and a 
beginning –“perforce beginnings”394– when understood through the metaphor of 
traveling. At a terminal one has arrived at a destination –a point of rest– and a point of 
transfer –action– or “redirecting pivots”395 in which the journey begins, begins anew or 
continues.  
To imaginatively reflect on invention consider that it starts at a terminal from 
which a particular destination –an end terminal– is sought even though the route is yet to 
be determined. Along the various paths to the destination what is encountered along the 
way can alter the travel, resulting in new terminals opening up even further possible 
corridors. In arriving at the original destination, its terminal functions as a place of rest or 
cessation from invention and therefore throws the person into action. It must be 
remembered though that every terminal always includes the possibility for further travel. 
In this way terminals or ends are actually “endless ends” with “no fixed self-enclosed 
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finalities”396 and yet every closure –terminal point or choice– to invention –productive of 
arguments– can also become generative of a new terminal for future deliberation. In 
framing invention the end becomes the aim of a rhetorical engagement, which is arrived 
at through deliberation.   
Confronted with a contextualized particular an individual stands before a problem 
that induces deliberative thought. As Dewey posits, “the occasion of deliberation” is 
found in the “stimulus” of a “future” end shrouded by “confusion and uncertainty in 
present activities.”397 To “experiment”398 with possible means to resolve this lack of 
satisfaction with a problem in one’s world, an individual entertains solutions through 
deliberation. The act of deliberating refers to “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of 
various competing possible lines of action.”399 In this dramatic rehearsal, a person 
imaginatively constructs the ambiguity or contention so that s/he can investigate –walk 
through– where certain courses “of possible action” will lead –the expectant triumphs or 
trials encountered along the way– and their affect(s) or end. As each new course is 
investigated, the objects –that “which objects”400– discerned, are registered in a mental 
account as beneficial or as a hindrance. Objects are what we imagine will make the travel 
toward the end easier, that stand with or are congruent and harmonizing. Or they can be 
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that which stands against feasibly following the course to the end. Through playful 
engagement with the objects of benefice or hindrance an individual modifies the course 
until the mind “finds a way fully open”401 to the end. Once a path that is thought to have 
impediments completely or sufficiently removed is discovered, deliberation “ceases” with 
the culmination of a “choice, decision.”402 Choice, representative of “what we really 
want” provides the “decisive direction of action”403 through which the problem is 
addressed. Therefore, deliberation engages one’s own preferences or “biases,” 
“stimulative” of “one direction rather than another,” in “a search for a way to act.”404 
Deliberation and choice then are productive of a transitive position that can stand as 
either a state of strong private will or weak public will. 
While Dewey highlights and positions choice as the transitional point to indicate 
the move from deliberative invention to action, choice actually riddles the deliberative 
act. Each time the mind comes to an object a decision is made regarding its value and 
how to respond to it. In considering questions of value the individual creates a distance 
between the object and the self to determine through self-reflection its significance. 
Consideration of the object is determinant of its value and forges an opportunity to 
address if it warrants attention and if so, how to deal with it. Is the benefit associated with 
the object imperative to preserve, or is it such that if the decided upon path includes or 
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passes it by it is of no matter? Does the object present an irresolvable impediment that 
makes the course untenable or is its presence justifiable, to which attention to it can 
successful modify? Deliberative invention invites a person into self-reflection that leads 
to willing and as such is productive of an individual’s agency relating to a public, 
contextualized particular.  
The private will is found in its truest, yet weakest form, when a present problem is 
noticed as a problem and in noticing a person says, “this is not how it should be, it should 
be like this.” This initial response can be nearly simultaneous as it pulls from held 
preferences and hopes to generate a desired end or it can even evolve out of thorough 
deliberative invention. In either case, when deliberation’s resources are predominately 
limited to preferences and hopes, Dewey argues that the arrived at end is merely a 
“fancy.”405 A fancy begins with “an emotional reaction against the present state of things 
and a hope for something different.”406 Hope is both generative –like an end can be– and 
guiding in that it supplies the motivating belief that even though the action found in the 
current state is deficient, it can actually be modified so as to be satisfying, leading to 
satisfactory results. Combined, one’s preferences and hope gestates the “it should be like 
this” idea and invents a means to express one’s private will in relation to an ambiguity or 
contention.  
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Dewey pushes beyond fancy to speak of how “invention operates” when “old 
consequences are enhanced, recombined, modified in imagination”407 for the purpose of 
being an aim. The transformation of a fancy into an aim is dependent on adding to the 
resource list the current context and memory. An aim is constituted “only when [a fancy] 
is worked out in terms of concrete conditions.”408 Found in memory or recorded history, a 
past answer to a problematic similar to the current situation is looked to as a means for 
understanding the current “sequences of [the] known cause-and-effect.”409 The past 
answer, “projected into the future”410 is applied to the situation “to generate a like 
result.”411 Applying a past answer to a current concrete context entails combining the 
fruitful aspects of both. Stripping away from the past answer that which does not translate 
to the current context, filling in those areas that call for different means and incorporating 
the specificity of the contextualized particular give an aim a “definite form and solid 
substance,” a “practicality” that “constitute it [as] a working end.”412 Deliberation on a 
current problematic rooted in ambiguity or contention, imaginatively invents an end and 
means to improve the situation; first through a phase that draws upon one’s preferences 
and hopes and then by adding knowledge of past similar occurrences and the concrete 
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attributes of the current context. In the first phase the private will in a weak form leads a 
discovery of one’s preferences and hopes, transitions into a strong private will or weak 
public one, and then through the second phase shifts into a public will, ready for public 
articulation and scrutiny.  
Deliberative invention, constructed from Dewey’s insights, pulls from personal 
preferences, hopes, past answers and present concrete context to construct how one 
decides to act in relation to a contextualized particular. This view resembles and enhances 
the more familiar rhetorical notion of invention that “involve(s),” in Young’s estimation, 
“attention to the particular audience of one’s communication, and orienting one’s claims 
and arguments to the particular assumptions, history, and idioms of that audience.”413 The 
process of deliberative invention then needs to include drawing upon, in Bitzer’s 
incomplete summation, the “persons, events, objects, and relations,”414 as well as the 
tradition and “historical conditions” in which the rhetorical engagement is embedded. 
These resources are productive of the “beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, 
images, interests, motives and the like,” that a citizen can employ in attempt to elicit the 
“decision and action … [necessary] to modify”415 a contextualized particularity. Aristotle 
contends that an individual “must know some, if not all, of the facts” related to the 
contextualized particular, or else there will be “no materials out of which to construct 
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arguments.”416 The summary list of inventional resources are sources from which a 
citizen develops the “topics” or “‘places’ – issues, values, commitments, beliefs, 
likelihoods” generative of and acting upon, in Michael Hyde’s view, the community’s 
“common sense.”417 By knowing the resources, sources, and sense of the common the 
citizen then is able to invent the appeals to be utilized. It is in invention that a citizen 
considers “the actual creating of narratives and arguments”418 that will be influential for 
potentially achieving his or her desired end. For a desired end to be persuasive though, 
one needs to attend to the influence of the plurality of the community in order to invent 
the rhetorical appeals necessary to democratic rhetoric and an authentic expression of 
democracy. 
This understanding of invention rests upon a particular conception of how a 
society is formed through communication. To invent persuasive appeals relating to a 
contextualized particular a citizen draws upon resources, sources, and sense of the 
common rooted in the ongoing construction of a society’s macro- and micro-culture(s). It 
is in understanding culture as a construct of communication and communication as 
constituted through culture that gives significance to and necessitates the relationship 
between rhetoric and democracy in its authentic form. The notion that culture is relational 
and interactively constructed through communication is one that has emerged through the 
work of various scholars. While one scholar would provide a prosperous perspective; to 
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develop a nuanced understanding of rhetoric’s significance for the constitution of society 
and culture a projection of the societal space in which a culture appears requires an 
imaginative interweaving of the contributions of many.  
From Symbols to Culture and Back Again 
Symbols 
Interpreting human nature and the nature of society provides a way of knowing 
what is essential for authentic governance, and yet it does not foster an understanding of 
how human beings and their societies are constituted. This understanding arises only 
when humanity’s dependency on and relationship to symbols is recognized as its 
preeminent characteristic, for human beings exist “in a symbolic universe.”419 This is not 
to diminish the stark actuality that humans live within nature or material reality, for 
human beings are born and caught up into the cradle of possibilities and constraints found 
in the physical universe; but it is to emphasize that people have a “drive to make sense 
out of experience, to give it form and order” through “symbolic activities” that enable 
them to “live in a world” that they need “to understand.”420 Clifford Geertz contends that 
the need for the symbolic is just “as real and as pressing as the more familiar biological 
needs”421 and perhaps more significantly that “symbols” actually “are prerequisites” for 
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“our biological, psychological, and social existence.”422 Through “symbolic expression” 
life breaks free, according to Ernst Cassirer, of “the limits of [its] biological needs and … 
practical interests.”423 It is through the ability to symbolize that one gains “access to the 
‘ideal world’”424 made available through thought. Thought itself is an “internalized 
conversation,” according to Geertz, that is reflective of those “external conversations … 
we carry on with individuals” and therefore thinking “is basically both social and 
public.”425 This means that thought, as George Mead argues, transpires “only in terms of 
… significant symbols.”426 Through the symbolic, individuals are able to satisfy their 
drive for understanding, think “relational[ly],”427 are “disengaged from … mere actuality 
[to] … impose meaning upon experience,” which then is productive of “human 
knowledge.”428 In the symbol, the reality of nature, the material, and the physical 
universe and its laws, “no longer … confront” individuals “immediately.”429 Instead the 
symbolic universal of human existence mediates between the individual and his or her 
experience of it and the world s/he lives in.  
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The symbolic universe is one that is “largely given”430 as each individual is born 
into an established –historical– system of socially constructed and circulating symbols. 
Analysis of a symbol, freezing it in time and space, is revealing of its general 
characteristics while also obscuring the dynamism of symbols in use. Consequently, it is 
imperative to be mindful that a symbol, rooted in a particular context, flows along a 
stream continually fed by a symbolic system. Prior, concurrent, and beyond the course of 
a lifetime an individual finds that symbols floating upon this stream “remain, with some 
additions, subtractions, and partial alterations.”431 Rooted and yet dynamic, the 
development of the symbol has allowed human beings to “make a sharp distinction 
between real and possible, between actual and ideal things.”432 Its first characteristic 
generated through and generative of social processes is representative of a symbol’s 
“functional value.”433 
Symbol’s functionality, as noted by Mead, is realized through their enabling 
characteristic “to make adjustment possible among the individuals implicated in any 
given social act with reference to the object or objects with which that act is 
concerned.”434 In other words, when an individual is desirous to engage with others 
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“deliberatively” or “spontaneously,” with “an end in view,”435 s/he must symbolically 
express that desire, which is then generative of an emotional, orientational, or actionable 
adjustment within that social context. For Mead, a “significant symbol” serves to 
“arouse,” in both the person employing it and those others to which it is directed (or 
pushing further those who attend to it), “the same response.”436 In his construction then a 
symbol is a stimulus and a response.
437
 Using a symbol, a person stimulates or “calls 
out”438 a certain attitude for both s/he and the person addressed, productive of a response 
or reaction within a particular social situation. As a means of arousal, the symbol 
awakens in an individual his or her consciousness by “mak[ing] him conscious of their 
[his or her and the other’s] attitude toward”439 it. Consequently, the use of a symbol 
allows one through reflection to make future (re)adjustments.
440
 To frame this insight into 
symbols more succinctly, symbols are arousal agents that act as “‘designators’,”441 
stimulant of particular attitudes that call for certain responses.  
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For a symbol to achieve this functionality, it must also share communally a sense 
of “universal[ity]”442 and “uniformity”443 so that “the idea behind” the symbol “arouses 
that idea in the other.”444 Without this universal and uniform characteristic symbols 
would not convey to any other the idea, attitude or response desired. This sense of 
universality and uniformity is not rigid as a symbol’s plasticity, recalling its dynamic 
nature, makes reception of it “extremely variable”445 and marked by “versatility.”446 Even 
those symbols that have remained can be received by those addressed as eliciting shades 
of or different attitudes generative of responses unintended by the person who employed 
it. When this occurs, an individual is awakened to the distinction in how the other is 
interpreting the symbol, foregrounding the difference and division between the 
interactants. Consequently, symbol use is productive of (un)certainty. Significant 
symbols shared across a social landscape create an expectation of certainty –that a certain 
symbol will stimulate a certain response– and yet the same symbol within that space, but 
more likely when used with another individual with whom cooperative symbol use has 
not occurred or is limited, also can create uncertainty which can become a space of 
learning through ongoing symbolic experimentation.   
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Meaning 
Learning to use a symbol is an ongoing process of awakening to an awareness of 
the attitudes and responses particular symbols produce. To clarify this point, a symbol 
becomes significant when a community of people learn what it symbolizes or means as a 
code for the attitudes and responses it is to stimulate. Expressive of this claim, Cassirer 
held that “a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning”447 and Geertz stated that 
“meanings can only be ‘stored’ in symbols.”448 This is especially true, according to 
Mead, when a symbol is significant or when a symbol is “internalized” to “have the same 
meaning for all individual members of the given society or social group.”449 From this 
perspective symbols are constructed socially to convey the meaning of an act; emotional, 
orientational, or actionable. 
The meaning identified with a significant symbol shares and is reflective of the 
characteristics of symbols. As “the conceptual structures individuals use to construe 
experience”450 meanings function upon “the field of relation between” a symbol 
employed by an individual “and the subsequent behavior … indicated”451 in the response 
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of an other. In other words, in Dewey’s definition, “meaning is a method of action.”452 
Supporting this contention, Burke makes a similar argument when he states that:  
To call a man a friend or an enemy is per se to suggest a program of action with 
regard to him. An important ingredient in the meaning of such words is precisely 
the attitudes and acts which go with them.
453
  
By communicating a particular symbol to another, one is not only eliciting its meaning, 
but in affect calling out within the other a desired attitude generative of a specific 
individual response/act that will facilitate present and future cooperative behavior. 
When symbols are expressed they call for a particular response, but they also 
project a frame of reference for future acts within that social context. All meaning, Mead 
claims, arises out of the “triadic relation” representative of the symbol, reaction, and 
“resultant … given social act.”454 This understanding of meaning points to a “matrix” 
from which one meaning employed “develops into [a] field of meaning.”455 For instance, 
if an individual, cognizant of a public problem, calls for a particular solution to be placed 
upon a future agenda for consideration by those empowered to act in the public realm, the 
call (symbol), if successful, not only achieves its goal (reaction), but also then results in 
the problem being addressed by those in power when they assemble (resultant given 
social act). If they accept that it is a problem worthy of a public response they will then 
provide the requisite corrective to provide what they believe to be a feasible remedy 
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(further future resultant social acts). Thus, when a citizen recognizes a public problem 
and voices his or her interest in a public resolution for it s/he not only calls out the 
possibility of future resultant acts, but is also indicating that it is something that would 
call forth a similar response or action within his or her self.
456
 
By introducing a meaning into a particular situation, an individual identifies the 
desired response as a response s/he would tend to produce as well. In calling someone by 
an affectionate term, that individual “takes the rôle of the other” believing that the person 
addressed will respond to the term in a similar attitude that the symbol’s meaning 
construes within the person who used it. So while the meaning of a symbol allows one to 
make distinctions productive of distinguishing difference and therefore division, it also is 
generative of a “common basis”457 or identification of how the individual believes s/he 
would and how those addressed should respond.
458
  
While Mead provides a foundation to understand the connection between a 
symbol or a symbolic system or order and meaning or a field of meaning, Dewey 
explicates the implications of meaning. Meaning, for Dewey is “primarily … [an] intent” 
to act, according to the significance ascribed to the symbols used, through “making 
possible and fulfilling shared cooperation.”459 These social acts arise out of the dual 
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nature of meaning; existent in “a property of behaviors, and … a property of objects.”460 
Beginning with the later first, as a meaning is circulated within a social group it comes to 
mark an object’s properties or essence in that it defines what that social group has taken it 
to be or “what it is.”461 By ascribing and inscribing a thing, person, or event with an 
essence, the community that has accepted a common symbol to symbolize it, they denote 
what it means to and within that social group.
462
 Consequently, the symbol and its 
meaning is not its “real substance of existence,”463 but is an arbitrary social construction 
that constitutes its parameters in order to render it understandable.
464
 Simultaneously 
though, when a “thing [is] pointed out … [it] gains meaning,” beyond what it “is at the 
moment” (essence), connoting or encompassing “its potentiality, as a means to remoter 
consequence”465 (future possible cooperative behaviors). In other words, meaning is 
generative of an “overt actuality and potentiality, the consummatory and the 
instrumental,”466 or what will be done and the means for its accomplishment. Therefore, 
meaning points to an object’s character (essence) and its characteristics (potentiality).467  
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From Dewey’s understanding of meaning three additional significant insights 
emerge. First meaning, as noted by Geertz, is a conceptual structure, indicating that 
while it arises out of a social context through interaction,
468
 it is productive of and held in 
the minds of society’s members. As such, Dewey claims that a meaning can be made 
“operative” beyond the particular context in which it is initially applied, carrying it across 
“space and time.”469 The meaning of a social act can be attended to by a person prior to 
its actuality (in deliberation of an end) or after it has transpired. Second, through the 
potentiality of a meaning, it also signals “more than mere occurrences” as it indicates the 
“implications”470 associated to an object or event. Taking both of these insights together, 
meaning then enables “inference and reasoning” since an individual can think through 
what certain responses and resultant given social acts or cooperative behaviors will likely 
result from introducing different meanings into particular “human associations.”471 
Meanings in this regard become “subject to ideal experimentation” through an 
individual’s capacity to imagine what results various acts, differently “combined and re-
arranged”472 will possibly produce. Through this process of experimentation then, 
individuals are able to learn how “some meanings”473 are or will be positively or 
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negatively held by the members of a certain community. This then leads to the third 
insight noted by Dewey. 
Enabling effective experimentation is the consistency that meaning attains 
through its significant symbol’s repetition and circulation. Its character and 
characteristics are indicative of “comprehensive and persisting … standardized habit[s], 
of social interaction.”474 These “rules” provide for “pattern[s]” of communicative 
behaviors that are “established by social agreement.”475 Considering all three of the 
insights together, a citizen preparing for a public discussion on a contextualized particular 
is enabled through thoughtful deliberation, possible through symbols, to experiment with 
different meanings to project how to best construct persuasive appeals that will result in a 
desired, positive outcome. Similarly, after (or during) such a rhetorical engagement, a 
citizen can recall the events that transpired, referring to the meanings employed to make 
beneficial (re)adjustments in future collectively binding decision-making opportunities. 
Typically significant symbols and meanings are lost in a sea of spontaneous use 
that obscures the deep weight they have for humanity. In part this is a result of the 
flourishing of symbols, becoming a ubiquitous phenomenon within the social space. 
Since an individual is born into a social world inundated with communication, symbolic 
orders –languages– are perceived as being natural instead of constructed. Language is the 
culmination of symbol use and, as Dewey notes, “a natural function of human 
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associations.”476 By ordering the symbols prevalent in a society, making combinations, 
stringing together multiple symbols, symbol users develop the “strict rules”477 that enable 
language to become operational. As a system of communication
478
 language reflects the 
attributes of its building blocks: symbols and meanings. Therefore a language exhibits, 
emphasizes and extends a number of the characteristics attributed to symbols and 
meanings. Here, then, it is important to attend to those areas of emphasis and extension 
attributed to language and the communicative conduct it enables. 
Language 
Building from the sense of uniformity and variability of symbols and meaning, 
language exhibits a “conservative” effect upon “human culture,”479 providing “stability 
and constancy”480 through “general rules”481 that guide its use and the meaning its 
symbols ascribe to the social experience. At this formal level, the uniformity regulating 
societal understandings of language practices make its shared meanings resistant to the 
deleterious effects of usage by a multitude of individuals over time.
482
 Despite this effect 
language retains the dynamic nature of symbols as it is “a continuous process” of an 
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“ever-repeated labor of the human mind.”483 Meaning, that since individuals have their 
“own way”484 of (mis)employing language in their day-to-day lives and relationships they 
manipulate the general rules to match their own styles and needs. Therefore, by 
communicating with other human beings, individuals reinforce the continuity of meaning, 
but when making unfamiliar applications they can shift and change meaning as well as 
(possibly) the general rules of language. Not only then, is the conservative effect, but also 
“change,” as Cassirer claims, “an essential element of language.”485  
To penetrate deeper into the implications of these attributes, it is necessary to 
point out what Cassirer claims to be the “principle … task of human language”; its 
capacity for “objectification and systematization.”486 In providing a system for symbol 
use, language separates and categorizes symbols and their associated meanings, so that 
individuals, Mead claims, can “pick out … hold” and “indicat[e] certain stimuli”487 
productive of making possible the behavioral response sought out in the other. Utilizing 
this system, language, notes Dewey, also “serves to register the relationship,” between a 
meaning(s) and an object, thereby “making it fruitful in other contexts of particular 
existence.”488 This system functions to make “distinction[s] and identification[s]”489 
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related to the potentiality of the meanings ascribed to a thing.  In facilitating distinction-
making between objects, language serves to establish “all the difference in the world.”490 
Distinctions driving difference leads to recognition of divisive state of objects in nature. 
Just as significant, while things appear in nature, language awakens one to their 
possibilities as objects of use. In making an object emerge, individuals become cognizant 
of it, through objectification, as part of their lived existence.
491
 Language therefore allows 
its users “to carry a set of symbols,”492 representative of specific meanings, productive of 
and corresponding to particular objects, that have been created and arranged by a group 
of people throughout the history of their ongoing association. 
As a means to distinguish and fill the world with objects, language functions as a 
tool to facilitate understanding, action and transformation. “Language, being the tool of 
tools”493 says Dewey, is “a form of action”494 that provides “a means of concerted action 
for an end.”495 By communicating with others, societal members are able to act in 
“cooperation” and “modif[y] and regulat[e]” the “activity,”496 situation and even the 
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members’ partnership that makes the action possible. These cooperative acts, are rooted 
in the ability of one person to understand what another is communicating. “Language,” 
argues Mead, “is simply a process by means of which the individual who is engaged in 
co-operative activity can get the attitude of others involved in the same activity.”497 
Understanding another rests upon one being able to react “from the standpoint” –
“perceive[ing] the thing as it may function in … [the] experience”498– of the person 
initiating the communication. Additionally, when a person communicates, s/he 
“conceives” of the object or act “not only in its direct relationship to himself”;499 
considering it also as the other will relate to it. Dewey summarized this well when he 
claimed that “understanding is to anticipate together” and “make a cross-reference”500 
between that which one deems possible in relation to a situation or act through 
cooperative behavior with an other(s). Inherent to language and communication then is 
the cognitive process of taking the role of an other, especially when the focus is to elicit a 
particular social response to a public problem. 
The transformative effects of language are productive of the mind, self, objects or 
situations. Mead argues that the “mind arises through communication”501 since a person’s 
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mind “is essentially a social phenomenon.”502 Within the social nature of human life “the 
individual becomes self-conscious and has a mind.”503 In society a person recognizes and 
learns the relations between him/herself and the objects and others found in the world. 
Through the “social process” inclusive of “social acts” arising from “social interactions” 
that correlate to “experiences … in a social context”504 a person also comes to recognize 
how the “social process” can be “modified by the reactions and interactions”505 of 
society’s members. Comprehending that social existence is responsive to one’s 
communicative behaviors allows for the individual to “reflexive[ly]”506 attend to a social 
act, becoming aware of his or her and the other’s attitude in relation to the act, project 
and make adjustments, and consider the possible responses. It is in “the turning-back of 
the experience of the individual upon” oneself, enabled through symbol use, that the 
“[r]eflexiveness, … the essential condition, within the social process, for the development 
of the mind”507 is realized. Conscious of the social world, an individual’s conception of 
his or her self also arises out of the social processes and communication s/he is 
embedded.  
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Awareness of oneself as a self emerges through one’s ability to “account” for 
one’s role in and relationship to the social process. In using symbols the person addresses 
his or her own attitude and response to a particular act. “The organization of the self,” 
argues Mead, “is simply [one’s] organization, … of the set of attitudes toward its social 
environment – and toward itself from the standpoint of that environment.”508 This 
organization is produced through self-reflection, consciously turning-back onto oneself 
the consequence of how one communicates in the social context. Each communicative 
exchange then, “affect[s] ourselves as we affect others.”509 Or from Dewey’s perspective 
the power of communication that results in shared “participation … is a wonder by the 
side of which transubstantiation pales.”510 In other words, communication makes possible 
the identification Burke says is part of human nature and existence. When an individual 
identifies with another through interaction, neither “person,” according to Dewey, 
“remains unchanged.”511 Drawing a further conclusion out of these insights –recalling 
that “if we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with 
ourselves”512 or in other words think– when a person deliberately engages in thought 
about a social experience or issue, through the internal conversation s/he transforms 
him/herself.  
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Symbol use, generative of the mind and self, fosters an awareness of internal 
attitudes and desired responses that relate to social acts; acts that are primarily made 
possible through the ability to communicate. As an arousal agent a symbol stimulates an 
attitude in the individual that initiates particular ways of acting: emotional, orientational, 
or actionable. When these symbols are circulated and communally shared they become 
significant as a form societal expectation of or code for certain shared attitudes and 
responses. Points of uncertainty within a social space, public concern over public 
problems in which the course of cooperative action is ambiguous for instance, are areas 
in which symbolic experimentation is most open to the potentiality and change in the 
meanings that symbols carry. The consequences of meaning, indicate that when a certain 
meaning is settled upon its effects ripple through the social space in (un)traceable ways 
through their associated resultant given social acts. To achieve these ends though, an 
individual, engaging in a symbolic expression or communication, has to reflexively take 
the role of the other in order to consider the likelihood that the communicative act will 
stimulate the attitude and result desired. Without doing so, participants will not achieve 
understanding and therefore be unable to arrive at cooperative behaviors. Actual 
communicative exchanges though allow for a person to (re)test prior conclusion about 
particular symbolic use to make ongoing (re)adjustments. Throughout this dynamic 
social process the individual awakens and constructs distinctions, identifications, and 
new possibilities for action by drawing from and (re)arranging –including and excluding– 
the existing, learned symbolic order internalized in the individual’s mind: a mind 
constituted through interaction with and consideration of one’s own standpoint as well as 
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that of others. Society and the meanings that suture together its people then, are primarily 
a result of the symbolic order through which it communicates. 
From this perspective, at each step of the process, it should be apparent that this 
construction of the mind, self, objects and cooperative acts productive of society involves 
not just communication, but rhetoric.
513
 Generating a shared meaning for a particular 
symbol dictates that individuals are persuasive in presenting the symbol and its 
application to particular social contexts. When a symbolic order, language, fixes meaning 
to symbols, it becomes a means, through the associated stimulants, attitudes, and 
responses that provide codes for communicative behavior, for persuasively enabling 
(determining what is possible and acceptable) and constraining (determining what is not 
possible, discouraged or disallowed) social acts. To persuade a community of others that 
a particular social, cooperative act will be more satisfactory as a common response to a 
contextualized particular, an individual must consider what other societal members will 
perceive as positive or negative stimulants, attitudes and responses in order to influence 
and generate a desirable reaction to his or her proposal. Additionally, with each rhetorical 
engagement, societal members experience a transformation of their own thinking and 
selves, even more so as they prepare for the engagement, reflectively replay the 
engagement or consider how to make (re)adjustments for future engagements. This 
understanding also implies that for collectively binding decisions to be truly integrated 
into a social space and integrative of the citizens their participation in the rhetorical 
engagement is of paramount significance since it is in the decision-making process that 
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the citizenry experiments and learns the symbolic meanings that stimulant the decisional 
outcome or response. 
Culture 
This story of symbol use is expressive of how symbols, meanings and languages 
emerge from and are generative of social processes and human associations. It is through 
“symbolic thought and symbolic behavior,” Cassirer claims, “that the whole progress of 
human culture is based.”514 Significant symbols, Mead contends, “aris[e] … [out of] a 
universe of discourse [that] is always implied … as the field within which … [they] have 
significance.”515 When a group of people gather they confront unique problematic social 
experiences that they must work through by innovating novel social acts responsive to the 
stimulant of a problematic contextualized particular. Meeting similar challenges members 
of this social group make (re)adjustments until a particular social act, aligning with their 
expectations, comes to provide a uniform social response.
516
 This process, repeated over 
a multitude of social situations results in the accrual of a repository of social acts and a 
language indicative of Mead’s universe of discourse. Certainly, there is drift in individual 
use of a community’s universe of discourse for as Mead notes, one’s “common response 
is one which … varies with the character of the individual.”517 Yet each social group, 
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producing different “common meanings for all [of their] members,”518 develop their own 
understandings of the world and social experiences, thereby forming the basis for and 
variety of cultures.
519
 These cultures with differing symbolic orders –languages– are 
indicative of the variety of, as Cassirer notes, “‘world-perspectives’”520 found across the 
social space of human existence.
521
 In other words, particular symbolic orders, productive 
of unique universes of discourse, are also generative of a particular point of view for how 
a people perceive the world through their culture. As Burke claims:  
Our minds, as linguistic products, are composed of concepts (verbally molded) 
which select certain relationships as meaningful. Other groups may select other 
relationships as meaningful. These relationships are not realities, they are 
interpretations of reality – hence different frameworks of interpretation will lead 
to different conclusions as to what reality is.
522
 
Consequently, to reinforce the argument that rhetoric is necessary for not only self-rule, 
but to provide validation for the claim that authentic democracy rests upon an empowered 
people it is imperative to drill back down through the end of social action and symbol use 
–cultures– to the communicative codes influential of the social acts of particular 
communities.  
Individuals living in society with one another generate a way of living or culture 
that dynamically emerges from their existent, structured social processes. Populated by 
individuals born into a pre-existing social world, societal members identify with 
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particular social groups and consequently coalesce into distinct associations. Culture 
entwines society, argues Clifford Geertz, through the “webs of significance … spun”523 
by its own members. Constructed, culture like a web connects a social space, bridging the 
divide between people for the purpose of providing a place of provision, meaning, and 
living. It is the source of necessary “information (or misinformation)” that “fill” the 
“vacuum”524 between humanity’s physiological existence and the means to procure the 
resources it requires for existence. Using Geertz’s example, while “the capacity to speak 
is … innate” the language a person communicates through is “cultural.”525 Significance 
signals that the webs of a culture individually and collectively convey certain publically 
held consensual meanings: “culture … is public526 … because meaning is.”527 Its patterns 
of meaning “give[s] form … and direction to … lives,”528 shaping their “‘…struggle for 
the real’” in which different social groups “attempt to impose upon the world a particular 
conception of how things at bottom are and how [societal members] are therefore obliged 
to act.”529 Defining the norms for communicative behaviors through this ongoing contest 
between social groups structures how experience is to be interpreted and conveyed. 
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Therefore, to comprehend a culture it is imperative to understand its symbolic order 
which in turn “exposes [its] normalness” or what a people consider to be common; 
“render[ing] them accessible … dissolv[ing] their opacity.”530 Culture, “as interworked 
systems of construable … symbols” provides the “context”531 –ever present, yet lurking 
beneath a society’s surface– in which the “flow of behaviors – or … social actions” of 
others are imbued with shared meanings that relate “an ongoing pattern of life.”532 For as 
Fanon states, “to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.”533 In other words, 
being born into a symbolic order, inculcated by a society’s meaning making system, 
means that one exists always already in a culture.  
While a human being “begin[s] with the natural equipment to live a thousand 
kinds of life,” a societal member is constrained by the webs s/he is born into, resulting in 
him or her “liv[ing] only one.”534 To be caught in a web, the potentiality of a person 
immersed in the connections that the web entails, seems to posit that culture is primarily a 
limiting structure. Instead, as the previous analysis of symbolic use and orders reveals, 
culture should also be conceived of as a productive power. Culture does constrain, but 
without its “patterns – organized systems of significant symbols,” Geertz contends, 
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humanity would be left adrift, “virtually ungovernable”535 as individuals lived a 
Hobbesian existence as “unworkable monstrosities with very few useful instincts, fewer 
recognizable sentiments, and no intellect.”536 Transforming monsters into humans, 
culture sets the stage upon which individuals come to know and recognize their place 
together in the world through facilitating cooperative behaviors. Its power does not 
submerge societal members’ individuality into mere expression of a collective self; 
instead it tangibly actuates “becoming human” through “becoming individual[s]”537 as it 
allows for each person a place to productively employ their differing natural and learned 
capacities. For Geertz, (wo)men are essential for culture, “but equally, and more 
significantly, without culture” there would be “no [wo]men.”538 It is in how individuals 
come to co-exist together in cooperative behaviors made possible through symbol use and 
exchange that humans come to distinguish themselves, their potentialities and the 
necessary conception for knowing how to exist in the world.  
In order to persuasively propose cooperative behaviors to rectify a common 
problem an individual needs to draw from the symbolic order, ethos and worldview of the 
cultural context. A society’s “organized systems of significant symbols”539 or culture, 
function, according to Geertz, to provide its “common sense,” emergent from its “ethos” 
                                                 
535
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 46. 
 
536
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 49. 
 
537
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 52. 
 
538
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 49. 
 
539
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 46. 
 143 
–“approved style of life”– and “world view” –“assumed structure of reality.”540 
“Congruence” among these building blocks results in “the imaginative universe”541 that 
gives the social acts of societal members meaning. What clouds one’s reading of a culture 
is its normalness or what is perceived as natural as the ebb and flow of a (symbolic) sea. 
It is in “grasping” the particular symbolic systems, ethos and worldview of a people that is 
generative of an individual’s “familiarity”542 with one’s own or another’s culture. 
Understanding society’s “conceptual world,”543 pushes one beyond just being able to 
account “realistically and concretely about” its people and their acts, it also enables one 
“to think … creatively and imaginatively with them,”544 as well as being able to 
“converse with them.”545  
Culture in a heterogeneous society is not monolithic, it is a composite of the 
various “powerful social groups” that “have powerful social effects”546 upon the struggle 
for what is defined as real. These groups “revere … celebrat[e] … defend … and impose” 
the core ideas that (re)produce their “intellectual and material” conceptions and 
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actualities of social “existence.”547 To transform a society, a change in its “pattern of 
social relationships” will reconfigure “the coordinates of the experienced world”548 and 
vice versa. At the institutional level this would mean nullifying or altering currently 
active establishments or constituting new ones. Especially generative for transformation 
of a society’s symbolic order and lived experience, from Geertz’s evaluation, are those 
that involve “politics” as it encompasses “the principal arenas”549 productive of cultural 
meanings. This occurred when the American colonists revolted against British rule, 
throwing off the authority of the Crown (nullification), to convene a republic ruled by 
representatives at the State and Federal levels (alteration and constitution). The American 
Revolution was preceded by and simultaneous with an ongoing shift in the colonists’ 
symbolic order that highlighted the power of the inhabitants for self-rule and self-
governance. Therefore, changing a society’s “structure of meaning”550 provides another 
level to influence changes in the intellectual and material organization of societal 
experience. 
Habitus 
Breaking through the cultural layer to social groups involves a metaphoric shift 
from that of a web of significance to space. Conceiving of society as “space” emphasizes 
that its social actors “occupy relative positions” as “directly visible beings” who “exist 
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and subsist in and through difference.”551 Upon a positional plane of existence an 
individual is a solitary being who “coexist[s]”552 in and is connected to society through its 
inherent relationships.
553
 Pierre Bourdieu, employing this spatial metaphor, positions 
individuals on a social plane to explain how one’s “relational property” separates and 
links with the “properties”554 of others. Using the metaphor of space facilitates an 
understanding of society’s “social space”555 –“structures of difference”556– through its 
entailments of “relations of proximity, vicinity, or distance” and “order, such as above, 
below, and between.”557 Positing that “the social world is accumulated history,”558 
Bourdieu, distinguishes social actors through their accrual of differing, operative capitals 
that provide “a force inscribed in [society’s] objective or subjective structures … [and] 
the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world.”559 It is through 
the capital(s) that one possesses and accumulates and is given significance in society then 
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that act to construct, influence, differentiate and structure the social world as found in 
society.  
All capital is not valued equally though, as each type of capital comes to be 
imbued with different symbolical significance within differing cultures. Economic capital 
–basically “private” ownership “of production”560 and accumulated goods– and cultural 
capital –particular dispositions and practices– form “the two principles of differentiation” 
for “advanced societies.”561  Using the relations of capital as the defining characteristics 
of social actors on a social plane points to “a structure of differentiated positions”562 that 
serve as references which allows for the “making of distinction”563 between individuals. 
“Difference,” then, “becomes a sign … of distinction” that “endow[s one] with categories 
of perception, with classificatory schemata, with a certain taste”564 indicative of 
(dis)similarity.  The position of an individual therefore is aligned with positions one takes 
regarding society, societal members, and social acts.
565
 
An individual as a point on the social plane provides one with “a point of view”566 
from which s/he perceives and acts in the social world. From a particular point of view an 
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individual or social group (mis)recognizes the distance between his, her, or their position 
and that of others.  This point of view, typically shared by others located in close 
proximity, emerges from a similar disposition or habitus. A habitus’ societal function is 
as a means for the “social conditioning” that is “generative” and reinforcing of a “unit[y] 
by an affinity of style.”567  While not determinant of “unity,” a habitus does indicate “an 
objective potentiality of unity,” as proximity “predisposes” social actors “to closer 
relations.”568  As such, knowing the habitus of an individual or social group, is 
“predictive of encounters, affinities, sympathies, or even desires”569 held by its member 
toward each other and other social actors within the social space. It is this concept of the 
habitus that is extremely valuable in comprehending the significance of rhetoric’s role in 
engaging the solid, yet shifting ground of a particular society or community.  
Since a habitus, expressive of a particular point of view “produces a form of 
interest,”570 it is instrumental in constructing and sustaining a mutable571 “unity of style” 
influential of “choices of persons, goods, practices” that are “distinct and distinctive.”572 
Productive of “different principles” or differing interpretations of communally held 
interests that an individual or social group employs to make differential decisions, a 
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habitus discriminates “between what is good and … bad, … right and … wrong, 
…distinguished and … vulgar.”573 Each habitus is “differentiated … [and] 
differentiating,”574 imputing principal interests that are distinct from other operative 
habitus and enabling recognition of distinctions between them. In a sense, the goods, 
practices and tastes of the various habitus of a society “constitute symbolic systems” 
composed of “distinctive signs.”575  
As a symbol system, the “socialized body” of a habitus “structures the perception 
of [the] world as well as action in that world.”576 How “social agents” engage the social 
world occurs through the “practical sense” rooted in the “acquired system of preferences 
… and durable [internalized] cognitive structures and schemes of action”577 reflective of 
one’s habitus.  When an individual or social group recognizes a public problem, 
oftentimes it is the habitus that informs “perception of the situation and the appropriate 
response.”578 Instead of making decisions “with full knowledge of the facts”579 a habitus 
guides the decisions of its group members through “a ‘feel’” that anticipates “what is to 
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be done in a given situation.”580 It does so by casting the principles of differentiation that 
filter the relationships between the social actors on the social plane into the future; either 
as the potentiality of a future “project” or as “pre-perceptive anticipations” provisional of 
“practical induction based on previous experience.”581 These projects and anticipations, 
generative of expectations, are based in the acquired dispositions of a habitus. Therefore, 
they are typically more substantial in relation to decision-making processes that lead to 
social, public action then conscious, intentional, deliberative choice.
582
 
Reflective of this claim, Geertz in essence concurs with Bourdieu when he states 
that “some of the most critical decisions concerning the direction of public life … are 
made in the unformalized realms of … ‘the collective conscience’ (or 
‘consciousness’).”583  Like Geertz, who contends that society emerges out of a struggle 
for the real, Bourdieu argues that “the social world, with its division” is “a field of 
forces” that structures how social actors act “in cooperation and conflict” upon “a field of 
struggles” when “collectively” considering their “contribut[ions] to conserving or 
transforming [the societal] structure.” 584 Consequently, proposed public solutions to 
public problems that fail to account for, acknowledge and incorporate in some way the 
various habitus of the social space that the collectively binding decision would effect will 
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lack persuasive appeal for those social actors. Worse, a collectively binding decision 
made without such consideration would appear unintelligible to members of unaccounted 
for habitus and serve to disenfranchise their public contributions and participation. Such 
an outcome likely would mitigate or negate support for the necessary social, cooperative 
behaviors to bring about the desired social end that addresses a problematized 
contextualized particular. 
Bourdieu’s analysis of society is based primarily on the metaphor of the social 
world as space and secondarily as capital. Both are productive for understanding the 
structure of social relations and the necessity of addressing society’s habitus in order to 
construct persuasive appeals for rhetorical engagements utilized in the context of 
collectively binding decision-making processes. By employing and emphasizing a spatial 
metaphor, Bourdieu’s contributions favor and establish the primacy of societal division 
and difference since one of the attributes of space is that an object cannot occupy the 
same space at the same time.  
Communication Communities 
Working from a different premise, Gerry Philipsen, builds his approach to society 
through the connective threads of communication. From his perspective “every person is 
connected to other people, whether the connection is obvious or subtle, tacit or 
announced, strong or weak, active or passive, pleasing or repugnant.”585 Consequently, “a 
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universal phenomenon” of human existence is “connections.”586 Society as connections, 
is contextualized and “constructed” by the “situated resources, the discursive resources in 
and through which the connections between and among people are thematized, 
constituted or reconstituted, and managed.”587 A paradox of human existence then is that 
emergent out of the symbol order, the situated, discursive resources used by a people, are 
the unique webs of significance –culture– that hold them together and the context that 
constructs and frames the “communicative conduct” of a society, as Philipsen posits, “is 
radically cultural.”588  
As previously explicated, culture is a publically constructed way of imagining 
human existence; constraining lived possibilities through the context it engenders while 
also productive of the cooperative behaviors necessary to meet physiological (resource 
provision) and psychological (individualizing) needs. It does so by providing a discourse 
effectually universal to a society, generated by and generative of common, consensual 
meanings that inform it members of its concepts, norms and common sense, which 
originate from the ethos and worldview that it describes and prescribes. Through these 
attributes of culture, a society’s heterogeneous social groups engage in a struggle to 
influence its symbolic order, social relations and institutions so as to conserve or 
transform it. Philipsen, closely following this conceptualization, summarizes his view of 
“culture as a code” representative of “a socially constructed system of symbols, 
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meanings, premises, and rules.”589 Out of a culture then arise the symbolic order 
employed by societal members to convey its conceptualization of the world and thereby 
what it sanctions and censures. While Philipsen delimits his theoretical insights, based on 
his empirical research, to speech and therefore refers to his theory as speech codes, it is 
possible and productive to push beyond this limitation by applying his contributions to 
communicative conduct in general. Communication codes then, of a particular people, are 
generative of and generated by the codes found in their culture.  
A code functions by putting its “particular elements” (symbols, meanings, 
premises, and rules) in relationship with each other in a “particular way”590 and thus 
wherever a particular pattern of elements –code– are operative, a culture exists. Or as 
Philipsen argues, with each “distinctive culture” there is a “distinctive [communication] 
code,” representative of “speech [communication] communities or social settings”591 that 
“reveals a distinctive code of self, society, and strategic action.”592 Within a society these 
ways of being, relating and acting form multiple dominant communication codes
593
 that 
reach only as far as its common usage extends.
594
  While those individuals who reside 
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within its domain of dominance are “expected to conform”595 to it, they also live amongst 
other overlapping, interpenetrating codes with which they develop varying levels of 
proficiency.  
It is one’s dominant communication code though that exhibits the strongest force 
upon how its users interact and engage the world. Knowing the dominant communication 
codes within a particular association of people then reveals their substance
596
 and serves 
as a means to rhetorically engage with them. Dominant communication codes infuse 
“substance” into an individual through its very “matter, … social life.”597 Individuals 
develop and express, not only a means “of coding, encoding, and decoding” 
communicative conduct, but also the “distinctive psychology, sociology, and rhetoric”598 
that a communication code engenders. Just as symbols are imbued with socially 
constructed meanings, all interaction is expressive of a distinct code that is meaningful 
and is comprehended by the actor and others as a means of “doing something.”599 
Through a code then, one’s expression of self is constituted, values are “embodi[ed]” and 
his or her “process of knowing”600 is enacted, enabling that knowledge to act upon the 
world.  
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Directed by a particular code “the ends and means of social action” are 
“thematiz[ed]” empowering its “knowledge about what to feel and what to do”601 to be 
“properly and efficaciously … employed.”602 Familiarity of the operative, dominant 
communication codes, influential within a collectively binding decisional space, allows 
one to understand points of conflict, the why behind ends desired, and the proposals 
offered for how to attain the necessary cooperative behaviors and act. It also is generative 
of understanding how to constructively find means to mutually constitute satisfying 
decisions for all those involved. In addition and even more significant, denial of a 
dominant communication code in the decision-making process excludes its users as well 
as the valuable experiential and practical knowledge it begets.  
Communication codes are “learned” ways of communicating, involving “terms, 
rules, and premises … [that] are inexplicably woven into [communication] itself.”603 
How a person communicates exhibits particular “patterns” conveying the values and 
practices of their dominant communication code. Recognition of these patterns, Philipsen 
holds, marks what cultural constituents are “expressed more prominently” due to their 
perceived significance and which resonate “widely throughout the lives of who use 
them.”604 The power of such a pattern, is that from it individuals can conceive of how 
certain communication conduct will be received, perceiving of the likelihood of outcomes 
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yet to be determined. Thus, through a dominant communication code the attitudes and 
responses of an individual to a stimulant are narrowed, from unlimited possibilities, to the 
constraints of meaning found in the cultural imperatives that it carries.  
While as Geertz contends, a “code does not determine conduct,”605 an assertion to 
which Philipsen agrees when he stated that, “individuals … on occasion violate and resist 
various cultural imperatives,”606 codes do describe and prescribe strong expectations 
guiding one’s communicative conduct. Through their employment, social actors “evoke 
and invoke standards of social expression” utilized “in characterizing and evaluating 
oneself and others.”607 When these expectations are violated, the individual is weighed in 
reference to the rules and premises of the code.
608
 When s/he uses them correctly, 
unnoticed, and when employed eloquently, honored. In providing “orderliness”609 for a 
communication community, a dominant communication code, allows one “a sufficient 
condition for predicting, explaining, and controlling” the “communicative conduct”610 of 
those who employ it. The pattern of communicative conduct of a particular social group 
serves as a resource that facilities the ability to enter into communicative conduct with 
expectations and explanations for the responses that communication elicits. Knowledge 
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of these expectations and explanations subsequently allow an individual to better 
influence the outcome of interactions with individuals who use that code. Therefore, 
when an individual’s communicative conduct expresses the meanings and conceptual 
world woven in and through the dominant communication code of another social group, 
that individual not only knows realistically and concretely about who they conceive 
themselves to be, the social relations they perceive as possible and how to rhetorically 
engage them, but also how to creatively and imaginatively think and converse with them 
in order to either effectively convey his or her own satisfactory proposal for or actively 
co-construct novel solutions to the common, public problem that has stimulated the need 
for cooperative social acts and ends. 
Returning to Philipsen’s nomenclature, speech codes guide who speaks when, 
how they speak and why, as well as where they convey what they speak about. Similarly 
non-verbal communication speaks, personal attire and artifacts speak, goods and practices 
speak, institutions speak, and the physical world is given meaning so that it can speak 
too. How a person stands before another, his or her appearance, a nod of 
acknowledgement or disapproval, symbols worn or waved, and even the procedures and 
procedural rules for collectively binding decision-making all rhetorically communicates. 
Constituted through this coded communication within a community are the self and 
others; what is meaningful and what is not; expectations regarding social relations and 
practices; predictions, explanations, understandings, and judgments of acts and actors; 
and even how one conceives of, relates to and acts in the world. 
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Symbolic Orders as Necessary Resources for Democratic Rhetoric 
Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a 
voice within.  
–Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Motives 
The symbolic order, manifest in its most complex system, language, provides a 
standpoint from which to see and be in the world. A shared language unites a society 
through the common culture that the citizenry always already experiences. “Language,” 
as Hans Gadamer stated, “always presupposes a common world.”611 A culture, productive 
of the common sense or ethos that provides an approved style of life and worldview, 
assumes a particular structure of reality. What a person perceives to be real shapes what 
s/he judges to be probable, right, and good. When a people share a symbolic order they 
are enabled to participate in a common interpretation of what is real and their relation to 
the real. In other words, a culture engendered through language is expressive of what a 
people believes to be reality and through their united perception a bond forms between 
them through their shared common sense. This common sense is in essence the “sense of 
the community”612 that guides how an individual member “sees things from right and 
sound points of view”613 in regards to the “concrete situation(s)”614 that comprise the 
community’s lived existence. For a people who live under the influence of a dominant, 
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unified culture, their sense of the common, constituted through their shared symbolic 
order, provides them with certainty when addressing each other persuasively. Under this 
ideal situation the symbolic choices that an individual employs in rhetorical engagements 
will likely lead to the desired cooperative behaviors s/he desired to induce.   
In general, a common good emerges out of a society’s sense of the common. This 
sense of the common helps to structure what solution will be perceived by the citizenry as 
a specific common good in relation to a contextualized particular. At times this could 
involve a solution held as beneficial for all citizens, but it also could mean that the 
common good is specifically beneficial for a micro-cultural group(s). A common good 
directed to a particular micro-culture, alleviating the burden of a public problem they 
experience, can be productive of a societal common good in that the collectively binding 
decision acknowledges these members as part of the community. In attending to and 
acting upon what a few perceive to  be a contextualized particular through the 
cooperative attitudes and actions of the many, then can act as a means to establish an 
understanding of the lived experience of the few. This focused attention and 
understanding could then lead to new ways of conceiving future societal common goods 
and shift the sense of the common to be more inclusive of society’s members.  
Since the culture of a society is not monolithic, fragmented through multiple 
habitus and communication communities that employ their own micro-cultural meanings 
and experiences, the people’s sense of the common is also fractured. The more pluralistic 
a society becomes the more likely that the common culture of the people and their sense 
of the common will not provide sufficient symbolic resources through which an 
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individual can effectively engage the people rhetorically. Consequently, when a 
contextualized particular that is considered to be problematic requires the people’s 
cooperative behaviors, the symbolic order of the common culture will not provide the 
meaningful symbols sufficient to arrive at a collective will or a  collectively binding 
decision. Instead, individuals will have to build coalitions that secure adequate support to 
enact policies and laws through which to govern society. 
To foster within the diversity found in a pluralistic society a collective will and 
collectively binding decision that is constituted out of the sense of the community and 
representative of the common good, requires democratic rhetoric. Democratic rhetoric 
emerges out of the very possibilities that communication engenders. Symbols act as 
arousal agents that provide unique meanings for the individuals of particular cultures, the 
individuals sharing similar dispositions due to their proximity on a social plane that 
differentiates them from others (habitus), and the individuals of communication 
communities that bridge difference through the employment of particular communication 
codes. For each there are particular symbols that stimulate certain responses that are 
productive of certainty in relation to attitudes and acts. Rhetorical use of a symbolic order 
that does not attend to these meanings will elicit attitudes and actions within an audience 
that results in uncertainty. This is especially true for non-in-group members when 
communicating in contexts that limit their ability for embodied, ongoing symbolic 
experimentation. In other words, to prepare for a successful rhetorical engagement that 
addresses a heterogeneous citizen audience an individual needs to take up the meaningful 
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symbols employed within society’s habitus or communication communities in order to 
influence, let alone elicit, the cooperative behaviors desired.  
While the meaningful symbols of a society’s culture provide its members with the 
webs of significance that bind them together at a macro-level, for differentiated, 
multivocalic societies this symbolic order is not sufficiently generative of the meaningful 
symbols that are necessary for rhetorical engagements productive of cooperative 
behavior for the common good of the society. To know a culture’s symbolic order allows 
a person to rhetorically craft messages that resonate with the majority of that society’s 
citizenry. This cultural knowledge provides substantial means to make meaningful 
messages, especially for a functionally homogenous society, and yet in societies that are 
more fragmented this cultural webbing is less pervasive and persuasive for generating a 
collective will productive of cooperative behaviors for the common good in regards to a 
contextualized particular. To increase the likelihood of making such connections across 
diverse societal groups, in order to constitute a collective will that leads to cooperative 
behaviors, an individual needs to engage the symbolic orders of the micro-cultural groups 
found in habitus and communication communities. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca point to the significance of engaging the symbolic orders of others when they 
wrote: “He (who wants to convince someone of something) acknowledges that he must 
use persuasion, think of arguments capable of acting on his interlocutor, show some 
concern for him, and be interested in his state of mind.”615 In the construction of 
rhetorical appeals for the engagement of the citizens of these groups the invention 
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process has to move beyond the intentional deliberation of persuasive appeals that only 
consider those symbolic meanings found within the symbolic order of the macro-culture 
to a process of invention that considers the meaningful symbols of society’s micro-
cultures as well. The implication of these factors necessitates that invention is infused 
through the entire process of rhetoric.  
How a persuasive appeal is arranged, stylized, remembered, and delivered all 
convey to an audience specific communicative meanings. Each culture, habitus, and 
communication community prefers to arrange their persuasive appeals in a particular 
way. This preference provides a temptation for some individuals to seek to privilege and 
codify how the citizenry must structure their public rhetorical engagements of 
contextualized particulars in a way that favors particular symbolic orders and cultures 
over others. In doing so, the means for rhetorical engagement become an object through 
which to assert power and dominance over other citizens. When this happens, the 
constitutive power and ethos of democratic rhetoric and democracy is subverted.  
Significance of Micro-Cultural Symbolic Orders for Democratic Rhetoric 
In recognition of this point, it is important to note before proceeding, that 
democratic rhetoric does not specify narrow constraints regarding how an empowered 
citizen invents, voices, and engages public ambiguities and contentions –public 
contextualized particulars. If it did, it would be susceptible to the strong and significant 
criticism of democratic formulations that favor one type of discourse for governance over 
others, which claims that such privileging is explicitly and implicitly exclusionary.
616
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This criticism is predicated on the belief that society’s micro-cultural groups positioned 
either at the bottom of society’s social hierarchy or at its margins can be muted by the 
dominant group(s) so as to limit the participation of these micro-cultural groups within 
the public space in which collectively binding decisions are made.  
The process producing mutedness evolves through the relationship between 
power and communication and results in dominant societal groups privileging particular 
ways of communicating that are expressive of their experience in and understanding of 
the world.
617
 “The experience of reality,” says Dale Spender, “of those who dominate, of 
those who have power, dominates.”618 Through their influence a powerful group’s 
communication –symbolic order– comes to dominant the public realm and governance.619 
The implications of this arrangement are, as Cheris Kramarae argues the following: 
…subordinate groups may have a lot to say, but they tend to have relatively little 
power to say it… Their speech is disrespected by those in the dominant positions; 
their knowledge is not considered sufficient for public decision-making… their 
experiences are interpreted for them by others; and they are encouraged to see 
themselves as represented in the dominant discourse.
620
  
For subordinate, micro-cultural groups to speak into the political sphere, for their voice to 
be heard, they have to either, foster and adopt allies within the dominant group to speak 
for them or they have to communicate in a way that mirrors the privileged 
                                                 
617
 Cheris Kramarae, Women and Men Speaking: Frameworks for Analysis 
(Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers, 1981), 1.  
 
618
 Dale Spender, “Defining Reality: A Powerful Tool,” in Language and Power, 
eds. Cheris Kramarae, Muriel Schulz, and William M. O’Barr (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications,1984), 198. 
 
619
 Kramarae, Women and Men Speaking, 2.  
 
620
 Cheris Kramarae, “Muted Group Theory and Communication: Asking 
Dangerous Questions,” in Women and Language 28, no. 2 (October 2005): 55. 
 163 
communication style.
621
 In translating from their means of communicating –symbolic 
order– to the dominant form of communication there can be a loss in meaning that leads 
to their ideas being undervalued or overlooked.
622
 Consequently, even when citizens are 
viewed as equal, the experiences and ways of communicating the lifeworld of micro-
cultural groups are implicitly or explicitly excluded from governance. 
A clear historical instance of the subversive power of privileging a particular 
symbolic order over that of others occurred in the municipal assembly of Belmonte, 
Portugal. Following the military coup of 1974 “a revolutionary constitution and a liberal 
democratic government”623 was adopted in 1976. This new political arrangement shifted 
governance of rural local matters to Assemblies composed of elected citizens.
624
 To 
facilitate “a fair hearing of members’ opinions … organize discussion and reach 
decision’s fairly”625 the assembly, Robert Reed reports, selected Robert’s Rules of Order 
to guide the Assembly’s communication. Instead of equalizing participation, members 
who incorporated Robert’s Rules into their communication repertoire were active in and 
dominated the Assembly’s proceedings626 over those who believed that the 
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communication style of the Assembly should employ the common rhetoric found in 
“informal debates in Belmonte’s streets and cafes.”627 Those who favored using rhetoric 
common to non-elites of their community did so because they believed that the 
imposition of Robert’s Rules invalidated the revolutionary ideal of equality for everyone 
and for everyone’s voice concerning local problems and solutions to be heard in the 
Assembly.
628
 
Individuals who employed the sanctioned symbolic order, Robert’s Rules, learned 
to speak within its communication codes and exhibited the proper disposition, so that 
they could know when to adhere to, negotiate, and even violate the Rules. Members 
preferring the common rhetoric of the community were muted, in “that they [could not] 
participate fully in the Assembly.”629 In Reed’s evaluation, the imposition of Robert’s 
Rules, “created a division within the Assembly,” that allowed one group to “make their 
voices heard” and the other to “have little political impact.”630 Consequently, by dictating 
stringent rules or norms for proper communication, limiting how the citizenry engaged in 
the process, resulted in a division within the Assembly, flattening the inclusion of societal 
difference and negating the facilitation of collectively binding decisions representative of 
a collective will.  
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Necessity of Productive Difference for Democratic Rhetoric 
By defining the communication space in which collectively binding decisions are 
made, unproductive division is produced and productive divisions are constrained. Such a 
space is not a democratic space, for if the democratic process is to authentically retain its 
vitality it needs to incorporate difference. Tocqueville alludes to this when he noted that 
“to meddle in the government of society and to speak about it is the greatest business … 
is the only pleasure an American knows.”631 To be able to meddle means, not only the 
notion that the people are empowered to do so and that through their efforts they actually 
can rule themselves, but that they can introduce differences that interrupt and thereby 
agitate the dominant reading of a contextualized particular. By creating this type 
collectively binding decision-making, democracy encourages rhetorical engagement of 
questions that agitate individuals to ask questions, arising out of their differences, for 
which the answers are open and not certain.
632
  
In the realm of governance the decision-making process through which its actors 
arrive at collectively binding decisions, productive of a common-good, address 
“subject[s] … such as seem to present [the citizenry] with alternative possibilities.”633 
Since individuals exist in a divided state and furthermore experience divided interests, 
contestation constitutes the very core of the political sphere. In Mouffe’s appraisal it is “a 
well-functioning democracy [that] calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political 
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positions.”634  This clash is severely hampered when the political space closes down the 
symbolic orders considered acceptable within it. Consequently, democracy that does not 
provide a space for its citizens to respond to exigencies of political conflict and allow for 
the employment of their particular symbolic orders is hardly worthy of conception.
635
 It is 
only when governance creates an inclusive arena for difference, that the collectively 
binding decision-making space truly recognizes and actualizes “democracy [that] … 
structur[es] political conflict so that [those areas of contestation] might be settled through 
the ‘force’ of communicative influence.’”636 It is here that the primacy of democratic 
rhetoric as the means for political interaction finds its substantiality.  
If democracy is to functionally exist, then a decisional space in which difference 
and conflict is constructively engaged in order to produce common good –that does not 
mute the symbolic orders of the macro- and micro-cultures of society is required. This 
means that the citizenry needs to be able to speak into the collectively binding decision-
making process through their micro-cultural symbolic orders. It also indicates though that 
when rhetorically engaging a pluralistic audience that has come together for the purpose 
of producing a collective binding decision an individual who desires to be persuasive 
needs to craft his or her rhetorical message in a way that communicates across difference 
by employment of the others’ symbolic order. Accomplishment of this type of rhetorical 
engagement does not mean that individuals disregard their symbolic orders; it means that 
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they integrate the key meaningful symbols of others into their own. To rhetorically 
engage in this way –not communicating solely through one’s own symbolic order– will 
produce in others the attitudes and actions that will elicit and coordinate the necessary 
desired cooperative behaviors.  
Symbolic Experimentation through the Process of Invention 
Normally when confronted with a symbolic exchange in which symbols used are 
not productive of expected attitudes and actions a period of symbolic experimentation 
follows until coordination between symbols and meaning is mutually discovered. 
Symbolic experimentation tests the attitudes and actions elicited through particular 
symbol use for particular macro- and micro-cultural groups. Every interaction actually 
involves the potential for this type of experimentation, but its probability is more 
pronounced when individuals do not share symbolic orders. In democratic collectively 
binding decision-making spaces, an individual who wants to enhance his or her 
probability for influencing the decision does not have the liberty to experiment 
symbolically during the rhetorical engagement. To experiment during a rhetorical 
engagement would result in uncertainty. Consequently, individuals desirous of competent 
rhetorical engagements in a pluralistic society need to conduct their symbolic 
experimentation prior to addressing the citizenry. 
In rhetoric, invention involves not just the mental exploration of effective 
arguments, but should also include traveling through the entire rhetorical complex to the 
provisional closure of the rhetorical engagement. It is through symbolic experimentation 
in the invention process that has the power to move a private will, dependent on personal 
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preferences, to a public will that has the possibility of positing and eliciting a collective 
will productive of cooperative behaviors for a common good. To engage in democratic 
rhetoric an individual needs to address the perspectives of others through invention, in 
order to call them into a position that is supportive of the individual’s proposal for a 
collectively binding decision. Democratic rhetoric then, does not just involve a question 
of how one thinks the contextualized particular should be resolved, it involves asking the 
question of how the supposed opposition and other citizens not part of a similar habitus 
or communication community will conceive of resolution.  
In asking these questions, an individual “unsettle[s]”637 what is true for oneself. 
This combined with the nature of a public problem or contextualized particular –always a 
matter of the future in which certainty is not possible– frames the collectively binding 
decision-making process as inherently a question as well, throwing the individual 
involved in the invention process into making the self, others, and the problem 
“indeterminate.”638 Gadamer tells us that “questions always bring out the undetermined 
possibilities of a thing” and that “questioning is … the test[ing] of possibilities.”639 The 
process of invention, indicative of one’s movement through one’s private will to his or 
her public will, begins with the question of the contextualized particular. It is when, in the 
midst of the process, an individual imaginatively considers the obstacles that the 
preferences and public will of others present as a hindrance to achieving the end s/he 
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desires that the affects of rhetoric for transformation are truly in effect. The exploratory 
period prior to the imaginative investigation during the journey one takes in the mind 
through invention is a point of instigation that continues throughout invention during the 
crafting required in each component of the rhetorical complex. 
Invention through Symbolic Orders is Productive of Transformation 
The claim that rhetoric is transformational is not radical when considered from its 
end point. Rhetorical engagements leading to collectively binding decisions and their 
enactments transforms the contextualized particular in a meaningful way for all members 
of society, not just the citizenry. While the validity of this assertion is supported, it does 
not broach the depth of the claim about democratic rhetoric being made here. Democratic 
rhetoric always transforms and can radically transform how an individual engaging in it 
sees him/herself; other citizens, including those in opposition; their relationship to each 
other, society, and the contextualized particular; and the contextualized particular itself. 
All of this begins with the process of invention and continues through the performance of 
rhetorical engagements.  
Invention is a mental practice and discipline that involves the process of thinking. 
“A person who thinks,” claims Gadamer, “must ask himself questions”640 and 
consequently consideration of a contextualized particular begins with a question. In the 
process of thinking, a person mentally interacts with oneself about an object through the 
symbolic order of his or her macro- and micro-cultures. Thinking then, as noted 
previously, is an internalized conversation with the self about what meanings –attitudes 
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and actions– relate to the object of thought. When one turns back the symbolic order 
upon one’s self, that individual is able to reflexively conceive of him/her self as a self. 
The self emerges out of an ongoing process of discovering and positing a person’s 
attitude and actions toward him/herself. The meaningful symbols of the particular culture 
that primarily shape the attitudes and actions its members hold in reference to  their social 
reality then actually mold how the person conceives of him/herself and the reality of the 
world. In order to engage imaginatively or experientially with another person means that 
the individual instigating communication, must take rôle of the other to consider how 
s/he will respond to the symbols employed. This means that to induce a desired attitude 
and action in the other, an individual must think through the symbolic order of the other. 
In order to think through an employment of rhetoric would then entail familiarizing 
oneself with the symbolic orders of others. 
Beginning with the initial and ongoing questioning inherent to the process of 
invention, “opens up possibilities of meaning,” Gadamer posits, “and thus what is 
meaningful passes into one’s own thinking on the subject.”641 This uptake of meaning 
occurs through the very nature of symbolic use. To construct a rhetorical appeal for a 
rhetorical engagement an individual needs to process through his or her own symbolic 
order and the orders of those whose support s/he deemed as significant. These other 
individuals should also include those believed to offer the most pervasive and persuasive 
opposition: to leave a powerful argument against one’s own position stand or even 
preemptively unattended to allows that argument’s presence to remain in the mind of the 
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audience, inviting the citizenry to take up that position uncritically, and possibly privilege 
it.
642
 Such inattention to proposed solutions could and likely would result in an 
undesirable alternative decision guiding the solution for the contextualized particular. 
These factors inherent to a rhetorical situation necessitating cooperative actions for the 
common good of society means that the deliberating individual needs to learn the 
meanings of others. By doing so, his or her perspective of self and the world will shift; 
either in negligible or substantial ways depending on the depth of symbolic uptake 
involved. Through the use of others’ meaningful symbols the individual facilitates an 
understanding of how the symbolic order of the other influences his or her attitudes and 
action.  
Knowledge of the meaning used by another opens up and enhances the 
understanding of a person’s own meaning system. This allows a person to see how the 
other interacts with and in the world in relation to the object and scope of the meaning. In 
taking the rôle of the other necessary for eliciting the attitudes and actions desired, an 
individual develops an understanding for how and why the other perceives a public 
problem –contextualized particular– as s/he does. Once the new symbolic meaning and 
understanding is integrated into one’s own symbolic order it becomes a resource for 
reflexive consideration of the self. The transformative effects of taking up another’s 
symbolic order do not end with how an individual sees and relates to him/herself and the 
other; they similarly radiate through perspectives regarding the lived experience of 
society, other citizens, and the contextualized particular. 
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Contextualized Particulars as Exigencies for Democratic Rhetoric 
Rhetorical engagements are the people’s responses to the exigency created 
through an acknowledged contextualized particular or the voice of a citizen or member of 
society that points the attention of the people to an unrecognized contextualized 
particular.
643
  When a contextualized particular is not recognized by the people as a 
public problem or even when the majority of the people perceive that a contextualized 
particular as not being significant, while for others its importance is unquestionable, 
rhetoric facilitates one’s ability to elevate the issue to the attention of the public. Being 
able to translate one’s persuasive appeals to the citizenry, providing justifications 
supportive of his or her position, will increase the likelihood of opening up of the 
people’s awareness to the relevancy of the problem. As Iris Marion Young has noted, 
“rhetorical moves often help to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation.”644 In a 
similar fashion, rhetoric also provides the means to build identification between the 
majority and others.  
Reaching out to societal members through their shared macro-cultural or 
individual micro-cultural symbolic orders assists an individual in constructing real or 
perceived consubstantiality between members of the citizenry. In effectively 
communicating how a public problem is common ground or a ‘we’ issue an individual 
can shift views of the contextualized particular. Bringing a public problem to the 
attention of the people and/or bridging a division between certain societal members can 
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educate the people about their differences and even transform how they see and relate to 
each other across their differences. Through translating the significance of these 
ambiguous contextualized particulars into symbolic orders more likely to produce 
attitudes and actions, individuals are able to rhetorical constitute societal identifications 
that lead to common interpretations and understandings of societal goods.   
Citizens faced with a contextualized particular that is recognized as a problem, for 
which solutions remain a mystery, presents an issue that requires the potentiality of 
language. Inherent to “the essence of language,” Heidegger argues, is its capacity for 
“rift-design” –to open up space– through its ability “to tear up, to rend or rive, to turn 
over”645 the ground it attends. In engaging such contextualized particulars, through 
multiple symbolic orders, the citizenry make it a question that can be generative of 
insights into its nature as well as what is needed to solve the problem it presents to 
society. In his explication of rift-design Heidegger employs a farming analogy; when a 
farmer plows a field the potentiality of the ground is realized since “it may harbor seed 
and growth.”646 Likewise, when solutions are not unknown, rhetorical engagements that 
are infused with understandings of the attitudes and actions –meanings– held across the 
citizenry, demonstrative of their own micro-cultural perspectives, can stimulate emergent 
creative thinking. By creatively thinking through a contextualized particular, solutions 
that were not yet known, harbored within its nature and the people, can come into the 
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consciousness of the citizenry through the growth made possible in the open space 
symbolic order use creates.  
When considering the typical scenario of contextualized particulars, those for 
which the problem is known and proposed solutions are disputed, rhetoric allows the 
citizenry to present their interpretations of the problem, their relation to it, and their 
justifications for their advocated public will. How they see the world in relation to the 
contextualized particular, its real life implications for their lives, their hopes for its 
resolutions and their re-envisioning of what the world should be like once a solution is 
implemented through society’s cooperative behaviors enriches the collectively binding 
decision-making process and ultimately the outcomes. Rhetorical engagements that 
incorporate the voices of all the citizenry allows for understanding of the contextual 
particular to be mutually held and resolution to be representative of the common good.  
When all citizens are empowered to speak into the collectively binding decision-
making process the creative process of questioning and thinking, inherent to the 
communication process, opens up ways of perceiving the public problem so that resultant 
collectively binding decisions are integrative interpretations that strengthen the webs of 
significance connecting the people and highlighting the common good. As is known 
through lived experience and observation of exchanges in current political arenas these 
results often are not the case. Rhetoric and rhetorical engagements do not necessarily 
have to recognize their full potentiality for transformation and the production of common 
good solutions. Empowering citizens to represent the standpoints generated within their 
own habitus and communication communities just as likely instantiate exchanges in 
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which the citizenry talks past each other. Individuals, not willing to invent their 
persuasive appeals through symbolic experimentation, expressing only their own 
preferences for solutions to public problems, risk dividing the citizenry into faction 
further. Consequently, for rhetoric to truly be democratic rhetoric, rhetorical engagements 
need to empower citizens to fully participate rhetorically and produce rhetorical 
accountability through the power of synchronous rhetorical responses. 
Democratic Rhetoric as Empowered Participation 
At the heart of democracy are the people. This historically rooted ideal of 
democracy has found its expression in two different ideological constructions of 
democracy that manifest different means for self-governance. As will be seen, in ancient 
Athenian democracy self-governance meant that the citizenry ruled themselves through 
being empowered for self-rule. In American governance, representatives of the citizenry 
are empowered to rule for/over the people, restricting self-governance to the people 
governing their selves individually by abiding by the laws and policies their 
representatives have deemed necessary for societal life and wellbeing. Democratic 
rhetoric eschews the American constraints to self-governance by privileging self-rule: a 
democracy in which citizens rule themselves through collectively binding decisions that 
they not only establish, but also abide by because they have instituted the decisions they 
have agreed to live by. Under this ideological construction of democracy the citizenry 
fully participate in the production of the external laws and policies they live under as well 
as actively participating in putting these collectively binding decisions into practice by 
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internalizing them as legitimate constraints and lived obligations for the betterment of 
society and the fulfillment of the goods societal life makes possible. 
Collectively binding decisions can be made through two radically different 
means. Human beings are decision-makers who can make decisions unilaterally as 
individuated beings –division– or through mutual engagement with others as relational 
beings –identification. The difference between the two is that unilateral decision-making 
asserts dominance, while relational engagement asserts the primacy of mutual 
dependence or interdependence. Unilateral decisions are productive of division, distance, 
and closure. Mutual engagement is generative of unity, intimacy, and continuance. In 
relation to governance, unilateral decision-making is found in the positive and negative 
types of the one (monarchy/tyranny) or the few (aristocracy/oligarchy) ruling over the 
many, while mutual engagement brings to life the self-rule of the many.
647
 The type of 
decision making that is put into practice affects how the collectively binding decisions of 
the shared world are made, thereby constructing the shared, lived experiences of the 
world. 
For democratic rhetoric to include mutual engagement collectively binding 
decision-making must be inclusive of society’s citizenry and the citizenry needs to be 
functionally inclusive of society’s micro-cultures. Each micro-culture needs to be able to 
bring their own symbolic orders into the decision-making spaces of governance through 
which collectively binding decisions are actually constituted. The rhetoric of those who 
present proposals based on claims of that they are inclusive of the people’s collective 
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will, generative of collectively binding decisions, cannot be tested and narrowed without 
members of society’s micro-cultures evaluating their positive and negative consequences 
through their unique lived –contingent– and relevant conceptual –non-contingent– 
knowledge(s) of contextualized particulars and their implications. While as previously 
noted, the certainty of collectively binding decisions in beyond the scope of certainty, the 
probability of a collectively binding decision satisfactorily accomplishing its desired end 
is only made more secure through the collective knowledge and therefore meaningful 
participation of the citizenry. For rhetoric to be democratic then, instantiations of rhetoric 
regarding public problems have to rely upon the active, empowered participation of the 
citizenry in the collectively binding decision-making process. 
Necessity of Rhetorical Accountability for Democratic Rhetoric 
Participation in the collectively binding decision-making process is necessary for 
democratic rhetoric, but it is not sufficient for its actualization. Citizen participants need 
to also be accountable for their rhetorical engagements in the decision-making space. 
Accountability, not only refers to an obligation for being answerable, but infers that one, 
being obligated to answers for what s/he has called for or done, puts his/her person at 
risk. As a result, individuals who enact democratic rhetorical engagements must be 
answerable for their collectively binding proposals and risk their ability to effectively 
participate in such present and future engagements.  Democratic accountability compels 
an individual who engages in rhetorical exchanges over a contextualized particular in the 
decision-making space to consider the short-term and long-term effects of his/her claim 
on his/her own self, micro-culture, and society. When an individual presents his/her 
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claims through persuasive appeals s/he needs to recognize that it is not just the 
immediacy of the moment that they will be accountable for in the future but the long-
term effects of his/her proposals; not just his/her benefits that are at stake, but those of the 
entire community. For a citizen to make these associations and be held accountable for 
his/her rhetoric, democratic rhetoric must actualize the obligation for being answerable 
and the risk to his/her person.  
To realize the obligation of being answerable necessary to rhetorical 
accountability involves two factors; one relating to temporality and the other to 
inclusivity. A weak notion of accountability allows one to separate the obligation to be 
answerable from his/her rhetorical act. Accountability is dependent on relationship and 
consequently requires at least two to enact –this is even true when one holds oneself 
accountable, in that thinking involves an internal conversation– in that to be answerable 
means that there is someone to whom one is obligated to give an answer. For someone to 
be accountable then there has to be another to hold the person accountable. Holding 
someone accountable can be accomplished in the moment or later in time. When done in 
the moment accountability rests heavier upon the person who is answerable, while a 
delay shifts the burden more fully to the other. When rhetorical accountability is 
distanced through time, the citizen audience has to remember the rhetorical claims and 
the source of those claims in order to hold the individual making them accountable at a 
future date.  
In democratic rhetoric, accountability necessitates a strong version that maintains 
primacy of the obligation for answerability on the person who makes the rhetoric claims. 
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A strong version of rhetorical accountability requires that individuals making claims, 
failed or successful, be answerable for those claims. If an individual’s proposal is enacted 
it will be embedded in the mind of the audience, as the presence of the event and 
experience sustains the collectively binding decision and its advocates in their minds. 
Likewise, individuals who propose failed collectively binding decisions, due to society 
investment and ownership, will lead to the holding of that individual accountable; 
perhaps diminishing that individual’s influence and ability to address the citizenry in the 
future. In both of these instances, distance is in part negated by enactment and its ongoing 
outcomes. It is the rhetorical claims that are not substantial or that are rejected in relation 
to the resolution of the contextualized particular that can become lost in the flux of the 
multiple claims made, thereby slipping from the consciousness of the citizenry. Temporal 
distance then is detrimental to holding an individual answerable for their rhetorical 
claims.  
Risking one’s person, necessary for rhetorical accountability, rests upon societal 
inclusiveness within the arena of rhetorical engagement. The more inclusive the audience 
an individual addresses the more accountability increases. When a person has to 
rhetorically engage a group that holds wider, disparate perspectives on the points of 
contention the greater the range of invention and relationships s/he must take into 
account. This risk to self requires that rhetorical accountability be, not an anonymous 
endeavor, but one in which identity and position are known. As Arnold claims, rhetorical 
engagements “are not confrontations of impersonally symbolized concepts … and 
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vaguely specifiable human beings”;648 they are embodied confrontations that are 
inherently “always rhetoric-in-stress.”649 In putting his/her “presence” on the line through 
his/her “verbal and physical behaviors,” indicative of his/her “entire physical and 
psychological organization,” an individual “must stand with his symbolic acts,” thereby 
opening his/her entire person “for interpretation and judgment”650 by the listening 
audience. When faced with a diverse audience of others, an audience inclusive of the 
micro-cultures of society, rhetoric-as-stress functions to heighten the risk to one’s identity 
and position; compelling individuals to vigorously endeavor to be as thorough in their 
invention and delivery of their rhetorical claims as possible. This positive inducement is 
reinforced by the negative consequences to the self, in that rhetoric-in-stress puts not only 
the reputation of the individual, but that of the micro-culture with which s/he is 
associated at risk.  
The greater the inclusivity of the citizenry the collectively binding decision-
making body is –increasing the possible oppositional arguments s/he must address– the 
greater the need for an individual to deliberate –invent– about how his/her proposal will 
be received by those listening. Without a strong version of rhetorical accountability, an 
individual would be able to make proposals that favor his/her preferences without much, 
if any, consideration of others. With a strong version of rhetorical accountability 
individuals who do not make productive or at least honest proposals that are inclusive of 
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society’s micro-cultural symbolic orders, are liable to see their ability to rhetorically 
engage contextualized particulars curtailed or rejected by the people. Combining the 
temporality and inclusivity that rhetorical accountability requires, democratic rhetoric is 
fundamentally only truly functional when rhetorical engagements are direct, face-to-face 
occurrences. 
Necessity of Rhetorical Response for Democratic Rhetoric 
Within the framework established by the necessity of rhetorical accountability the 
need for rhetorical response for democratic rhetoric becomes apparent. The essence of 
rhetorical response is found in the ability to actually speak back during a particular 
rhetorical engagement. The value that rhetorical response has for democratic rhetorical 
engagements is that individuals making rhetorical claims regarding proposed solutions 
have to consider that their proposals will be challenged. When immediate rhetorical 
responses originate across the spectrum of society’s micro-cultures individuals cannot 
just make claims based solely on their own preferences or contingent knowledge because 
oppositional responses will come from not only the area of expertise, but also from those 
who have the ability to speak from non-contingent knowledge(s). By allowing the 
members of the citizen audience to immediately rhetorically respond –speak back– to 
rhetorical claims they do not support, they can filter the rhetorical claims through their 
will and judgment in order to render a response that holds the individual accountable in 
the moment. When this possibility is denied, then individuals can make rhetorical claims 
based on whatever s/he prefers without taking into consideration those s/he are 
addressing. 
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The implications of not creating a probability for immediate rhetorical response as 
related to rhetorical accountability directly affect the obligation for being answerable and 
the risk to one’s person. When an individual addresses a present citizen audience that is 
not able to respond within the context of that rhetorical engagement then rhetorical 
accountability is diminished due to the creation of temporal distance. Without the 
likelihood of immediate rhetorical response the risk to the individual making rhetorical 
claims is also reduced since the possibility that his/her identity and position being called 
into question is lessened. On the other hand, it is the probability of an immediate 
rhetorical response that ensure the likelihood of rhetorical accountability, in that 
individuals who rhetorical engage contextualized particulars need to consider the entirety 
of the citizen audience and their experience. In addition, citizens who have the right and 
opportunity to immediately respond to the rhetorical claims of their opponents compels 
these citizens to engage in the process of invention to formulate their responses drawing 
individuals from society closer together through uptake of the differing symbolic orders 
found in society. Both rhetorical response and rhetorical accountability then constrain 
democratic rhetoric and its benefits of superior knowledge –inclusion of an empowered 
citizenry– and its transformational affects to direct rhetorical engagements.  
Conclusion: The Nature of Democratic Rhetoric 
Democratic rhetoric is a form of rhetoric –persuasive communication– that is 
constrained by the nature of human existence, communication, and the implications and 
obligations of living is society together. To govern society authentically, the means of 
governance grow out of human characters and their dispositions. If this is true, then 
 183 
authentic governance must acknowledge, engage, and achieve human equality, liberty, 
power, identification, and public happiness. Democracy as the form of governance that 
best enables the achievement of authentic governance must be based upon a collectively 
binding decision-making process that realizes these characteristics and dispositions. To 
understand what democratic governance should look like –how it should be 
institutionalized and practiced– the means through which the citizenry engages one 
another that recognizes the characteristics of authentic governance needs to be 
established. Democratic rhetoric is that means: 
 Democratic rhetoric is generative of the sense of the common and societal 
identification. Citizens, who construct their persuasive appeals through a 
process of invention that explores and incorporates the micro-cultural 
symbolic orders of society, transform their understanding of a 
contextualized particular. This uptake of meaningful symbols used by 
citizens with different perspectives on a public problem has the power to 
enable a sense of the common across those differences. This short-term 
effect, assisting in the possible development of a common good for a 
specific rhetorical engagement of a contextualized particular, can also lead 
to a greater sense of the common throughout a society through the 
accumulation of ongoing, meaningful rhetorical engagements. When 
collectively binding decisions are arrived at through a citizen audience 
empowered to legislate policies and laws societal members are likely 
drawn together through the necessary uptake of their individuated 
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symbolic orders. Through this process then, the citizenry a sense of the 
common is dispersed throughout society and identification between 
societal members is enhanced.  
 Democratic rhetoric leads to equality through effective, inclusive 
participation that is productive of public happiness. If rhetoric does not 
have to specifically address a citizen audience that is inclusive of society’s 
micro-cultures and their meaningful symbols, then the effects of rhetorical 
accountability are significantly negated. A collectively binding decision-
making process that does not equally empower the citizenry to speak into 
and decide upon solutions to contextualized particulars mitigates the 
effectiveness of immediate rhetorical response to compel individuals to be 
inclusive throughout the process of invention and engagement. 
Consequently, democratic rhetoric requires a functionally inclusive citizen 
audience that is empowered to participate and make collectively binding 
decisions. In addition, since democratic rhetoric necessitates that an 
inclusive citizen audience, which participates through rhetorical 
engagements that contested public problems engender, is afforded the 
opportunity to individually or collectively act in a way that is productive 
of their public happiness. 
 Democratic rhetoric manifests liberty. Liberty rests upon the notion that 
citizens can choose and act in the world in a way that is reflective of their 
desired ends. Unlike freedom though, liberty implies a sense of obligation 
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in relation to the context of being a citizen. Under natural law the 
obligation is to oneself, free to choose and do what one desires, but as a 
citizen what one can choose and do is constrained by mutual dependence 
necessary to achieve desired ends. To realize liberty as a citizen then 
means that collectively binding decisions need to be born out of a process 
that empowers citizens through a decision-making process that relies upon 
mutual engagement. Through the parameters inherent to democratic 
rhetorical engagements societal members can choose which contextualized 
particulars –acknowledged or unrecognized– to attend to by setting the 
agenda for their engagement in the collectively binding decision-making 
process. Being the decision-makers enacts the citizenry’s ability to dictate 
the course of cooperative actions taken by societal members. By 
necessitating that citizens, across the spectrum of society’s micro-cultures, 
are the participants of the collectively binding decision-making process, 
democratic rhetoric fosters a decisional space in which the citizenry can 
enact their liberty. 
 Democratic rhetoric fosters a better decision-making through 
incorporating difference. In addressing a contextualized particular, 
rhetoric is a means to present and develop probable and provisional 
responses. When the collectively binding decision-making process is 
inclusive of society’s micro-cultures and equally empowers its citizen 
participants, that process is enriched through the non-contingent 
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knowledge(s) found throughout society. Individuals of differing habitus 
and communication communities perceive and experience contextualized 
particulars in different ways, which in turn affects their knowledge of 
them differently. More diverse knowledge about a public problem can lead 
to a more robust contestation over how to satisfactorily resolve the issue in 
that multiple standpoints. Through incorporating these different 
knowledge bases into the collectively binding decision-making process, 
thereby broadening possible points for contestation, the effects of the 
arrived at solution will have been imaginatively tested more thoroughly. 
While no guarantor of certain outcomes, solutions through democratic 
rhetoric have a greater chance at being the best collectively binding 
decisions for the particular contexts in which they were made.  
 Democratic rhetoric creates richer understandings. In constituting an 
environment that compels a deep process of invention, applicable to the 
entire rhetorical process, which should seek to understand the perspectives 
of others, democratic rhetoric opens up a space for learning. The process 
of discovery for relevant meaningful symbols employed by other micro-
cultures adds to his/her knowledge about their lived experiences. Through 
invention the imaginative deliberation to uncover practical and symbolic 
obstacles and clear pathways to a satisfactory solution can develop 
creative and critical thinking. Team these benefits, with the nature of a 
question that interrupts conceptions of the self, others, what is thought to 
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be known, and the contextualized particular, and the possibilities for 
enhancing understanding in a multitude of areas can be realized through 
democratic rhetorical engagements.  
 Democratic rhetoric is transformational. As an individual gains 
knowledge and familiarity of society’s symbolic orders other than one’s 
own primary meaningful symbol system his/her meanings are shifted. 
Depending on the level of integration transformation can provide small or 
radical changes in how an individual relates to areas that connect to the 
specific contextualized particular and others that one is exposed to through 
his/her related investigation. Reflexively considering the rôle of the other 
is transformative of one’s own meanings, which are applied to 
understanding one’s attitude and actions –meanings– toward the self, 
others, society, and the contextualized particular. Through its dependency 
on the process of invention and the productive constraints of rhetorical 
accountability and response, democratic rhetoric shifts a person’s ways of 
seeing and being in the world. 
Rhetoric, since ancient Athens, has long been associated with democracy. 
Athenian democracy and the role of rhetoric were recorded by individuals, either strongly 
or mildly adverse, to both. On the other hand, American governance at the time of the 
founders and framers, exhibited disdain for democracy and privileged reasoned debate. 
Both of these forms of governance, despite their relationships to democracy and rhetoric, 
have been strongly associated with the institutionalization and practices of democratic 
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governance. In learning from and understanding the ideologies that structure these forms 
of governance, their strengths and weaknesses, will provide guidance in how authentic 
democratic governance should be structured to best allow democratic rhetoric to be 
enacted.
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CHAPTER FOUR: IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE: IDEOLOGY OF ATHENIAN 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Introduction: Ideological Critique 
Authentic governance involves a number of attitudes and actions that spring up 
out of the nature of humanity and society. Equality, liberty, empowerment, identification, 
and public happiness/engaged participation are not simply concepts and practices to be 
held as an ideal, they are also a means for evaluating and justifying if the function and 
structure of a government is or is not authentic. Democracy, as it creates spaces for and 
calls people into governance, must exhibit the attitudes and actions –meanings– of 
authentic governance if it is to satisfy this test of authenticity and thereby be satisfying 
for the citizenry. Authentic governance is a symbol that stands for a particular set of ideas 
strung together; constructing a particular meaning that is significant for a particular 
people group. Such a framework for determining what authentic governance is can be 
referred to as an ideology of authentic governance. Ideology is a problematic term often 
cast in a negative light for the public and disparaged by many in academia –it is always 
that which the them of an us/them binary holds and is blinded by, while the us lives free 
of ideology. Rather ideology is simply another layer to the meaning-making process that 
entangles all of humanity. The ancient Athenians, as the first formulators of democracy, 
developed and honed democratic ideology. Entangled in the webs of democratic 
significance more two millennia ago, the Athenians still provide the foundation for 
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understanding the democratic ideal. Therefore, to continue investigating and developing 
an understanding of authentic governance as democracy, it is important to first 
understand, in many ways re-conceive, what an ideology is, how to conduct a critical 
ideological analysis, and then explicate as a foundation the ideology of Athenian 
democracy. Through this foundation the American claim to democratic governance will 
then be analyzed and evaluated in the subsequent chapter.  
The Inevitability of Living through Ideologies: A Means of Sense-Making 
Every individual exists entangled in a society’s webs of significance. The macro- 
and micro-cultures’ symbolic orders found in a society prescribe and inscribe upon those 
individuals, who ascribe to them, certain ways of seeing and being in the world. The 
meaningful symbols of a culture’s symbolic order are not individual and independent; 
they form a system of interrelated, interdependent relationships generative of unique 
interpretations and understandings. (Re)presenting particular articulations of meanings 
that call out and “select certain relationships as meaningful”651 a culture’s symbolic order 
affects how its adherents relate and respond to what they perceive to be reality.  Due to 
the nature of symbols –in that they are arbitrary, human constructions– “these 
relationships are not realities, they are interpretations of reality.”652 Through these 
“different frameworks of interpretations” members of differing cultural groups come to 
“different conclusions as to what reality is,”653 which enhances the significance of “some 
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human preferences and [causes] the frustration of others.”654 As such, a symbolic order is 
expressive of “a common set of norms” and “deviations”655 that are “loaded with 
judgments” and “emotional or moral weightings” that are suggestive of “attitudes and 
acts that go with them.”656  What then distinguishes the symbolic orders of the macro-
culture from that of micro-cultures and of micro-cultures from other micro-cultures are 
not necessarily the symbols employed, but the meanings of the individual symbols and 
the articulated meanings of the symbols put into relationship with each other. It is at the 
level of articulated meanings (re)presentative of the ideologies associated with and 
privileged by particular cultures that the distinctions between cultures emerge, become 
identifiable, and are consequential.  
Working through what is considered to be the most complex system of symbolic 
(re)presentation, language, Burke provides a prime starting place from which to 
conceptualize ideology. Each symbolic order of a culture coalesces around particular 
terminologies. The nature of a particular terminology provides its users with “a reflection 
of reality” that also is “a selection of reality,” which “function[s] also as a deflection of 
reality.”657 Terminologies as such, act as perceptual screens, or what he refers to as 
“terministic screens,” that “necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather 
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than others,”658 The implication is that differing terminologies exert “‘terministic 
compulsion’,”659 generative of ways to perceive “the same objects” through lens that 
“were made with different color filters.”660 Through these filters, attention is not only 
directed, but the possibilities associated with the object attended to are also implied.
661
 
Due to the consistency –universality and uniformity– necessary for symbolic orders to be 
functional meaning systems, when an individual is embedded in the perceptual screen of 
a particular terminology, his or her understandings of and beliefs about the world bends 
to what the terminology highlights. “Deliberate or spontaneous” language choices, 
according to Burke, reflect, select, and deflect “the kinds of observation[s]”662 one attends 
to, as well as how one interprets or gives meaning to those observations. It is through the 
perceptual screens instantiated through terminologies that an individual observes, 
perceives, relates to, feels, acts, and judges his or her own existence and that of others in 
the world. While these insights are consistent with the nature of symbols, meanings, and 
language, Burke’s limitation to terminologies and thus terministic screens is too 
restrictive for the totality of the meaningful symbolic representations available to 
particular cultures. A more productive conceptualization of how each culture chains 
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together certain meanings in order to give meaning to a particular emotional, intellectual, 
social, and/or material object or context is the idea of ideology. 
A set of terminology is productive of a perceptual screen that frames the 
experiential and conceptual, the attitudes and actions of the person employing the 
terminology. Even though “language and ideology are not the same”; ideologies, like 
language, are a means “through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make 
sense’ of some aspect of social existence.”663  While conceptually ideology eludes a 
“single adequate definition” because of its “wide range of historical meanings,”664 its use 
here, as I conceive it, will point to a system of meaning relating to a particular contextual 
domain for a particular association of people. Ideologies, as systems of meaning, have a 
structure and function that shapes its various cultural interpretations, understandings, and 
individual and cooperative acts. 
The Structure of an Ideology 
The structure of an ideology is primarily symbolic. The notion of the symbolic 
used here though encompasses materiality, as the division between the symbolic and 
material for human beings is an artificial construction. For while materiality, what we 
consider real and concrete either preceding the application of human efforts or not, pre-
exists the symbolic, it only meaningfully exists for human beings and society when it is 
recognized as being symbolic. Consider Burke’s contention concerning materiality –
                                                 
663
 Stuart Hall, “The Whites of Their Eyes: Racist Ideologies and the Media,” in 
Gender, Race, and Class in the Media: A Critical Reade, 3rd ed, eds. Gail Dines and Jean 
M. Humez (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011), 81.  
 
664
 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 2007), 1, 221.  
 194 
nonverbal– made when discussing persuasion: “For nonverbal conditions or objects can 
be considered as signs by reason of persuasive ingredients inherent in the ‘meaning’ they 
have for the audience to which they are ‘addressed’.”665 For instance, a common 
instrument of citizen participation, a cast ballot, is a material object that involves a 
ritualized practice, a performance, infrastructure, institutions, and once acted upon 
subsequent concrete consequences. To cast a ballot –to vote– a system of practices needs 
to be established that consensually a group of people recognize as being a means for 
representing individual judgments. For these practices to be meaningful though, 
individuals need to perform them by entering the space designated for the purpose of 
casting the ballot. This practice and performance then needs correlated infrastructure that 
facilitates the necessary individual and cooperative behaviors. Institutions fostering this 
infrastructure and which regulate and maintain the viability of these acts are needed to 
allow for the repetition of the practices and performances of voting. In addition, other 
sundry institutions, infrastructures, performances, practices, and objects have to emerge if 
not already existent and be maintained in order to carry out the consequence of the vote. 
The object used to cast the ballot is meaningless in this context without being symbolic 
for the people employing it as a means for voting. A ballot and all of its associated 
entailments, which are conceptual and concrete, have little value for victors or others if it, 
its uses, and its consequences are not symbolically meaningful. What is material then, to 
be interpreted as meaningful, has to be rendered and taken up into the symbolic order of a 
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particular people group. In other words, no matter if considering what is conceptual or 
material for it to become part of a culture it must be a meaningful symbol. 
Ideology as symbolic is structured as “a system (with its own logic and rigour) of 
… images, myths, ideas or concepts” that Althusser argues is “endowed with a historical 
existence and role within a given society.”666 Stuart Hall, “refer[s] to those images, 
concepts and premises”667 as “mental frameworks –the languages, the concepts, 
categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation–” that structure how 
individuals and communities “make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the 
way society works.”668 Composed of “practical as well as the theoretical knowledges”669 
ideologies are constructs that string together multiple symbols to form “distinctive set(s) 
or chain(s) of meanings.”670 The structure of an ideology is found in its linked constructs 
–ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, practices, institutions, and material objects– that 
“connote – summon – one another”671 in order to generate particular “schemas of 
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interpretation.”672 What distinguishes one ideology from another then are either the links 
and/or how the links are articulated.  
Ideology as an “ideological chain”673 rests upon Hall’s idea of articulation. 
Articulation configures the constructs –links– of an ideology in a particular pattern that 
structure its meaning in a unique way. The arrangement of the links of an ideological 
chain is productive of and privileges a certain meaning. This imagery of a chain though 
can be misleading for two reasons. First, the linkages of a chain are ordered linearly and 
therefore typically conjure an image of one link connected to the links before and after it. 
The linkages between the constructs are much more dynamic and diverse as they 
converge together to influence meaning. Second, it is the weight or significance of a 
link’s meaning in relation to the ideology that mark its importance for interpreting, 
understanding, and even transforming the ideology. Structurally an ideology is like a 
confluence of constructs; with the more significant constructs –stronger interpretative 
value– found at the center and those with less significance at the edge. Perhaps a better 
visual representation of the relationship and significance of the links then would be a 
cluster; with the more meaningful constructs closer to the cluster’s core while those less 
significant are found on the fringe. The benefits of the chain imagery is that it is easier to 
perceive each link as distinct and to parse out each links’ entailments, while a cluster 
provides a better understanding of which links have greater significance for meaning 
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construction and their interconnectivity –which effects the meaning of one construct and 
the meaning of the ideology is affected.   
Since cultures exist concurrently there are multiple ideologies circulating in a 
society. In a heterogeneous society, ideologies of one cultural group can be taken up, 
“negotiated,”674 or resisted by another cultural group. Each pattern of articulation 
generates different ideological meanings and effects even if the core constructs of an 
ideology appear to be the same. When authentic governance is conceived of as liberty, 
equality, empowerment, identification, and public happiness these conceptions are 
representative of core constructs for an ideological chain. The first three links of liberty, 
equality, and empowerment are privileged as core constructs for American governance. 
Yet, consider the construct of equality. Even though the Declaration of Independence 
claimed that all men are created equal, equality as constructed in the Constitution 
entailed that not all individuals were considered men or human and therefore its defining 
characteristics or entailments narrowly constrained equality. As notions about governance 
and human rights shifted culturally modifications to the Constitution enlarged the scope 
of equality to incorporate all men and then all women of a certain age. Each construct of 
an ideological chain is symbolically meaningful for specific cultures and it is the 
entailments of the construct’s meaning that shape the ideology specifically for the 
members of that culture. 
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Since ideologies are socially constructed “‘chains of meanings’”675 that frame the 
way cultural members understand and relate to their social world, ideologies are a site of 
societal contestation. As constructions ideologies, like meanings and symbols, can be 
(re)defined. An ideological struggle –a way to define what is considered to be real in the 
world– occurs:  
not only when people try to displace, rupture or contest [an ideology] by 
supplanting it with some wholly new alternative set of terms, but also when they 
interrupt the ideological field and try to transform its meaning by changing or re-
articulating its associations.
676
  
In other words, by reordering, adding or subtracting, and/or transforming the constructs 
that comprise an ideological chain or the constructs’ entailments, the way in which social 
and political existence is understood and experienced can be reconstituted.
677
 
Reconfiguring the constructs of an ideology “establish[es] a new articulation” that 
“produc[es] a different meaning.”678 This holds true as well when the entailments of a 
construct(s) is shifted to include different defining characteristics. Consequently, as will 
be seen in the subsequent analyses of the ideologies of Athenian democracy and 
American governance, even when ideologies employ core constructs that are seemingly 
similar, if one or more of the constructs entails different meanings the meaning and the 
effects of the ideology will differ as well. 
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Ideological Effects – Functions 
In essence, since an ideology is structurally a complex meaning system built upon 
language, yet also inclusive of all meaningful symbols of a culture, it function also flows 
from its attributes as a symbolic system of meaning. To be meaningful then an ideology 
must be consensually agreed upon; its strength and scope of agreement is dependent upon 
its cultural currency; and just as “meaning cannot be conceptualized outside the field of 
play of power relations”679 neither can an ideology. Consensual agreement is necessary in 
that ideologies are social constructions that allow cultural members to share the meanings 
associated with a particular context. The currency of an ideology is established and 
maintained through how it is circulated, the frequency of its circulation, and its 
significance. How an ideology is circulated affects its currency through the acceptance of 
the medium by the cultural members. During the period prior to and during the American 
Revolution the populace of predominately English citizens came to think of themselves 
first and foremost as Americans through the messages distributed through the popular 
medium of the pamphlet. Highly circulated ideologies can gain importance for cultural 
members through their consistent presence in the culture. The construct of equality in the 
articulation of the ideology of American governance has been continually conveyed 
throughout America’s history and remains as a foundational ideal that is consistently 
circulated. Significance is productive of currency, even when an ideology is rarely 
circulated, in that its meaning is judged by cultural members as being core to their 
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interpretation and understanding of a particular lived context.  For instance, while the 
significance of knowledge for governing, particularly as exhibited by the founders and 
framers of America, though not highly circulated, is still a valued construct that resonates 
with Americans when selecting those who rule over them. Currency is also connected to 
the power relations in which cultural groups and their ideologies are embedded. 
Individuals or collectives that have power within a culture and even society are able to 
privilege particular definitions –knowledge– of meaningful symbols over others. 
Likewise, cultural members of powerful cultural groups have more influence in defining 
which particular ideologies shape society and how its members can demonstrate their 
connection to it. With enhanced power the ability of these cultural members to circulate 
the ideologies they ascribe to is elevated over the ideologies of other less powerful 
cultural members. Consequently, these powerful groups have a greater ability to define 
social reality for its own members and those of the macro-culture. The consensual 
agreement, currency, and power relations differentiating cultural members provide the 
baseline for how meanings of an ideology are functionally conveyed to and disseminated 
throughout society. The real functional power of an ideology though is derived from the 
“‘material force’”680 it prescribes and inscribes upon those who ascribe to its meanings.  
Meanings are constitutive of attitudes and actions for those who accept and 
ascribe to them. These meanings are also used to interpret and conceive of others, one’s 
self, and the roles each should take up and act out in the world. Similarly, ideologies are 
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productive of subject positions that lead to the development and maintenance of related 
practices, performances, institutions and infrastructures. Althusser highlights this 
function of ideology when he contends that an ideology is productive of “material 
existence.”681 Ideologies work by “produc[ing] different forms of social 
consciousness.”682 As a meaning system productive of a social consciousness an ideology 
posits a reality for the world that influences the way a person should inhabit that reality. 
Reflective of the structure and function of an ideology, Hall claims that they “are the 
frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world – the ‘ideas’ which people use to 
figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to 
do.”683  As such ideologies present ideals about how to be in the world. To be in the 
world, following the specific social consciousness of an ideology is productive of ideals 
that frame how an adherent should be, behave, and construct their world.  
At the center of ideological materiality is the ideal subject position an ideological 
chain constructs and continually calls people into.
684
 An ideology provides an ideal 
ideological formation of the subject that is a model by which an individual compares 
her/himself to in order to distinguish his or her positionality within the people group 
adhering to that ideology. When an individual takes up an ideology s/he enters into a 
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circular relationship connecting the ideology to an ideal subject position: “the subject is 
constitutive of all ideology” only “insofar as all ideology has the function (which defined 
it) of constituting concrete individuals as subjects.”685 At the core of this relationship, 
according to Althusser, is the dual meaning of the symbol, subject, which he defines as: 
“(1) A free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; 
(2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all 
freedom except that of freely accepting his submission.”686 So while the ideal “[s]ubject 
…subjects the subject to the [ideal] subject”687 position “a subject, free to obey or 
disobey the appeal” can embody good or bad individual and collective enactments of the 
ideal subject position.
688
 While not deterministic, in that individuals have the capacity to 
select the ideologies they ascribe to, highly accepted ideologies tend to disappear into the 
background so that its meanings –called forth attitudes and actions– are “taken-for-
granted.”689 “‘Natrualized’” ideologies typically “work unconsciously”690 so that the free 
subjectivity Althusser notes is subverted in that an ideology guides the individual in 
accepting its (re)presentation of reality as obvious.    
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For a person to belong to a culture s/he is called to a subject position that 
performs practices supportive of particular forms of institutions and institutional 
infrastructure. Hall contends that ideological meanings: 
are through and through inscribed in social relations and structures. They function 
and operate socially only insofar as they are and can be, by specific cultural and 
political practices, articulated to various social positions, and insofar as they 
constitute and reconstitute social subjects.
691
 
When an individual is responsive to the call of an ideology s/he enters into a relationship 
that is constitutive of a sense of belonging to the ideals of the ideology and other 
individuals who subscribe to the reality it constructs. The act of belonging, according to 
Kraus, involves a “self-positioning” as well as being “positioned by others.”692 The state 
of belonging then is an enactment of a subject position that is “negotiated, tested, 
confirmed, rejected or qualified again and again.”693 The symbolic meaning of an 
ideological chain moves a person to take up the attitudes and acts the ideological meaning 
calls for and entails. In other words, just as the “ideas”694 held by an individual typically 
guide a person’s acts, which are material, a people form institutions that empower the 
manifestation of their ideas through supportive practices; for as Althusser claims “there is 
no practice except by and in an ideology.”695  Or stated differently, an ideology functions 
through practices that, as they are taken up, transform individuals into subjects, who in 
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turn (re)constitute and (re)circulate the ideology symbolically through associated 
meaningful symbols and materials. 
Ideologies, due to symbolic residual their function in the societal and cultural 
context leaves behind, are an effective means to investigate how different associations of 
people have governed themselves. There are two historical instantiations of governance 
relevant for this inquiry into democracy and democratic governance. The first occurred in 
ancient Athens and the later manifested during the period of the founders and framers of 
America. To highlight the key differences between these two forms of governance the 
core constructs of their ideological chains and their entailments will be established. The 
differing ideological effects –functions– of both will also be explicated. Through this 
investigation the form of governance that provides the most productive means for the 
realization of authentic governance –direct democracy of ancient Athens– will then be 
used as a model to generate a system of authentic democratic governance that could be 
employed in the contemporary American context.  
Athenian Democracy 
The day began with the sun rising out of the Aegean Sea, cresting the island of 
Salamis before directly shining its light upon Athens’ port city of Piraeus. Rowers, 
officers, tack, and minimal supplies were all on board as the rowers slipped their oar 
blades into the water to launch the warship, a trireme. The rowing master, keleustês, set 
the pace as the ship glided through the protected and fortified harbor that housed the 
might of the Athenian people, its navy. With the rhythm of one single beating heart one 
hundred and seventy men simultaneously pulled one hundred and seventy oars to power 
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the ship through the sea. History greeted the crew as they turned the trireme to the North 
and merged with others to form a squadron that would patrol the vital sea routes to the 
Hellespont. Mere decades ago, in 480 B.C. the greatest naval battle the Athenians had 
ever participated in occurred between the Persians and the Greeks in the narrow slip of 
water between Athens and the island of Salamis. Pushed to the brink by the invading 
hordes of barbarians, who crushed the Spartan led Greek army at the Battle of 
Thermopylae and occupied and burned to the ground an evacuated Athens, the Greeks 
routed the vastly numerically superior Persian fleet at Salamis and later vanquished the 
Persian army in 479 B.C. at the battle of Plataea.  
Athens, with its massive, unparalleled navy, emerged from the war, along with the 
Spartans, as a leader of the Greeks. Not only did victory and preeminence crown Athens 
but all of its citizens as well. Nearly a quarter of a century before the battle of Salamis the 
Athenians had instituted reforms that had firmly established their democratic orientation 
and with the success of its navy, populated by all of the classes of free Athenian male 
citizens, democracy had also benefitted. As Aristotle would later claim, democracy in 
Athens was strengthened through “the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the 
common people who served in the fleet.”696 Reflecting back on that history the trierarch 
or captain of the trireme, standing upon its deck, looked down into the hull of the ship, 
Demokratia,
697
 to see the power of Athens at its oars: democratic, free citizens. 
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Power: Empowered for Self-Rule 
Democracy for the Athenians was an emerging phenomenon that centered on a 
crucial core construct. In Greek, the word democracy unites, “kratos, a term for power, 
and demos, a term for ‘the people’.”698 Josiah Ober notes that while dêmokratia can be 
translated as “the power of the people” it was more likely that to the citizens of Athens, 
democracy meant “‘the capacity of a public … to accomplish things of value in the public 
realm’ – thus ‘the empowered people’.”699  Robert Dahl notes:  
“during the first half of the fifth century when ‘the people’ (the demos) steadily 
gained acceptance as the sole legitimate authority in ruling, the word ‘democracy’ 
– rule by the people – also seems to have gained ground as the most appropriate 
name for the new system.”700  
In other words, as political theorist Sheldon Wolin writes, the citizens of Athens came to 
recognize “that the power of the polis was, in large measure, their power.”701 Aristotle’s 
own analysis of democracy, “democracy is the form of government in which the free are 
rulers,”702 clearly conveyed this notion of the people, deemed citizens, being empowered 
for self-rule. It must be remembered that in ancient Athens the empowered citizenry was 
narrowly conceived to exclude women, children, foreigners, and slaves. Yet by putting 
power into the hands of this narrow band of citizens –Athenian males– Athenian 
democracy did something that was up to that point historically and politically 
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inconceivable; it elevated those who had previously been ruled to a position of 
collectively ruling the affairs of their own country.  
This core construct of an empowered people, which was positioned at the center 
of the Athenians’ ideological cluster for democracy, did not stand alone. Here the 
definition of mere definition of democracy fails us and necessitates a more complete 
explication of its additional core constructs. This is especially true since democracy 
represented more than simply the Athenian way of governance; it defined for many their 
way of being in the world.
703
 As such, the core construct of democracy –an empowered 
people– fostered a number of other core constructs or significant ideas and practices.  
Knowledge: A Finite Human Capacity 
If empowered people is set as the cornerstone of Athenian democracy, then two 
significant beliefs about governance and knowledge provided foundation stones which 
functioned to justify, in part, the people’s right to rule through self-government. The first 
belief, that citizens are sufficiently knowledgeable to govern their public affairs,
704
 is 
implied in Aristotle’s observation that “the many, of whom each individual is but an 
ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if 
regarded not individually but collectively.”705 The citizens of Athens believed that they 
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“were competent to make political judgments” about “matters of substance”706 because 
they held that “political expertise – or political ‘wisdom’ – belongs to the political 
community.”707 Each citizen brought to the political decision-making process knowledge 
of their own lives, burdens, and needs. As a result they were in the best position to 
ascertain what collectively binding decisions needed to be addressed and which proposals 
would likely be the most beneficial to the common good of the political community.  
In addition, since the Athenian people were the end users of the collectively 
binding decisions, the citizenry was also in the unique position to know the effectiveness 
of their decisions.
708
 Therefore, if a political decision was deemed ineffective, they were 
the best entity to bring the decision back to the table for revision. This belief implicates 
the second belief that since governance involves decisions about uncertain probable 
outcomes for which no one has adequate knowledge to forecast with certainty, then no 
one person or group has the right to usurp the citizens’ ability to determine the decisions 
that govern their public lives.
709
 This belief is reflected in Isocrates’ premise “that 
foreknowledge of future events is not vouchsafed to our human nature … for mankind 
this power lies in the realms of the impossible.”710 Both of these democratic beliefs rest 
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upon a claim that the knowledge and ability to rule are not exclusive to any individual or 
set of individuals but can be found in each citizen, especially when making decisions 
collectively.  
Liberty: The Heart of Democracy 
The Athenian conception of democracy also received ideological support from 
two other ideals. As classical theorist Mogens Hansen argues, “democracy is connected 
first of all with liberty, next with equality.”711 In his analysis of democracy, Aristotle 
contended that its defining principle
712
 and its end was eleutheria, or freedom.
713
 “The 
basis of a democratic state,” he claimed, “is liberty.”714 Writing some two hundred years 
prior to Aristotle “the Athenian statesman and poet” Solon, linked freedom to the 
“prerogatives and rights of Athenian citizens.”715 Even though after Solon freedom could 
have represented liberty from tyranny
716
 it was not until the completion of the Persian 
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Wars, in 479 B.C., that freedom was established in Athens as a “political concept.”717 
Learning from the war experience, the Greeks witnessed the difference between their 
fighting spirit and that of the Persians. While the Persian soldiers served and fought as the 
slaves of King Darius, the Greeks were freemen fighting for their homes, families, 
livelihood, and lives. This distinction, cemented in the Athenians’ consciousness through 
the victory over the Persians, “laid the foundations,” according to classical scholar Martin 
Ostwald, “for the later view that democracy is the only ‘free’ form of government.”718 
Liberty or eleutheria was the ideal that defined the person, the polis and the political 
sphere of Athens.
719
 
Half a century later, Pericles, Athens’ leading politician who led the Athenians 
into the Peloponnesian War, summarized the merits of democracy when he claimed that 
the citizens of Athens “are open and free in the conduct of [their] public affairs.”720 In 
fact, Pericles went on to claim that an Athenian “who takes no part in public affairs,” was 
a citizen who leads “a useless life.”721 Addressing Pericles’ comments, Hansen points out 
that one of the basic ideals Pericles emphasized in his speech was that “freedom [was] a 
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feature of public life.”722 To be free in Athens meant to be a citizen who participated in 
the government. Specifically, Athenians held that “the essence of their freedom was the 
right of any citizen to speak in the Assembly” which was their governing body.723 
Freedom afforded Athenian citizens the ability to decide their collective future. As 
Aristotle noted, “all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy.”724 
This kind of freedom, which entailed and protected the right of participation in the 
collectively binding decision-making process, links to the second pivotal construct 
necessary for empowering people within a democracy: equality.  
Equality: The Functional Realization of a Fundamental Right 
The Athenian conception of isotēs, or equality begins with their view of human 
nature. Aristotle claimed that “man is by nature a political animal” who “desires to live 
together.”725 He insisted that “man is by nature adapted to a social existence.”726 Moving 
beyond the narrow constraints of the culture’s androcentric orientation, according to this 
view, ontologically human beings share in a fundamental drive to congregate with one 
another. To be “fully human,” to manifest “qualities of excellence as human beings” 
people have to forge connection with others to fulfill their “nature [as] social beings.”727 
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It is through association with one another that humanity is able to exceed its capabilities 
as individuals and thereby perform exceptional deeds.  
Sophocles points to humanity’s uniqueness among the world’s animals when in 
the play, Antigone, he extols the great consequences that arise out of humanity’s generic 
nature.
728
 He proclaims that “numberless wonders, terrible wonders walk the world but 
none the match for man … [for] he conquers all, taming with his techniques.”729 Of all 
the mortal beings in the world, humanity, according to Sophocles, is an unfathomable and 
awe-inspiring wonder who rules over all the other creatures. Beyond their preeminence 
among their fellow animals human beings also exhibit a capacity for the political arts in 
that they have “speech and thought, quick as the wind and the mood and mind for law 
that rules the city – all these he has taught himself.”730 Humanity does not just rule over 
the beast of the fields, but they also have the capacity to learn how to meet the need of 
their fundamental nature for living in society. From this perspective human beings, share 
in a “generic humanity”731 that exhibits a common fundamental human nature, which for 
the Athenians was established at the point of creation. 
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When it was time for “mortal creatures” to be formed “out of a mixture of earth 
and fire”732 according to the creation myth told by Protagoras, the Greek deity, 
Epimetheus, convinced his brother, Prometheus to allow him to distribute to each 
creature its unique powers and nature. While Epimetheus equipped all of the “brute 
beasts,” attending to the “principle of compensation” to guide his distribution of means 
for their mutual survival, he forgot “the human race … [leaving it] unprovided for.”733  
Consequently, Prometheus found humanity to be “naked, unshod, unbedded, and 
unarmed.”734 As the appointed time for the work of Epimetheus and Prometheus to be 
inspected by the pantheon of gods and goddesses approached, Prometheus stole fire and 
the civilizing arts from Hephaestus and Athena in order to imbue human beings with 
“sufficient resources to keep himself alive.”735 Human beings were brought forth from 
the earth “into the daylight”736 with a nature to worship, speak, name, and invent, which 
allowed people to meet their basic human needs of shelter, clothing, and sustenance.  
Constituted as such, individuals emerged on the earth “weaker” than the beasts 
since they lacked the means to protect themselves. Even when they gathered in “fortified 
cities” for mutual defense they “injured one another” due to their lack of “political 
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skill.”737 Unable to live in community with one another they scattered and once more 
faced being devoured by the beasts.
738
 Looking down upon the earth Zeus, “fearing the 
total destruction of [the human] race,” decreed that Hermes impart to all the virtues of 
“respect for others and a sense of justice.”739 With these further endowments human 
beings were now able to “bring order to [their] cities and create a bond of friendship and 
union.”740 Humanity then, rooted in a common nature as gifted by the gods, share in a 
fundamental or natural equality. 
Protagoras related the creation myth as an argument to convince Socrates that 
human nature indicated their fundamental equality and that they could be educated in 
virtue. This view is also expressed in Sophocles’ Antigone. When Sophocles wrote that in 
relation to humanity and the political, all these he has taught himself, Sophocles was 
distinguishing a midpoint between a fundamental and a functional equality based in 
observation: while humans have the potential for the political arts, the art is something 
learned. The connective thread between the political arts and learning as understood by 
the Athenians, claims classical philosopher Paul Woodruff, is humanity’s ability for 
language acquisition. 
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According to Woodruff, the Athenians “knew that language can weave society 
together” and “that language is the medium of government.”741 Being the political 
animal, driven to live together, society is actualized through our capacity to communicate 
with one another. In a particularly illuminating passage, Isocrates claimed that the power 
of language and speech or “the art of discourse … belong[s] to the nature of man, is the 
source of most of our blessings.”742 Explicating the claim that communication lies at the 
heart of humanity’s commendable accomplishments, Isocrates stated:  
…because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to 
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of 
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and 
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which the power of speech has not helped us to established. For this it is which 
has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and 
base: and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one 
another.
743
 
In this passage Isocrates established that the political arts are dependent on the human 
potential for language acquisition and usage. Therefore, as Woodruff argues, the 
Athenians reasoned that since, “all humans have the potential for learning and using 
languages” humanity is also “capable, by nature”744 to employ language to govern. 
Connecting the fundamental equality of human beings and the ability to learn a 
language is important in that it highlights a distinction that the Athenians made in relation 
to equality. While Protagoras does not link language and the political arts, he does argue 
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that there is a bridge between the political arts and learning; that the virtues required for 
governing well can be taught. He stated that the Athenians “do not regard it [the political 
arts] as innate or automatic, but as acquired by instruction and taking thought.”745 In his 
argument, Protagoras, identifies a tension between the gods’ gifts, fundamental equality, 
and the development of these capacities.  
In analyzing Protagoras’ creation myth and his further dialogue with Socrates, 
political theorist Ryan Balot, argues that Protagoras offers “a justification of the 
democratic view that all citizens have a (roughly) equal capacity to contribute to political 
discussions.”746 In defining capacity, Aristotle claimed that it is an ability inherent to a 
species according to its nature: “Capacities we have by nature.”747 In his explication of 
capacities a key phrase that Aristotle included is, “we are able.”748 In other words, a 
capacity is not a guarantee, but indicates an ability or a potentiality. This conception of 
capacity is paramount in understanding that even though every human being, according 
to Protagoras, has these capacities, their ability to enact them well or virtuously is not 
equal. The notion of “rough equality”749 acknowledges that even though all humans are 
equal in their capacity for political wisdom –mutual respect, sense of justice 
(Protagoras)– or the mood and mind for law that rules the city (Sophocles) –it also admits 
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that “no one believes that these virtues are inborn qualities.”750 Rough equality allows for 
“natural differences in ability” and “differential levels of talent.”751 Rough equality 
acknowledges the experiential, in that the human social experience demonstrates that 
while an individual can be viewed as fundamentally equal he or she is not equal in 
relation to the abilities and resources of others within his or her own community.  
It appears then, that Athenians considered individuals to be fundamentally equal 
in their capacity for the political arts even though life demonstrated that through 
fortuitous birth, an abundance of gifts from nature, education, or possession of power, 
some did rise above the others. Some people are born into positions of status and wealth, 
have greater intellect or knowledge, are gifted with physical prowess, or have more 
refined moral virtues and these realities affect how fundamental equality is practiced 
functionally within society. These advantages of birth, genetics, and/or privilege can be 
parlayed into beneficial social distinctions that result in beneficial power differentials 
which then elevate their possessors politically over those less fortunate.
752
 
Fortune becomes a point of distinction only when it is referenced against another. 
Capacities and abilities have to be demonstrated in relationship to the capacities and 
abilities of others before certain abilities can emerge as being privileged. Consequently, it 
is in the realm of politics, the realm of association, that distinctions become apparent, 
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evaluated, and certain abilities are valued over others. It is out of the space in between 
people –when an individual or an association of individuals decides that in order to 
accomplish a certain goal, common effort is necessitated– that the realm of politics 
emerges.
753
 Wolin points out –just as Protagoras indicated in the creation myth– that for 
human beings to “survive, meet their needs, and begin to explore their capacities and the 
remarkable world into which they have been cast” they must share in a “common life 
[that] resides in … cooperation and reciprocity.”754 It is here, in the collective, where the 
individual strength of humanity is transformed into power. “The nature of human power” 
in the words of political scientist Hannah Arendt, “comes into being only if and when 
men join themselves together for the purpose of action.”755 Or as Wolin contends, “the 
common life and the political culture emerge to the accompaniment of power.”756 Or 
even more succinctly, “politics” according to political theorist David Held, “is about 
power.”757  
Hannah Arendt contends that “power – which no individual can ever possess ... 
arise[s] only out of the cooperative action of many people.”758 Power, is found in the “in-
between space” where people join together to manifest “the capacity of social agents, 
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agencies and institutions to maintain or transform their environment, social or 
physical.”759 Once human beings live in society, the abilities related to their political 
capacities become more significant and endowed with power. Out of the embodied 
differences enacted in the political realm, inequalities of power that were individual or 
familial become magnified exponentially within the political realm.   
It is in the political realm where individuals access their “world-building capacity 
… of making and keeping promises.”760 By making and keeping promises with one 
another, people instantiate common effort. To address the tension between the 
fundamental equality of capacities and the natural inequalities of abilities, the citizens of 
Athens constructed and refined a space where power inequalities based on social 
distinctions such as, “wealth, birth, and education,”761 could be mitigated. A fundamental 
equality that employs language to weave together society might be the gift of the gods, 
but a functional or “normative”762 equality in which individuals live as equals would have 
to be “conventional and artificial.”763 Arendt, argues that in Athens, this functional 
equality was the result “of human effort” within the “political realm, where men met one 
another as citizens.”764 In democracy the Athenians created “an artificial institution,”765 
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where individuals would be considered equal as citizens who could make and enact their 
self-governance. Athenian equality then, acknowledged the fundamental equality of 
human capacities and recognized their rough equality as experienced in differing abilities 
and power differentials. Therefore the Athenians constructed a space in which, as 
citizens, they could enact a functional equality through political participation. 
Throughout this explication of Athenian democracy and its justifications, “the 
concepts of dēmokratia-eleutheria-isotēs” or democracy-freedom-equality have been 
linked together to form “a set of political ideals.”766 These ideals functioned as “the core 
of democratic political ideology”767 for the Athenian citizens. In addition, as mentioned at 
the outset, Athenian beliefs regarding the nature of knowledge also formed part of their 
core constructs of democracy. The ideology of Athenian democracy thus far, includes 
empowerment, freedom, equality, and sufficient knowledge to rule. To establish a 
complete picture of the Athenian ideology of democracy one more core construct was 
considered to be foundational. 
Participation: Being a Democratic Citizen 
Athenian democracy was not merely a set of concepts or ideals, but it was also “a 
political system”768 that was “constituted through institutions, practices”769 and the 
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materiality of Athens. The institutions and the practices the Athenians developed enabled 
“as far as possible … [the] active involvement of the citizens.”770 Wolin makes this 
contention when he states that “the most crucial and revealing element in Athenian 
democracy was the system of annual rotation in office, the lot, and the public 
subsidization of citizen participation.”771 Aristotle supported the importance of the 
institutions of democracy when he clearly articulated its embodied, experiential practices 
in two passages from Politics. “For if liberty and equality,” he wrote, “…are chiefly to be 
found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the 
government to the utmost.”772 To secure the fundamental ideal of democracy –for the 
citizenry to be empowered– the Athenians believed that self-governance meant actual, 
direct participation in the government. As noted earlier in the discussion on freedom, the 
statesman Pericles defined a non-participant in the public affairs of Athens as being 
useless. An individual, who did not participate in the process of guiding Athens 
politically, did not enact or maintain the ideals of Athenian freedom or equality.  
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Later, Aristotle connected the ideals of democracy to the embodied and 
experiential practices within Athens’ institutions of governance. That the Athenians also 
conceived of their form of governance through a variety of forms of participation is clear 
when Aristotle defined democracy’s characteristics as:  
…the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and 
each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those 
which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property 
qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one… all men 
should sit in judgment....
773
  
Here he clearly indicated that the positions of Athenian governmental power were open 
to all citizens – Athenian males. By the mid 400s B.C. any Athenian citizen could be 
elected or assigned by lot to political positions. More commonly they could preside over 
the courts to adjudicate both private cases and public affairs such as when they 
scrutinized the performance of fellow citizens during their terms in political office. To be 
an empowered people required that the people rule and as rulers they must act to maintain 
their position of power. For the Athenians, to rule obligated their direct participation in 
the political realm. 
Athenians did not just fill their political posts in an egalitarian fashion, they 
participated in formulating the collectively binding decisions they lived under in a like 
manner as well. In Athens, the ability to rhetorically engage over the issues that produced 
collectively binding decision was believed to be the legitimate domain of the entire 
citizenry. “Democratic decision making” for the Athenians, according to Ober, “was 
predicated on public speech making, that is, on the public practice of rhetoric.”774 Such 
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regard for an egalitarian view of governance and rhetorical engagement was engendered 
from their political arrangement of direct democracy. For the Athenians, political activity 
was rooted in their understanding of isonomia, or free constitution.
775
 Isonomia meant 
“that all have the same claim to political activity,” which “primarily took the form of 
speaking with one another … essentially the equal right to speak.”776 The ability of 
Athenians to govern themselves was “based on what Pericles refer[red] to as ‘proper 
discussions’, i.e. free and unrestricted discourse,” which were “guaranteed by isegoria, an 
equal right speak in the sovereign assembly.”777 Pericles though, did not simply refer to 
discussions as one of direct democracy’s characteristics or as a means to achieve 
functional equality in the political realm, he lauded the act of discussion or rhetorical 
engagement as a means for arriving at wise decisions: “public men have, besides politics, 
their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the 
pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters.”778 He went on to contend that 
“instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of action, we think it an 
indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.”779 In deciding the course of their 
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collective action, their world-building capacities, the Athenians prized the participation of 
the entire body politic of citizens, not just that of the rich, privileged, and intelligent. Just 
as freedom was enacted through participation in the rhetorical engagements that lead to 
collectively binding decisions; so too were equality and empowerment. In ancient 
Athenian democracy the right to speak, to have an equal voice in the political decision-
making process, was essential for fair and authentic democracy. 
With the act of rhetorical engagements set as his contextual ground, is it no 
wonder that Aristotle is considered to be “the first major theorist to defend”780 political 
deliberation. For instance, he argued that “for each individual among many has a share of 
excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a 
manner one man … the many are better judges than a single man….”781 Athenians 
believed that the knowledge of the many, when accessed through the direct participation 
of the citizenry, would provide a means for arriving at better collectively binding 
decisions. For democratic Athens, it was the democratic rhetorical engagements between 
its citizens that drove and sustained its democracy. 
Conclusion: Democracy Interrupted 
Through the “first democratic transformation”782 the capacity to rule in Athens 
was extended from the few to the many. This revolutionary conception of the political 
realm and its reification as practices, institutions, and materiality exhibited linkages 
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between unique ideals about power, knowledge, freedom, equality, and participation. 
While the ideals of freedom and equality strongly resonate with contemporary 
associations with democracy, it was the Athenians’ belief about power that distinguished 
the center of the Athenians’ core constructs or ideology regarding democracy. First and 
foremost, in Athens, democracy related to a particular distribution of power. That is, its 
citizens were empowered to rule over their collective efforts and were considered to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable to do so. To concretize their notion of power, the Athenians 
created a political space where it was possible to experience and enact their knowledge, 
freedom, equality, and ultimately their power functionally.  
In Athens, the citizenry’s claim to self rule and their democratic ideology evolved 
from its rough beginnings with the reforms of Solon in 594/3 B.C., the revolutionary 
rupture in 508/7 B.C. that led to Cleisthenes’ reforms, and its “culmination” in 462/1 at 
the instigation of Ephialtes.
783
 While interrupted by brief forays with oligarchic rule in 
411-410 B.C. and 404-403 B.C.
 784
 democracy remained solidly entrenched in Athens. 
The classical age of Athenian democracy came to a close when in 322/1 B.C. “a 
Macedonian army seized Athens and suppressed [its] democratic institutions”785 and in 
317 B.C the Macedonians installed a governor. The spark of democracy did not 
substantially reignite until the fires of the American Revolution erupted nearly 2100 years 
later. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 
 
… beset with difficulties and dangers, we were fellow laborers in the same cause, 
struggling for what is most valuable to man, his right of self-government. 
Laboring always at the same oar, with some wave ever ahead threatening to 
overwhelm us and yet passing harmless under our bark, we knew not how, we 
rode through the storm with heart and hand, and made a happy port.
786
 
 –Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings 
Introduction: Ideology of American Governance 
Reemerging on the world stage with the American Revolution, democratic 
governance, once again placed the empowered people on trial. Thomas Jefferson 
repudiated governance of the one or few over the many –“Every government degenerates 
when trusted to the rulers of the people alone”– and averred the people as “its only safe 
depositories.”787 Such confidence in the “safe depository of the ultimate powers of the 
society [in] the people themselves”788 and the recognition that this belief had “not been 
fairly and sufficiently tried”789 led Jefferson to acknowledge that “the event of our 
experiment is to show whether man can be trusted with self-government.”790 Like, 
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Jefferson, George Washington recognized the tenuous nature of the endeavor on which 
the nation was embarking. In his First Inaugural Address he exhorted the people to 
remember that “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of 
government are … staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American 
people.”791 In this trust, the people were deemed to be the “the only legitimate fountain of 
power.”792 Stepping out from the shadow of the British Empire the American 
revolutionaries were thrust into a necessity; to determine how to best govern themselves 
now that they were free of the imposition of the British Parliament and Crown.  
Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, recognized the unique situation that 
independence would afford the people: “The present time, likewise, is that peculiar time 
which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of forming into a government.”793 
Throughout the history of nation formation, Paine argued that when presented with 
similar circumstances, “most nations have let slip the opportunity,” only to find that 
government was then thrust upon them. He continued by encouraging the people to “learn 
wisdom, and lay hold of the present opportunity – to begin government at the right 
end.”794 For Paine the right end of government was its lifeblood, the people. 
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How these revolutionaries from thirteen disparate Colonies, who had united to 
throw off oppression, engaged in the formation of government was a matter influenced by 
their understanding of past political thought, their own experience, and the ongoing 
production of literature, practices, and institutions. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
“understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event,”795 in which “our historical 
consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is 
heard.”796 When human beings seek understanding, they are enmeshed in the web of 
history. The process of coming to an understanding entails an act of interpretation, which 
Gadamer claims is grounded in the choice of highlighting. He argued that “all 
understanding is interpretation”797 and “all interpretation is highlighting.”798 As the 
framers of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and eventually 
the Constitution of the United States were working out how to organize the government, 
their actions were firmly rooted in their understanding of the past and their experience of 
their present conditions. 
Democracy: Fears of a Mobocracy 
While Athens is admired as the historical fountainhead of democracy now, many 
of the leading figures at the time of American independence and nation formation viewed 
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Athens and its form of governance unfavorably.
799
 Functionally, democracy was found to 
be limited in that the expanse of the American boundaries and its population precluded its 
citizens from gathering together to deliberate and vote on collectively binding decisions. 
Thomas Paine articulated this limitation well when he wrote:  
Simple democracy was no other than the common hall of the ancients. ... As these 
democracies increased in population, and the territory extended, the simple 
democratical form became unwieldy and impracticable.
800
  
While this limitation was significant, it was the founders and framers understanding of 
Athenian democracy that made it an untenable political solution.  
Fears of a pliable, divisive citizenry, as well as the anti-democratic perspective 
preserved in original texts from ancient Athens, colored the American interpretation of 
Athenian democracy and popular governance in general. Drawing from an array of 
historical accounts concerning the republics of ancient Greece, Alexander Hamilton 
opined that his contemporaries should experience: 
sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they [the Greek 
Republics] were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, 
by which they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny 
and anarchy.
801
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More specific to the formation of the American government, during the Constitutional 
Convention, it was argued that “the evils we experience flow from the excess of 
democracy” and that the people “should have as little to do as may be about the 
Government” because “they want information and are constantly liable to be misled.”802 
Writing in defense of the proposed Constitution, its “master-builder,”803 James Madison 
reasoned that “had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly 
would still have been a mob.”804 Madison viewed popular governments and democracies 
as suffering from “instability, injustice, and confusion”805 and as being “spectacles of 
turbulence and contention.”806 Democracy, in his estimation, was fundamentally 
“incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property”;807 core concerns for the 
framers of the Constitution. 
How to negotiate between the right and the power of the people to self-rule and 
the limitations of and fears attributed to ancient democracy became the key question in 
the formation of the American national government. In answering this question, the 
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framers arrived at different conclusions concerning the core ideas and beliefs about 
equality, power, and knowledge, which in turn resulted in profound distinctions between 
their American ideology of governance and the Athenian ideology of democracy. 
Standing upon very similar intellectual ground concerning foundational ideas about the 
nature of human beings, the American trajectory of thought highlighted certain human, 
societal, and political aspects that lead them ultimately to different conclusions than the 
Athenians.  
Society: The Inclination of Humanity 
Beginning with the nature of human beings from which society and politics 
emerge, the Athenians and Americans shared common ground. Much like the Athenians:  
 John Adams believed that “there is, in the human Breast, a social 
Affection, which extends to our whole Species.”808 
 Thomas Paine held that “there is no period when this love for society 
ceases to act. It begins and ends with our being.”809 
 Thomas Jefferson, “consider[ed] man as formed for society, and endowed 
by nature with those dispositions which fit him for society.”810 
Across the span of time and space, culture and civilization, human beings had 
demonstrated to these thinkers a natural inclination to gather in community.
811
 “Man,” 
                                                 
808
 Adams, The Portable John Adams, 149. 
 
809
 Paine, Rights of Man, 293. 
 
810
 Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1064. 
 232 
claimed Jefferson, “was destined for society.”812 This love for society within the Breast of 
people was not left without the necessary resources to enact the people’s natural need.  
Endowed with a nature to live with one another, humanity, it was argued, was 
also bequeathed with the dispositions and capacities to succeed in society. Adams 
claimed that nature: “has [also] furnished... [individuals] with passions, appetites, and 
propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual 
enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections.”813 Gifted 
with a social affection and a variety of faculties, in the anthrocentric phrasing of the time, 
“man has been created”814 to live in and equipped to function within society. Society in 
its own right was not considered to be inert, but due to its very nature and structure made 
specific demands on its members, requiring certain capacities, orientations, behaviors, 
relationships, and goals.   
 A fundamental aspect of community, according to Thomas Paine, was that 
individuals, driven “by a diversity of wants”, find that they are in a state of “mutual 
dependence.”815 It is this dependence, which spawns the essential nature of human 
society. In order to attain their various wants, whether abstract or concrete, individuals 
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eventually have to rely on an association of others, since “no one … is capable, without 
the aid of society, of supplying his own wants.”816 The realization that the “natural 
wants” of an individual are beyond one’s own “individual powers,”817 led Paine to argue, 
that an individual is compelled to live in society in order to consolidate the necessary 
power for the satisfaction of his or her wants and reciprocally the wants of other societal 
members. Society oriented individuals to a relationship with others through mutual 
dependence, calling on societal members to work together to achieve individual and 
common goals.  
Capacities: Reason to Limit Self-Rule 
Due to human nature and the exigence of society, human beings lived with one 
another in order to satisfy their individual and collective wants. To obtain these wants, 
each societal member brought to bear his or her various individual powers or capacities. 
Capacities, the basis for power and influence in society, were believed to be unequal in 
their distribution.
818
 Consequently, even though “all men are created equal”819 and share 
in a fundamental equality of rights, life demonstrated that humanity was not functionally 
equal. John Adams provided a clear declaration of this point after visiting a hospital in 
France where he observed fifty newborns in a single ward. He noted that “these were all 
born to equal rights, but to very different fortunes; to very different success and influence 
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in life.”820 As soon as the children departed the hospital the distinctions derived from the 
history of their families’ capacities, as well as their own, would significantly impact the 
chart of their own lives.  
In a succinct summation Melancton Smith, a preeminent Anti-Federalist, claimed 
that “the author of nature has bestowed on some greater capacities than on others – birth, 
education, talents and wealth, create distinctions among men.”821 The varying capacities 
and their differing strengths, when employed by men and women in society, resulted in 
“inequalities,” which were undeniably obvious throughout “the natural history of 
man.”822 Adams was so insistent on this point that he argued that to teach the people 
otherwise, “to teach that all men are born with equal powers and faculties, to equal 
influence in society, to equal property and advantages through life is … [a] gross … 
fraud.”823 If the people believed that all were equal, in every regard, then Americans 
would likely make collectively binding decisions concerning the rule of society and 
formation of the government reflecting this unsubstantiated belief. Adams, Smith, and 
other leading men –for citizenship was limited to certain class and race of males– who 
contended with one another during the formation of the American government, held fast 
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to the idea that due to the nature of human beings, people were not functionally equal 
even though they were fundamentally equal.
824
 
While the Athenians and Americans arrived at these foundational ideas about the 
nature of humanity and society from different sources (i.e. religious traditions), they 
shared in a consistency of thought. The importance of these foundational ideas and their 
implications is not found in the ideas themselves, but in the conclusions men like Adams, 
Madison, and others derived from them. It is here, that the trajectory of prominent 
American thinkers and political actors substantially diverged from that of the Athenians.  
Power: Containing the Beast 
At the most basic level, the Americans’ notions about capacities affected their 
conceptions about the regulation of power. Capacities interacted with four essential 
characteristics of power, resulting in a deep concern about how a national government 
should be composed. To understand their concern, their conceptions of power need to be 
explicated further. According to historian Bernard Bailyn, for Adams and his 
contemporaries, power “meant the dominion of some men over others, the human control 
of human life.”825 As society formed, members, contrary to authentic governance, 
“surrendered individual powers”826 to enable the government to act; to propose, enact, 
and enforce collectively binding agreements for all the members of society. While power 
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meant dominion, it was not conceived as being inherently negative. Power was neutral 
and a natural occurring phenomenon that emerged through the formation of society and 
which could be used for its good or its detriment.
827
  
The characteristic of power that contributed to the perception that it was 
problematic, as Adams noted, was that “[power] naturally grows.”828 Power as dominion 
continually pushed its sphere beyond the boundaries set for it.
829
 Tightly connected to 
power’s inclination for expansion and the perception of its dangerous disposition was that 
its “natural prey” was “liberty, or law, or right.”830 Indicative of this perspective, Paine 
wrote that “freedom hath been hunted round the globe”831 and in her correspondence with 
Thomas Jefferson, regarding the political situations in “France Holland and Germany” 
Abigail Adams asked, “Will Liberty finally gain the assendency, or arbitrary power strike 
her down.”832 In essence it was accepted that, due to the natural dialectical relationship 
between power and liberty, where dominion increases the liberty of the people decreases. 
Of the four characteristics of power its “essential characteristic”833 was its “encroaching 
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nature,”834 which was fueled by and fused with the capacities of individuals. Considered 
naturally occurring, morally neutral, fundamentally aggressive, and an enemy to liberty, 
it was “the nature of man – his susceptibility to corruption and his lust for self-
aggrandizement”835 that transformed power into an evil. 
It was the passions of individuals and their desire to increase their own sphere of 
dominion that corrupted the use of power. When Adams stated that “[power] naturally 
grows” he followed that claim with his explanation as to why: “Why? Because human 
passions are insatiable.”836 Or as George Washington stated, the “love of power and 
proneness to abuse it … predominates … the human heart.”837 No matter what the 
political system “absolute power intoxicates alike despots, monarchs, aristocrats, and 
democrats.”838 Teamed with superior capacities, an individual, driven by his or her own 
passions, could expand his or her dominion over others in ways that violated the liberty 
of the people. This linkage between capacities and domination was clearly articulated 
when Centinel wrote “that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents, 
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abilities, and superior acquirements.”839 This love of domination, could lead the best of 
leaders into being “instruments of despotism.”840 Therefore, vigilant watch over those in 
power by those invested with power was a necessary function to preserve liberty.  
This conclusion was a problematic for the political thinkers of the time since they 
also believed in the right of societal members to determine how they were to be 
governed. The people were held to be “the fountain of all power”841 since it was in the 
people that “all power reside[d] originally.”842 Therefore, the right of self-government 
was a “natural right,”843 a view clearly articulated by Thomas Jefferson when he wrote: 
 Every man, and every body of men on earth, possess the right of self-
government. They receive it with their being from the hand of nature.
844
 
 From the nature of things, every society must at all times possess within 
itself the sovereign powers of legislation.
845
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Historian Gordon S. Wood summarizes that “the sovereignty of the people … did not just 
mean that all government was derived from the people,” but it also “meant that the final, 
supreme, and individual lawmaking authority of the society remained with the people 
themselves.”846 According to Jefferson, individuals who had, through “the exercise of … 
faculties,” “procured a state of society,” also secured the “right to regulate and control” 
society “jointly … with all those who have concurred in the procurement.”847  Due to the 
exigency of society and the common demands of it upon societal members, each 
individual contributing to society had a right to participate in the formation and 
regulation of the government.  
Not only was the right of self-government a natural right bestowed at birth and 
through being a societal member, but it was also a reasonable response to functional 
inequality. Adams claimed that “all that men can do, is to modify, organize, and arrange 
the powers of human society … in the best manner to protect, secure, and cherish the 
moral, which are all the natural rights of mankind.”848 Seemingly this conception of 
power and the right of self-government reflected that which was discussed in relation to 
Athenian democracy, but in actuality there lies within it a significant distinction.  
In contrast to the Athenian ideology of democracy and in opposition to authentic 
governance that acknowledges, enables, and achieves a state of political agency for the 
people as empowered, the American ideology of governance extended the natural right of 
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self-government not to self-rule, but to the power of constituting and dissolving the 
chosen means of governance. While it was claimed that America was "a country where 
all power is confessed to be derived from the People”;849 the power of the people was 
limited to “a right of living under a government of their own choosing.”850 In his 
Farewell Address, George Washington echoed the notion that the American government 
was established “by the free consent of the People” and “that the People c[ould] change 
[the government] at their pleasure”851 when he stated: “The basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government.”852 
Consequently, Americans, as well as all of humanity –who are naturally driven to live 
together, compelled to social connection for the satisfaction of a variety of needs and 
wants– who are imbued with capacities inherent to the individual and/or inherited from 
others –capacities that are unequal in their distribution and which lead to distinctions 
among individuals and inequalities in society– had an equal right and the power to form a 
government in order to mitigate the influence of the inequalities found in society and 
dissolve a government that failed to do so. 
Founded in the tension between power, passions, rights, and capacities the 
American’s aversion to democracy as enacted by the Athenians comes to light. American 
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thinkers conceived of democracy as a government in which the “citizens, who assemble 
and administer the government in person,”853 ruled over the political affairs of society. 
“Sovereignty” was held by the people854 and it was “not delegated to any person or 
persons, as supreme rulers.”855 Such a system, because of the influence of capacities and 
the nature of power, according to the founders and framers, would result in the rule of the 
few over the many.  
Due to the unequal distribution of capacities or talents, a few talented individuals 
would have the means to rise to political prominence and power. “Talents,” Adams 
wrote, “…in fact commands or influences true Votes in Society.”856 Upon the strength of 
superior capacities, “Birth Fortune, Figure, Eloquence, Science, learning, Craft Cunning, 
or even … Character for good fellowship”857 an individual or a select number would 
elevate, through a succession of votes, to dominate a governing assembly. Presiding over 
the assembly, the one or few would then dictate the collectively binding decisions of the 
assembly thus effectively ruling over the entirety of society. Power in this scenario would 
then rest not with the people or the assembly, but with the one or the few who directed 
the affairs of both.  
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James Madison expressed similar concerns when he argued that the ability to 
arrive at reasoned judgments by the public or its representatives was thwarted through 
two causes: the power of passions and the influence of superior capacities. First, he 
claimed that in making political decisions “the passions … not the reason, of the public, 
would sit in judgment”858 and that “in all very numerous assemblies, of whatever 
characters composed, passion never fail[ed] to wrest the scepter from reason.”859 Those 
with superior capacities could move the passions of the decision-making audience, 
whether the public or representatives, and therefore their capacities elevated them to the 
position of de facto rulers. Even in “legislative assemblies,” Madison argued, “a single 
orator” could come to rule “as if a scepter had been placed in his single hands.”860 
Reflective of his thinking about capacities, he also dismissed the democratic oriented 
proposal of multiplying the number of representatives beyond what was necessary for 
“the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole 
society.”861  Instead of making the government more democratic, enacting such a 
measure, he argued, would actually cause “the soul that animates it” to “be more 
oligarchic.”862 
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Adams and Madison were not alone in their concern that capacities, passions, and 
power would dictate the judgment of the people. In asking “Why has government been 
instituted at all?” Alexander Hamilton proclaimed a similar refrain, “because the passions 
of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”863 Even 
more telling, is that noted anti-Federalists also held similar views. For instance, 
Melancton Smith argued, “I know that the impulses of the multitude are inconsistent with 
systematic government. The people are frequently incompetent to deliberate discussion, 
and subject to errors and imprudencies.”864 The influential voices in the debate about the 
constitution of a national, American government then, held that the people, or their 
representatives, could not be trusted to follow reason when called upon to make sensible 
collectively binding decisions since their passions could be elicited or swayed by 
individuals with superior capacities.  
Due to these considerations about the regulation of power and who it was to be 
entrusted too, power for the constitutional framers was the focal point through which the 
other ideological links of knowledge, liberty, equality, and property revolved. To resolve 
their fears about power –especially “unconstrained centralized power”865– whether 
consolidated in the hands of one or the few or even the many, Adams and Madison, 
proposed that the governing body should be divided in order to produce a system of 
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checks and balances. Both held that when “the power surrendered by the people was 
accumulated”866 into “the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective” that system of governance “may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”867 To ensure that tyranny was avoided the 
consolidation of the powers of the government –“legislative, executive, and judiciary”868– 
had to be “guarded against, by a division of the government into distinct and separate 
departments”869 or branches that were for the most part equally balanced in power. These 
divisions would create “rivalries”870 between the branches that would check the use of 
power by each. Adams argued:  
That an equilibrium of those ‘different powers’ was indispensably necessary to 
guard and defend the rights, liberties, and happiness of the people against the 
deleterious, contagious, and pestilential effects of those passions of vanity, pride, 
ambition, envy, rage, lust, and cruelty.
871
  
By structuring the government so that its powers were shared by three branches, the 
liberty of the people would be protected
872
 from the effects of the lust for self-
aggrandizement, passions, and the superior capacities of the few.  
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As seen in relation to power, the foundational ideas about capacities had profound 
implications on the emerging ideology of American governance. The core ideas of that 
ideology –power, knowledge, liberty, equality, and property– began with conclusions 
about the influence of capacities. At the fundamental level each societal member had a 
natural right to form, regulate, and conclude a government. Therefore, collectively the 
ultimate end of political power was deemed to reside in the people. At the functional 
level, power was not something held equally by all, but was derived from the embodied 
enactment of those capacities valued by societal members. In order to address the power 
and influence arising from superior capacities bestowed upon and developed in some to 
the exclusion of others, the first solution was for the people to relinquish a portion of 
their natural rights in order to empower a select few to rule over them. John DeWitt 
claimed that in composing society, individuals had to “surrender such a part of their 
natural rights, as shall be necessary for the existence of that society.”873 Likewise, 
Melancton Smith argued “what is government itself, but a restraint upon the natural rights 
of the people? What constitution was ever devised, that did not operate as a restraint on 
their original liberties.”874 Rather than empowering themselves to rule as authentic 
governance requires, Americans, drawing upon political traditions founded in English 
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roots, elected individuals “that they themselves … deputed”875 to be “trustees”876 or 
representatives. 
Instead of proposing and composing an artificial field of equality for all 
Americans, a more exclusive political domain emerged that limited rule to 
representatives: Representatives who provided a “protective barrier against 
democracy”877 and its dangerous tendencies. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point 
out, “the essence of representation [is that] it connects the citizens to government and at 
the same time separates them from it.”878 They go on to argue that “when … power is 
transferred to a group of rulers, then we all [–the people–] no longer rule.”879 This is in 
sharp contrast to the Athenian perspective of enacting power equally within a constructed 
functional political space. In Athens, the people had the right to participate, to enact their 
power upon the collectively binding decision-making process, and therefore they 
equalized the opportunity to self-rule. In the America system of governance, self-rule was 
denied to the people as their power was to be entrusted to the best individuals of society 
who would rule as the people’s representatives. 
The principle justification for a representational form of governance addressed the 
functional weaknesses of democracy. “The direct action of the citizens” that a democracy 
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calls for, Jefferson said, reduces it “to very narrow limits of space and population.”880 
Governing through representatives resolved these issues be extending the effective reach 
of the government over a “greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country.”881 
While these structural limits were of great practical concern they also obscure another 
justification for representatives that revealed a radical shift from the Athenian conception 
of knowledge. 
Knowledge: Dividing Rulers from the Ruled 
Certainly like the Athenians, the American framers recognized that individual 
knowledge was fallible. During the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin, 
acknowledged that throughout his life he had the occasion of “being obliged by better 
information, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, 
which [he] once thought right, but found to be otherwise.”882 In defending the proposed 
Constitution, Madison conceded that because the document was created by, “a body of 
men” that the framers “were liable” to have made “errors” due to their “fallibility.”883 
The point of difference between the Athenian and American perspectives about 
knowledge emerges from how each addressed the functional inequality of human 
capacities. According to the American perspective some were bestowed with or had the 
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means to accumulate and develop knowledge and therefore were better suited to be 
“rulers”884 rather than others.  
In the view of the framers and other political actors of consequence, the people 
did not possess the necessary knowledge or intellect to arrive at effective and just 
collectively binding decisions. This view was expressed during the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 when Roger Sherman claimed that the people “want information and 
are constantly liable to be misled.”885  Even Thomas Jefferson felt that they were 
“unqualified for the management of affairs requiring intelligence above the common 
level.”886 Federal representatives needed capacities that allowed them to procure, store, 
retrieve, and employ a vast quantity of information.  
This requisite knowledge and intelligence was a condition implied by the idea of a 
good government: “first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of 
the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best 
attained.”887 The knowledge Madison addressed, related to three disparate branches of 
knowledge. The first type included “the laws of all the states” and “local knowledge … 
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[about] commerce, taxation, and the militia.”888 This knowledge was necessary since 
representatives were to compose an assembly that would “be in miniature an exact 
portrait of the people at large … think[ing], fee[ing]l, reason[ing], and act[ing] like 
them.”889 This was the “ONE MAXIM” claims historian Jack Rakove that “reflected 
Americans’ ideas of representation.”890 Melcanton Smith stated that representatives 
should “resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people; 
possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their 
distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.”891 To represent the people, 
knowledge of people’s lives, resources, opportunities, and challenges was necessary so 
that the representatives could best articulate the sentiments of the people in the 
collectively binding decision-making process.  
Decisions about domestic policies though, had to also integrate national concerns 
with international realities. This involved the second “branch of knowledge,” that 
included expertise in “foreign affairs … treaties” and “the law of nations.”892 The Federal 
government –members of Congress– would now have to provide legislation that 
maximized the economic potential of American resources by considering “the wider 
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world in which the commercial and strategic interests of the United States would be 
immersed.”893 A representative then also needed to be “a legislator”894 and as such, s/he 
would need to navigate the “science of government,” which was considered by Centinel 
to be “abstruse.”895 This third and final type of knowledge, “acquaintance with the 
objects and principles of legislation”896 could “be acquired to best effect, by practical 
attention to the subject, during the period of actual service in the legislature.”897 Members 
of Congress in both, the House and Senate, had to serve as representatives of the people 
and legislators in their respective assemblies. To fulfill these roles they had to possess 
superior capacities related to their intelligence and knowledge.   
For Madison, members of Congress would need to “refine and enlarge the public 
view” since through their “wisdom [they would] best discern the true interest of their 
country.”898 He did not hold the view that representatives needed to have the same level 
of intimate knowledge of the people as some of his contemporaries. In fact, in defending 
the representative form laid out in the proposed Constitution he stated that “ignorance of 
a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of 
legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the 
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legislative trust.”899 The relevant knowledge “essential to liberty,” in the view of 
Madison, was an affinity with the common interests of the people and an intimate 
connection to their sympathies.
900
 Consequently, the requisite knowledge, actually could 
“easily be conveyed by a very few hands”901 as long as it was conveyed by “men who 
possess[ed] most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
society.”902 John Adams expressed this sentiment when he argued that “the first 
necessary step” in forming a good government “is to depute power from the many to a 
few of the most wise and good.”903  John Jay argued that the people should assent to the 
wisdom of having the best of society rule over them since the Congress of 1774 was 
composed of just such “men who pursued the true interests of their country … public 
liberty and prosperity.”904 Future members of Congress would rise to positions of power 
through the merit of their superior capacities; being “distinguished … by those 
qualities”905 they would occupy positions “where they [would] exert all their faculties, 
and enjoy all the honors, offices, and commands, both in peace and war, of which they 
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are capable.”906 These most wise and good representatives would rule for the people as 
delegates, who were entrusted with the power of people to rule over them, in order to 
secure the people’s rights to liberty, property, and equality. 
Liberty: A Right Undefined, Yet Known When Violated 
The belief that “Liberty” was considered to be “the greatest of all earthly 
blessings”907 resonates with a common, contemporary understanding of the 
Revolutionary and early Constitutional period. Patrick Henry’s proclamation of “Give me 
Liberty or Give me Death!” still is firmly ensconced in the public’s consciousness. In 
1766, John Adams, writing under the pseudonym of the Earl of Clarendon, argued that 
“the end of all government” is “the public good and “that Liberty is essential to the public 
good.”908 While the fact that liberty was a core concern of the founders and framers is 
clear, what they meant by it is not. Rakove states that “no word was more multivalent 
than liberty.”909 Cooke supports this contention claiming that “understanding” liberty “is 
extraordinary difficult.”910 To explicate what was meant by liberty, the influence of the 
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British political perspectives, which reverberated through the Colonial world at the time, 
provides a point from which to begin. 
Liberty was an idea that identified the English as freemen, no matter their “social 
rank” or their “political persuasion.”911 It was a right and practice that they 
“celebrate[d]”912 enthusiastically. For the English and their American brethren the right to 
and practice of liberty was rooted in the political philosophy of John Locke.
913
 As the 
colonists moved toward revolution their ideas about liberty reflected the arguments 
Locke developed nearly a century before 1776. Locke argued that “a state of liberty” did 
not allow for “a state of license” since the “law of nature” –or reason– governed how one 
was to “dispose of his person or possessions.”914 Reason dictated that even though 
humanity was “equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions” because as each person was “the workmanship of one 
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker” there could not “be any … subordination.”915 
When found “in society,” liberty was bound by those laws the government “enacted 
according to the trust put in it … common to every one in that society.”916 The crux of 
liberty for Locke was twofold: First, it meant freedom from “the inconstant, uncertain, 
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unknown, arbitrary will of another man” and second, liberty enabled one to “follow [his 
or her] own will in all things”917 where the law, empowered by the consent of society, 
was silent.  
These dual characteristics found their way into the American discourse about 
liberty. In 1747, liberty was defined in a New York Evening Post article as “a natural 
Power of doing, or not doing, whatever we have a Mind, so far as is consistent with the 
Rules of Virtue and the established Laws of the Society to which we belong.”918 Nearly a 
half century after setting down the enduring words, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” Jefferson claimed that “rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our 
will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others.”919 While the bare 
essence of liberty was described in these definitions, the nature of liberty was considered 
to constitute certain possibilities of thought and behavior. Adams argued that “it is a self-
determining power in an intellectual agent” since the employment of it “implie[d] thought 
and choice and power … [to] elect between objects.”920 Liberty resulted in a “state of 
mind” that “enabled citizens to exercise other rights free from the fear of tyrannical 
rule.”921 It also was suggestive of obligations and duties on the part of the people.  
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Essential for the protection of the people’s liberty, claimed George Washington, 
was their ability “to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of licentiousness – 
cherishing the first, avoiding the last.”922 For Washington, liberty obliged the people to 
honor the authority of the government, comply “with its laws” and acquiesce to “its 
measures.”923 In considering rights, Thomas Paine, argued that “when we speak of right 
we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights become duties by 
reciprocity.”924 In society, liberty existed under the limitation of the social compact, 
being constrained by the laws to which societal members consented. If liberty slipped the 
bonds of the law through a free individual’s imposition of his or her will upon another or 
another’s property, then that individual would be engaged in an act of power.  
The law hemmed in acts of power by placing boundaries within which it could 
properly function. The space within the strictures of the law was the domain where power 
had dominion over the people. Outside that space individuals were at liberty to pursue 
their pleasure. This articulation of liberty is incomplete, just as John Quincy Adams’ 
declaration that “liberty and law have marched hand in hand”925 falls short of an adequate 
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understanding of the relationship between the liberty, law, and power. The law could be a 
means of “arbitrary power” in which the “will and pleasure”926 of the one or the few was 
enforced or the law could be the expression of a free people and free government. Brutus 
argued that “in every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by 
which they are governed.”927 In a similar fashion, Thomas Paine equated “independency” 
with the ability to “make our own laws.”928 Liberty and laws walked hand in hand when 
the laws were made by or consented to by the people. Found in the space outside of the 
law were the people’s rights; rights that indicated –marked off– the extent of the 
government’s reach or power.  
The American colonists spoke “THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS …  naturally … 
[as] it was … their native tongue.”929 Liberty, according to Rakove, “was one of the great 
triad of inalienable natural rights.”930 Life and liberty were joined together by God at 
birth
931
 and therefore liberty was considered to be a natural right “derived from our 
Maker.”932 Due to its nature, liberty is not contingent upon historical-cultural-social 
factors, but is an unassailable entitlement. It is how this right to liberty is interpreted into 
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the specific “alienable”933 or legal rights of a society and its government at a particular 
historical moment that is violable. As a means to protect the people from those whom 
were entrusted with power, liberty and the legal rights made to secure it were “only for 
the governed” since rulers “did not speak for it [or] … naturally serve it.”934 These legal 
rights, as human constructions, placed a tremendous obligation on the framers of the 
Constitution, as it was their “duty … to frame a government friendly to liberty and the 
rights of mankind, which [would] tend to cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among … 
[the] citizens.”935 In the process of constructing the Constitution and its ratification, the 
legal rights necessary to preserve the people’s right to liberty were debated and defended.  
In writing his contribution to The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, 
defended the lack of a bill of rights in the Constitution. In part, he argued that the 
protection of liberty was secured by the Constitution through “the establishment of the 
writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and the TITLE OF 
NOBILITY.”936 For many though, Hamilton’s defense was inadequate and calls were 
made for the inclusion of specific rights. Centinel decried the omission of a “right to 
freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments” in addition to protection against 
the imposition of “general warrants.”937 The neglect of the right to “the FREEDOM OF 
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THE PRESS” was particularly disturbing to John DeWitt, as experience had “esteemed 
[it as] one of [civil liberty’s] safe guards.”938 In responding to James Madison’s inquiry 
about the proposed Constitution, Thomas Jefferson, expressed from his post as Minister 
to France, deep reservations. That the proposed article of government for the United 
States did not include a bill of rights that provided for “freedom of religion, freedom of 
the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against [commercial] 
monopolies,  …habeas corpus”939 and “trial by juries in all cases”940 was unconscionable. 
While all of these various rights and protections were deemed to be significant, it was 
representation and trial by jury that were given “preeminent importance” for “shelter[ing] 
nearly all the other rights and liberties of the people.”941 Under these rights, liberty, it was 
argued, would be secured.  
John Adams claimed that “in these two powers consist wholly, the liberty and 
security of the people.”942 Through jury trials the people were sheltered from the abuse of 
power by the judiciary through denying judges and other influential public and private 
individuals the ability to incarcerate indiscriminately people who they had deemed as 
problematic. As for representation, it shielded the liberties of the people in two ways. The 
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first was expressed well at the Constitutional Convention when Oliver Ellsworth stated 
that “taxation and representation ought to go together.”943 Since the government would be 
able “to lay and collect taxes”944 the property and possessions of the people could be 
confiscated and their wealth distributed to benefit those favored by the nation’s rulers 
through an oppressive system of taxation.  
In order to hold such an abuse in check members of the House of Representatives, 
according to Madison, “should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration 
of their appointments.”945 In such a system, the rulers would avoid passing laws that they 
too would not want to live under; for as Madison astutely argued, “they can make no law 
which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as the great 
mass of the society.”946 By returning rulers to the rank of the ruled the Constitution 
provided security against repressive, collectively binding decisions. Consequently, 
through the dual protection from unjust trials and non-binding decisions for the rulers, 
and the collective passage of the ten amendments or bill of rights, the liberty of the 
people was deemed to be made safe. 
As the ideation of liberty took hold in the American consciousness, it became 
tangible as laws, rights, and duties. This convergence of abstract philosophy with 
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concrete practices around one of the core constructs of the American ideology of 
governance found its fullest manifestation in its connection to property. Legal historian, 
John Phillip Reid, argues “that liberty in the eighteenth century was personal 
property.”947 Liberty as a possession was “bequeathed … as an inheritance,” “obtained … 
by prescription,” “fought for,” or “earned.”948 It was, according to Rakove, considered to 
be their “birthright.”949 Summarizing this perspective well, in 1802 it was argued in the 
Fredricktown’s newspaper, The Hornet that “every child can’t inherit a fortune, but every 
child ought to inherit liberty.”950 To hold liberty as a tangible object, not just a political 
ideal, meant that while it was a possession held by all, it was wielded only by those who 
could protect it. “Freedom” according to Nash, was “defined as being secure in one’s 
property.”951 The reason that “property must be secured or liberty cannot exist,”952 was 
due to the belief that property was the medium through which liberty was realized.  
The relationship between property and liberty developed along two key paths. 
First, property allowed for people to live free of dependency on others. Adams argued 
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that property was only “secure,” when an individual was “at liberty to acquire, use, or 
part with it, at his discretion.”953 Jefferson held a similar view, which Cooke summarized 
as “a man’s liberty was his property, and his property … guaranteed a minimum of 
liberty.”954 Through the ability to pursue economic endeavors, from working land owned 
to “any other industry,” an individual was provided with “such compensation as not only 
to afford a comfortable subsistence, but … [also] for a cessation from labor in old 
age.”955 It was through property and liberty, Jefferson claimed, that every individual had 
the means “to reserve to themselves … a degree of freedom.”956 The freedom to use one’s 
own property to establish one’s economic independency then, was a precursor to the 
political freedom of the individual.  
Without economic freedom the votes of dependent individuals could be bought or 
manipulated by those who sustained their lives.
957
 In the debate over suffrage at the 
Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris articulated this position when he stated, 
“Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who 
will be able to buy them.”958 Economic dependency would lead to political dependency959 
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and ultimately result in the enlargement of the sphere of dominion of those with superior 
capacities and subsequently negate the liberty of those with lesser capacities. In these 
ways, during the “decades after the Revolution … property ownership was” considered to 
be a “necessary” condition “for personal independence.”960 By being able to provide for 
one’s self, an individual was able to enact the natural liberty possessed by all and sustain 
one’s self in his or her economic and political liberty.961 
Property: Securing the Rights of the People 
The significance of property was not limited to its relationship to liberty. 
Property, along with life and liberty, distinguished “the fundamental trinity of inalienable 
rights.”962 Stating “that Property is the principal Cause & Object of Society”963 
Gouverneur Morris argued that of the three it is the most dependent on society. Over the 
decades leading up to the Revolution, property and the laws that regulated property use 
had become a means for the English to impose arbitrary rule over the colonies; thereby 
directly interfering in American society. To set the stage for understanding the role of 
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property in the American ideology of governance, a discussion of the demographic and 
economic exigencies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is needed.  
There were three forces that shaped the colonists’ perspectives and experiences of 
property, prosperity, and power. First, “the colonial population” was “doubling every 
twenty years.”964 This population increase was the result of active procreation, as well as 
a steady stream of immigrants.
965
 As people crowded the coastal regions, pressure was 
exerted on people to move inward from the coast. “This demographic explosion, this 
gigantic movement of people” states Wood, “was the most basic and the most liberating 
force working on American society during the latter half of the eighteenth century.”966 
Beyond powering growth and movement the influx of people also created economic 
tensions that energized economic expansion. 
Around the Atlantic rim, the “demand for foodstuffs … began enticing … 
American farmers into producing for distant markets.”967 To facilitate the transport of 
“wheat and other foodstuffs”968 throughout the colonies and the colonial world, support 
services sprang up and infrastructure developed. With the increase in exports, a reciprocal 
rise in imports occurred as well. Legal and illegal imports entered into a commercial 
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network that benefitted from the improved infrastructure and competed with an emergent 
“domestic manufacturing”969 sector. 
Domestic enterprise developed alongside the demographic growth and the foray 
into foreign trade. As the seaboard population grew local arable land was lost. The family 
farmers who remained turned to “manufacturing and trading,” Wood claims, in order to 
“bolster their income and raise their living standards.”970 Driving the desire to improve 
living standards “was the weakness of the social hierarchy in America.”971 Lacking a 
hereditary aristocracy, individuals recognized opportunities for upward social mobility. 
Combined with a desire to improve one’s lot in life, the “increased purchasing power 
among the ordinary people” assisted “social emulation” through “emulative 
consumption” of “luxury goods.”972 The people in the New World were constructing a 
new basis for society –consumerism.  
Impeding the development into a consumer society was the intervention of British 
economic policies. Historian Gary Nash notes that confronting the burgeoning economic 
potential of the colonies were certain economic stressors introduced by the British Crown 
and Parliament. The English were able to interfere with the American economy, 
according to Nash, through several routes: “trade policy … enforcement of custom laws, 
the availability of currency, the role of English traders in the American market, and the 
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strength of overseas demand for American products.”973 In writing A Summary View of 
the Rights of British America, Jefferson addressed a wide range of American concerns 
over violations of rights. Of particular interest is his explication of his distress relating to 
commerce. Even though the inhabitants of the colonies were English subjects who 
enjoyed the right to “the exercise of a free trade with all parts of the world,” Jefferson 
noted that Parliament had “assumed upon themselves the power of prohibiting 
[American] trade with all other parts of the world, except the island of Great Britain.”974 
Their “rights of free commerce,” that provided economic security, became “a victim to 
arbitrary power.”975 English policies dictated that the only foreign market open to 
American producers and merchants were buyers in Britain. A British merchant would set 
the purchase price for American goods and then resell the merchandise to “foreign 
markets, where he [would] reap the benefits of making sale of them for full value.”976 
Reaching even deeper into the commercial policies of the colonists, Parliament passed 
policies regulating the products manufactured in America. Jefferson decried the fact that 
“they would prohibit us from manufacturing for our own use the articles we raise on our 
own lands with our own labour.”977 Not only were the colonists denied free access to the 
markets in the British Empire and beyond, but they were also restricted from producing 
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goods that could be consumed locally if those items competed with products sold by 
British merchants.  
American merchants and landowners came under even more pressure during the 
debt crisis of 1772. During this period Americans were called upon to answer for their 
debts to “British creditors”978 while the creditors were not held accountable for their own. 
If unable to pay their debt the Americans were “hauled into court for settlement of 
accounts and committed to debtors prison.”979 The extent of British tampering went 
further, when British merchants were allowed to cut out the “colonial middleman” 
through “sell[ing] off English goods directly to the public.”980 In bypassing the colonial 
merchant, not only were the British merchants able to eliminate the middleman, they 
were also able to unload goods at costs that undermined “the interests of the seaboard 
merchant and shopkeeper.”981 Nash points to the Tea Act of 1773 as an example of an 
attempt to “wrest control of the internal workings of the American economy from the 
hands of its own people.”982 The tea was to be sold by the East India Company directly to 
the colonists through company agents. American merchants were cut out of the tea 
market, diverting profits straight into the hands of a British company. These policies and 
practices of the English hurt those with direct commercial interests as well as those who 
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worked in industries that provided support services; including laborers who had little 
margin room to absorb shifts in prices and wages.
983
 
Throughout the eighteenth-century the colonists recognized the economic 
potential of the New World. The opportunities opened the way to population increases 
and shifts. As immigrants flooded the seaboard cities a wave of people spread out into the 
interior. Additionally, space restrictions encouraged people to creatively engage in 
cottage-industrial activity. Wealth through surpluses and new ventures was generated and 
consequently the standard of living was raised. People began to emulate the upper 
societal classes, including the purchase of luxury goods. The colonists realized they were 
primed for success. The irritations that could derail American commercial fortune were 
the arbitrary violations of the economic system by the British government. The English 
imposed their will upon the colonists through legislation and the threat of force. Faced 
with the immense possibilities for economic development and success, the meddlesome 
British policymakers’ Acts disrupted the stability of the American commercial enterprise 
and subsequently the ability of each colonist to protect their property. In the American 
mindset, “the economic regulation[s]” interfered unjustly in the economic affairs of the 
colonists and was viewed as “a coordinated attack on their ‘lives, liberties, and 
property’.”984 Consequently, as Nash argues, “protection of property was one of the main 
incentives for resisting England.”985 American revolutionaries found in the Acts of 
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Parliaments –beginning in 1764 with the American Revenue Act through 1773 with the 
Tea Act– that control over property and the economic system directly related to their 
ability to live free and equally within society. 
While the Declaration of Independence included in its “history of repeated 
injuries and usurpations” charges of “cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world” 
and “imposing Taxes on us without our Consent” as “Facts [to] be submitted to a candid 
world”986 to prove British tyranny over the colonies, it is in the arguments given to solicit 
support for the ratification of the proposed Constitution which bring to the foreground the 
importance the founders, framers, and the people gave to property. In providing 
reasoning to establish a union instead of fracturing into thirteen or less disparate nations 
John Jay argued that “the prosperity of the people of American depended on their 
continuing firmly united.”987 Even more succinctly he stated that “the prosperity of 
America depended on its Union.”988 Hamilton claimed that through “unrestrained 
intercourse between the states” there would be an “advance of trade” meeting “not only 
… the supply of reciprocal wants, but … [also] exportation to foreign markets.”989 He 
went on stating that in each State “the veins of commerce” and “commercial enterprise” 
would be invigorated and stabilized through the “greater scope” that “the diversity in the 
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productions of different states”990 would supply. A united nation then would supply “a 
prosperous commerce” that was held “by all enlightened statesmen” as “a primary object 
of their political cares.”991 In order to achieve economic freedom and maintain political 
liberty preserving the unification of the States was argued to offer the best road for 
success.  
The road to a unified nation would come through the ratification of the 
Constitution, which would establish an energetic federal government. An energetic 
government, while desirable for promoting and protecting American commercial 
interests, was also a source for trepidation. If the checks and balances built into the 
structure of the government did not work to impede the consolidation of power into the 
hands of one or a few a strong centralized government could wrest ultimate power from 
the hands of the people. To help ensure that the concentration of power did not fall under 
the sway of the one, the few, or the majority, Madison, theorized another contribution of 
property in relation to good republican governance.  
Where liberty existed, individuals were able to pursue prosperity and property at 
their own discretion. When this was the case, Hamilton argued that individual capacities 
would elevate some endeavors over the pursuits of others. As some enterprises met with 
success, the end result would be an “inequality of property[, which in turn] constituted 
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the great and fundamental distinction in Society.”992 Madison succinctly explicated the 
linkage between capacities and property. He argued that “the diversity in the faculties of 
men” resulted in “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,” which in turn 
produced “the possession of different degrees and kinds of property.”993 Madison 
concluded that property inequities and the generative concerns associated with differing 
levels of property accumulation form the ground from which “ensues a division of the 
society into different interests and parties.”994 To simplify the connections:  Capacities 
produce property which in turn informs and results in societal and political factions. The 
differing interests of society and the positions held by members advocating those interests 
in relation to current or proposed collectively binding –political– decisions therefore were 
a direct outcome of the enactment of capacities within the economic sphere of society. 
For Madison, the sum of this equation –factions– was an absolute necessity in checking 
the formation of a ruling majority and mitigating its influence once composed. As such 
he argued that “the protection of these faculties, is the first object of government.”995 The 
only way for the government to accomplish this goal, was for it to protect the fruition of 
capacities in the economic sphere –property– and the interests of property holders. 
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In formulating the Constitution, Madison recognized that “persons and property 
[were] both essential objects of Government.”996 Neglecting either would not result “in a 
just and a free Government” since both needed “to be effectually guarded.”997 Key for the 
protection of persons and property was the presumption that both were connected to 
representation through suffrage. Debates during the Constitutional Convention raged over 
the right to suffrage as each State had established its own qualifications regarding who 
could vote.  
During this time period most States restricted voting rights to property owners, 
with the primary “legal alternative,” according to Williamson, “a tax-paying 
qualification.”998 In considering this issue the framers eventually decided that it was best 
for the States to determine the necessary qualifications for voting rights, but before they 
did they thoroughly explored the issue to see if a national standard could be set through 
the Constitution. The framers knew that “there [was] no right of which the people [were] 
more jealous than that of suffrage”999 but they also acknowledged that “the regulation” of 
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suffrage was “a task of peculiar delicacy.”1000 The delicacy lay in balancing the rights of 
those with property against those of people who did not.  
Limiting the right to vote to people with property could result in “the rights of 
persons … [being] oppressed.”1001 On the other hand, universal male suffrage could leave 
those with property at the mercy of the landless majority.
1002
 In addressing these 
alternative positions two significant concerns were expressed in the debates. The 
paramount question that framed the first concern asked what guaranteed the affections of 
the people toward the good of society. For some, an individual’s attachment was only 
assured through ownership of property. The assumption was that when a person shares in 
the ownership of an object, then s/he is interested and motivated to ensure that it is 
preserved. Those who advocated for property did so because they felt that property 
holders –freeholders– were, as Dickinson claimed, “the best guardians of liberty” and “a 
necessary defence against the dangerous influence of those multitudes.”1003 People 
without property represented a “danger to the holders of property”1004 in that if they could 
vote for representation then they might select individuals willing to redistribute the 
wealth of the property owners. And yet by limiting the right to suffrage to freeholders, 
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the interests of their persons and property would be protected, but the rights or persons of 
those without property would be violated. The assumption that property equaled 
attachment did face opposition and was challenged when individuals like Colonel Mason 
asked:  
Does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment? Ought the 
merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are 
to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and 
unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.
1005
  
Mason does not deny that ownership of property does produce social attachment, but he 
is willing to acknowledge that there are alternative means for producing a solid 
connection between a societal member and the governance of that society. Mason’s 
question is also informative in that at its foundation lies a hint of the second concern.  
When Madison noted that it was a “fundamental principle that men can not be 
justly bound by laws in making which they have no part”1006 he provided a clear 
articulation of the bases for the second concern: since in society collectively binding 
decisions limit the available sphere of liberty by increasing the sphere of power should 
not those who are expected to abide by the decision have voice in the making of that law. 
When Jefferson declared in 1816, “let every man who fights or pays, exercise his just and 
equal right in their election”1007 he was pointing to the idea that those who support 
society should have a right to define the limits of their liberty. However a stronger 
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declaration of this fundamental principle was expressed in an article that appeared in 
1802 in The Hornet:  
To say that the farmer & Mechanic have nothing to do with government, is to say 
that farmers and Mechanics have nothing to do with their own happiness or 
misery. We say they are capable of government themselves and ought to enjoy the 
right of suffrage.
1008
  
In this article, Every Freeman Ought to Vote, the right to suffrage was the means to 
secure, not only the ability to vote, but also one’s own happiness. Societal happiness was 
a means to evaluate whether or not a government, according to John Adams, was 
achieving its designed end.
1009
 Those denied a voice in the government, were denied the 
opportunity to affect their own individual happiness, which was “the end of man.”1010 
The right to suffrage enabled those qualified to have a voice in shaping the directions and 
goals of the government, and thereby their own happiness. Consequently, if the right to 
vote was tied to a property qualification, then the government for the majority of societal 
members would be illegitimate as they would not have the ability to affect the course of 
the government and the laws it enacted. Therefore, as the question of suffrage continued 
to be a topic of concern for the citizenry, eventually the tax-paying qualification, along 
with service in the military were considered to be adequate expressions of attachment to 
society.
1011
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Even with the eventual popular shift in suffrage to include all men, the role of 
property was already firmly inscribed into the Constitution. Property or economic 
freedom ensured that individuals were free to pursue their own political goals. Property 
distinctions produced factions and factions mitigated the likelihood the majority would 
oppress minority groups. Property secured societal attachment. And finally, property was 
one of the spheres in which equality was realized.  
Equality: A Revolutionary Idea 
The idea of equality was firmly established and expected in the American 
consciousness prior to the Revolution. For instance, John Adams wrote in 1766:  
that the meanest and lowest of the people, are, by the unalterable indefeasible 
laws of God and nature, as well intitled to the benefit of the air to breathe, light to 
see, food to eat, and clothes to wear, as the nobles or the king. All men are born 
equal....
1012
  
In his explication of equality, Wood states that it was “the most radical and most 
powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution.”1013 As was previously discussed 
the American conception of equality viewed humanity as being fundamentally equal and 
yet functionally unequal due to the effects wrought through the disparity of capacities. 
Consequently, even though Thomas Paine argued that while “mankind [was] originally 
equals in the order of creation”1014 Wood could claim that “republican equality did not 
                                                 
1012
 Clarendon [pseud.], The Earl of Clarendon to Wm. Pym.; and Wood, The 
Radicalism of the American Revolution, 237. 
 
1013
 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 232. 
 
1014
 Paine, Common Sense, 12. 
 
 276 
mean the elimination of all distinctions.”1015 The first distinction that is relevant is the 
narrow scope that equality was limited to for the framers. Equality during this radical 
awakening was not for all of humanity in that it was restricted to a particular set of men. 
Additionally and more significant for these white males as they were framing what 
equality meant and how it was to be applied was their recognition that capacities made 
the political sphere dangerous ground for equality. As a result, equality needed another 
sphere where individuals could realize what Charles Pinckney, delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, argued was “the leading feature of the U. States.”1016 
Equality permeated deep down into the roots of American society and spread 
across all facets of its existence. In the political arena, equality influenced the creation of 
the Constitution. The popular conception of equality pushed beyond the boundaries that 
the limitations of capacities had created for it. Yet during the time of the founders and 
framers, it was in the realm of possibility and opportunity where equality was allowed to 
find its fullest expression in American society. In other words, politically equality was 
the ideal, functionally it was a rallying cry, but in reality it was realized through 
opportunity. 
The ideal of equality in the political sphere was limited to the principal of equal 
representation, equal privileges in voting and equal rights before the law. In regards to the 
former, the Federal Farmer argued that it entailed the expression of the interests of “every 
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order of men”1017  in the Assembly, as if they were actually there speaking for 
themselves. In applying the principle to the Senate, Alexander Hamilton conveyed the 
belief that parties –States– involved in the government “ought to have an equal share”1018 
no matter the size or power of the party. At its heart though, equal representation was not 
possible without the ideal of equality in voting. Thomas Paine declared that “every man 
has a right to one vote, and no more in the choice of representatives.”1019 John Adams 
concurred in principle when he wrote that “the only practicable method” of establishing 
“the equal right of citizens, and their proper weight and influence in society, is by 
elections.”1020 Similarly, during the Constitutional Convention debates, Roger Sherman 
argued that with “an equal vote” the rich man and the poor man were “equally safe.”1021 
The political ideal provided the standard against which the Constitution and future 
legislation would be measured. While ultimately it was deemed by the framers that 
decisions concerning representation (besides its relation to the Senate) and suffrage were 
both best left to the States, they were able to isolate one area in which the ideal of 
equality could be written into the Constitution.  
The ideal of equality before the law was succinctly expressed when Charles 
Pinckney claimed that “every freeman has the right to the same protection & 
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security.”1022 This right is found in the Constitution at section one of article fourteen: “All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States” cannot be “deprive[d] … of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law” and all people “within its jurisdiction” are to 
enjoy “the equal protection of the laws.”1023 This equality before the law was held by 
Adams “to be the true and only true definition of a republic.”1024 In his first Inaugural 
address, Jefferson, affirmed that “equal and exact justice to all men” was an “essential 
principle of our Government.”1025 It was through the judiciary branch of the government 
then that equality was extended to all societal members. While the inclusion of the equal 
protection clause embedded equality into the Constitution, the strength and vitality of the 
ideal was not located in its influence on principles, privileges or portions of the 
Constitution, but was fed by and found in the people’s belief in equality.  
According to Wood, popular sentimentality favored a far reaching sense of 
equality. At one level “the common sense of common people” exhibited the “qualities 
that were essential for republican government.”1026 In other words, the moral capacities 
necessary for equality were considered widely dispersed among the populace. Exhibiting 
this perspective Jefferson claimed, “State a moral case to a ploughman & a professor. The 
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former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter.”1027 In relation to the 
government, he made a similar argument when he claimed “that the good sense of the 
people will always be found to be the best army.”1028 In his perspective, there was 
relatively no distinction between the moral character or good sense of a commoner and 
those distinguished by superior capacities.  
Wood pushes even further though in arguing that revolutionary Americans 
actually accepted that everyone was “in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out 
manner”1029  equal to each other. What caused differences were not inherent capacities 
per se, but the distinct realities that nurtured each person.
1030
 It is likely that these beliefs 
led to the advocacy for a robust system of education or dispersal of information to correct 
those deleterious environmental effects that could impede the abilities of the people to 
regulate society and the government. For instance Melcanton Smith claimed that “the true 
policy of constitutions will be to increase the information of the country, and disseminate 
the knowledge of government as universally as possible”1031 and Washington argued that 
“knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public happiness.”1032 People were 
created with “understanding, and a desire to know,” which according Adams, afforded 
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them “a right … to knowledge.”1033 The popular sense of equality was based on the 
supposition that all people had the “moral sense” to make good decisions and “do 
good.”1034 These views of equality certainly circulated throughout the States during the 
ratification of the Constitution. However, in the political sphere, due to the intersection of 
equality and capacities, the founders and framers favored restricting equality out of a fear 
of capacities’ influence.  
The people’s perspective of equality and the framers’ fears of capacities created a 
paradox. Adams conveyed this paradox well when he claimed that while the people 
should have “equal rights” they “cannot, and ought not have equal power”1035 as they 
could be swayed by their passion or a personality into making imprudent –politically 
unsound– decisions. Consequently the framers limited the political sphere to those who 
exhibited superior capacities, but made open the opportunity to rule a right of every 
citizen. In composing the requirements indicating who could be a representative, senator, 
president or judge “no qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil 
profession, [was] permitted to fetter the judgment, or disappoint the inclination of the 
people.”1036 Every man had the opportunity to rise to political power as long as the merit 
of his capacities enabled him to win the favor of the people.
1037
 As Madison put it, “Who 
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are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him 
to the esteem and confidence of his country.”1038 If a citizen could win the favor of the 
electors, then that citizen could be one of the few to rule the people. In principle then, it 
was this equal opportunity that framed the reality of equality for Americans.  
While limited in the political arena, the sphere in which equality was loosed and 
flourished was that of economic opportunity. Americans might not be functionally equal, 
but they had an equal opportunity to make the most of their lives through an application 
of their capacities. Wood claims that “equality … meant most obviously equality of 
opportunity”1039 and this opportunity referred primarily to the private lives of the people 
and their engagement in civil society. After observing American society in 1832, 
Tocqueville, wrote in reference to the American conception and manifestation of equality 
that: 
[It] can be established in civil society and not reign in the political world. One can 
have the right to indulge in the same pleasures, to enter the same professions, to 
meet in the same places; in a word, to live in the same manner and pursue wealth 
by the same means, without having all take the same part in government.
1040
  
His observations confirmed Jefferson’s claim that “the true foundation of republican 
government is the equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their 
management.”1041 America was the land of opportunity, of which it was said that while 
“no one can obtain wealth without toil and industry; [it is] where each one has an equal 
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chance for riches and honors.”1042 Opportunity to rule in the political sphere or to 
advance one’s standing in civil society then defined the limits and reality of equality in 
America. American citizens could conceive of themselves as being equal because in their 
day-to-day lives, whether in the political sphere or civil society, they all, in principle, 
started from a position of equality. 
Equality in the American formulation recognized the fundamental equality of all, 
created a functional equality in the private and economic spheres of life and restricted it 
in the political sphere to those chosen by the people to rule in their stead. This conception 
of equality differs substantively from that of the Athenians. The Athenians believed that 
they were all fundamentally equal and as such a political sphere in which functional 
equality could be realized was a necessity for the enactment of self-rule. Capacities and 
the founders and framers’ view of capacities seeped down into the very soil from which 
the framers drew out their ideas about not only power, knowledge, liberty, property but 
also equality. 
In the ideology of American governance the core constructs of even liberty and 
equality differ radically from that required for authentic democracy and governance. 
Liberty and equality are forever in a dance. Joined together equality necessitates that 
liberty is not freedom to do whatever one wants to do. Being equal, liberty is obligated to 
respect, preserve, and protect the right of the other to experience the same scope of 
choice over his or her life. Without this obligation then liberty tramples over the equality 
of another. Yet this is what liberty does under American governance for two reasons. 
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First, the citizenry does not participate in collectively deciding the imposition of power –
the required cooperative acts– in their lives as they have given up their power to do so to 
representatives; resulting in the citizenry and representatives not being functional 
political equals. Second, American governance has not constituted a space of equality; 
equal opportunity, while laudable as an ideal, is farcical when certain capacities are 
valued and rewarded societally more than others, which allows over time for the 
accumulation of power into the hands of those who can maximize their capacities in these 
areas or invest and capitalize on the capacities of others. This mirage of equality is 
maintained through the examples of the exceptional few who have parlayed their superior 
capacities to rise to preeminent societal positions –translatable into economic success– 
instead of the majority of the people experiencing near economic equality across the 
societal spectrum. While any citizen can be a representative of the people the disparity of 
resources this ideology results in makes the possibility of this opportunity highly 
unrealistic. Consequently, the American construction of equality as equal opportunity 
leads to inauthentic governance as it is not generative of a functional equality in the 
private sphere or in the public –political– sphere as it invalidates individual liberty 
through denying the great majority of the citizenry participation in the collectively 
binding decision-making spaces. In restricting equality in this way American governance 
also fails to be authentic because it restricts for the great majority of citizens their pursuit 
of happiness only to their private endeavors, when human happiness necessitates a public 
expression as well. Disempowered as such the people are denied their full potentiality for 
happiness, which as the Declaration of Independence constructs is an inalienable right.   
 284 
The founders and framers of the American government established a form of 
governance based on a particular ideology composed of conceptions concerning power, 
knowledge, liberty, property and equality. This ideology of governance was strongly 
influenced by their beliefs about human capacities and society. The outcome was a 
substantially different form of governance than the one that functioned in ancient Athens. 
Athenian ideology of democracy formed around the concepts of power, knowledge, 
liberty, equality and participation. As such the nature of American governance produces 
significantly different ideological effects within the structure of society and its members 
than what was found in ancient Athenians and what is called for in authentic governance.  
Certainly the contemporary view of the conceptions and instantiations of 
democracy in America has shifted from the founders and framers’ ideology of 
governance. This point is significant but since their ideals were inscribed into the 
Constitution, where the people have not acted to revise those conceptions, their voice still 
strongly influences how Americans experience the government. Indeed we still accept 
that “all authority in [the government] will be derived from, and dependent on the 
society,”1043 but the implications of power surrendered, of superior capacities, of the 
governing bodies being divided into a system of checks and balances for the preservation 
of liberty and protection of property has secured the people from their passions and an 
oppressive dominion the few. Consequently, it has also meant that the empowerment 
experienced by the citizens of Athens has been lost to all except for the few chosen to 
rule. 
                                                 
1043
 Madison, Federalist #51, 290. 
 285 
Contemporary Scholarly Conception of Democracy 
Democracy today is a political framework or “regime”1044 that is defined by 
certain ideals. What is conveyed as democracy in America actually emerges out of an 
articulation of the Athenian and American ideologies. Democracy as an idea is a 
historical, cultural and social construction that “is complex and … marked by conflicting 
conceptions.”1045 Liberal and republican traditions1046 have been influential to this 
ongoing construction. The modern view of democracy, Chantel Mouffe argues, exhibits a 
fusion of “political liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers and individual rights) 
and … the democratic tradition of popular sovereignty.”1047 In the convergence of these 
two rich and robust streams of thought, liberal discourse appears to have tipped the scale 
of balance in its favor, so that currently around the world “liberal democracy seems to be 
recognized as the only legitimate form of government.”1048 To map out all of the contours 
of how contemporary academia regards democracy is not feasible, since the number of 
voices speaking into our understanding of it is immense. A sketch though is possible by 
following the prolific and influential work of political theorist Robert Dahl with 
supplements provided through the contributions of a few others.  
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In considering how democracy is conceived of in contemporary political 
scholarship, it is important to note that in a significant way we still live in a world similar 
to that of the Athenians and early Americans. When people live in a society they “need a 
process for making decisions”1049 about societal life. Robert Dahl argues that societal 
“members are expected to conform to these decisions”1050 as the decisions are considered 
to be collectively binding. Decisions that are collectively binding are made through a 
two-step process that includes participation in the composition of the agenda as well as 
deciding its decisive outcomes.
1051
 In the United States these decisions are arrived at 
through a political process known today as representative democracy. 
Even though the attributes of liberalism dominate the tradition of democracy, the 
influences of democracy are still significant. While the Athenian ideology of democracy 
is ancient and thereby far removed from our contemporary world, political 
communication scholar John Gastil can still claim that “at its core, democracy means 
self-rule, rule by all.”1052 This democratic ideal continues to make legitimate the laws and 
policies under which the American people live through their connection to “popular 
assent.”1053 Democracy has a legacy, which instantiate an established tradition that 
reflects this core belief about the people. 
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Following Aristotle’s explication of democracy, Gastil contends that the 
fundamental features of a democracy are manifested by “institutions that makes the will 
of the majority into the law of the land” through regular elections, the assurance that 
citizens have “an equal chance to hold offices,”1054 and minimizing limitations on 
citizenship. In other words, Gastil is arguing that democracy empowers people’s decision 
for collective effort, requires participation among equals, and is inclusive of the people 
under the direct influence of the collectively binding decisions they are obligated to obey. 
Democracy’s core construct of an empowered people has fostered a web of related ideals, 
beliefs, assumptions, procedures, practices and institutions concerned with constituting 
democratic principles and governance. These classical notions of democracy have been 
translated into contemporary, popular assumptions about democracy. 
Democracy is a political ideology that posits ideals and practices that organize 
society in a particular way. A contemporary view of the core constructs of democracy, as 
identified by Robert Dahl, includes effective participation or the ability and opportunity 
to convey to others one’s own views concerning policies; voting equality or the 
opportunity for each member to cast an equally weighted vote when deciding a decisive 
outcome; enlightened understanding or the ability within reasonable constraints for 
members to learn about proposed policies and their consequences; control of the agenda 
or the ability to propose and place items on the political agenda;
1055
 and the extension of 
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the corresponding fundamental rights that secure these democratic ideals
1056
 in order for 
the inclusion of adults to include “all, or … most, adult permanent residents.”1057 These 
ideals form the structure of the state and the ground from which people understand what 
their positions and levels of participation are within a democratic form of governance.  
To deepen this understanding of the basic ideals necessary for democratic rule 
within the political sphere and civil society Darrin Hicks adds:  
Democracy, in principle, refers to the promise that those who call upon the law 
and those whom the law calls upon are also its authors. Democracy, in practice, 
refers to a particular institutional arrangement for making binding political 
decisions. Given the heterogeneity of “the people,” an institutional arrangement 
generating binding decisions is democratic if it is constituted by free and open 
participation of all (or at least sufficient representation of those affected by the 
decision) and if, from the perspective of the participants, the outcomes of this 
process are not known in advance.
1058
 
Democracy from this conception entails institutions that enforce collectively binding 
agreements that are arrived at by constituents who have created governing apparatus 
through their non-coerced participation in the decision-making process. Again Dahl has 
provided a concise list of “basic political institutions” representative of the modern 
instantiations of liberal democracy. This includes institutions in which (1) representatives 
of the people can “directly or indirectly” decide between proposed policies and are held 
accountable for the decisions made; (2) the frequent election of representatives by 
citizens, who “are entitled to participate” in the process through voting and (3) as part of 
the pool of possible representatives if one decides to stand for an open position s/he can 
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do so; (4) the free expression regarding politics and political decision is allowed and 
protected; (5) the citizenry can search “independent sources of information” from various 
resources that are free of governmental and monopolistic control; and (7) the citizenry 
can “form and participate in relatively independent associations and organizations.”1059 
Dahl’s list of institutions indicate not only those located in the political sphere but also 
includes in the latter half those found in civil society. Between these two spheres of life a 
consistent equilibrium needs to be maintained. Balancing the “power and authority” of 
the state are the independent “structures and organizations” created and populated by the 
citizens “that are strong enough to stand up to the state and serve as a counterbalance to 
the authority of the government.”1060 It is through the institutions of civil society that the 
state learns of the “active interests”1061 of the public and about public support for 
proposed collectively binding decisions. Consequently, instead of constructing a space 
for the authentic self-rule of the citizenry, these institutions are meant to convey the 
public’s will to representatives who rule in their stead.  
How democratic principle and practice are taken up though can vary according to 
background beliefs. Jürgen Habermas sketches out two of the more pervasive means of 
conceiving of democracy, which exhibit key components noted by Hicks: the liberal and 
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republican views.
1062
 Each view presents an understanding of the state, the individual, 
and politics. A liberal view of democracy entails: (1) governing institutions that function 
to administer the “interests of society” and “collective goals,” (2) citizens interact and 
enact private interests according to the norms of a “market-structure,” and (3) politics that 
consolidates private interests in order to counter the power and unresponsiveness of the 
governing apparatus.
1063
 The republican view posits that (1) the state provides the 
regulatory arm for a (2) society of “free and equal citizens” who recognize and 
acknowledge that “their dependence on one another” necessitates (3) politically oriented 
interactions that compose and maintain governing apparatus in ways that benefit the 
common good.
1064
 In the liberal view, Habermas claims that politics has a mediating role 
between institutions of governance and the people. Under the republican concept, politics 
produces a “reflective form of substantial ethical life”1065 that sustains the solidarity of 
citizens.  
The republican view as outlined by Habermas, reflects much of the democratic 
tradition to which Mouffe alludes, as mentioned above. According to her, it is the liberal 
and not the republican view that frames representative democracy. In addition, she 
contends that “the defining feature of modern democracy”1066 is pluralism and it is the 
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liberal construction of pluralism that shapes liberal democracy. Pluralism, according to 
Held, involves “political circumstances constituted by a plurality of identities, cultural 
forms and interests”1067 that, in Mouffe’s words, have led to “the end of a substantive 
idea of the good life.”1068 Liberalism privileges “individual liberty and … human 
rights,”1069 which affects “any attempt to construct a ‘we’, a collective identity.”1070 
Through this orientation to pluralism a market-structure influences the formation of the 
political sphere and how the democratic ideals outlined by Dahl are realized. One of the 
main outcomes of this influence is how the political process is conceptualized. A 
citizenry conceived through the democratic tradition is able to partake in deliberation 
about differing preferences and interests. Consequently they are able to arrive at a 
consensus or majority position that either reduces the difference or incorporates as much 
as possible the overlap between the differences, in attempt to produce a common good for 
society. The liberal view however, posits that individuals, contrary to living in society 
authentically, are “moved” by and seek to promote their preferences and interests in order 
to construct an aggregate of their “self-interest”1071 that wins the majority of votes so that 
collectively binding decisions represent their particular conception of society.  
                                                 
1067
 Held, Models of Democracy, 261. 
 
1068
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 18. 
 
1069
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 2. 
 
1070
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 20. 
 
1071
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 81-82. 
 292 
While Dahl and others provide a means for a deep conceptualization of 
representative, modern, liberal democracy, Mouffe pushes into “a profound 
transformation in the symbolic ordering of social relations.”1072 Likewise, Kim and Kim 
move beyond “the simple fact that ‘democracy’ refers to both an ideal and an 
actuality”1073 by calling attention to the constitutive effects of democracy:  
Democracy is not only a way of achieving certain goals but more often than not, it 
is also about constructing our goals. Democracy is not only a way of reaching 
consensus but also about constructing the fundamental background on which we 
can collectively negotiate to achieve a consensus.
1074
  
This position acknowledges democracy’s role in framing how democratic societies 
construct their lived worlds in accordance with its endemic principles. Democratic 
citizens then are constituted through particular orientations or background beliefs –
ideologies– that inform the goals they should pursue. Such goals then, in turn result in the 
production of related subjects, procedures, practices and institutions. 
Conclusion: Flourishing Democracy Requires Rhetoric Democracy 
Contemporary scholarship on democracy and its construction of what democracy 
is posits a system of government that harkens back to the Athenian ideology of 
democracy, but still falls short of authentic democracy and governance. The Athenian or 
even the republican view, articulated by Habermas, suffers from a “contamination”1075 of 
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their principles by liberal values and views. For instance, governance manifesting Dahl’s 
recommended institutions in the two spheres of life –political and civil– deprives the 
people of their right to self-rule. The same critiques leveled at the founders and framers’ 
formulation of American governance undercut Dahl’s conception as well. Ultimately, 
Dahl’s institutions effectively disempower the people politically, which in turn 
compromises their functional equality and their liberty; impedes strong accountability 
and response; limits the majority of the citizenry’s participation to institutions outside of 
the collectively binding decision-making spaces, thereby severely constraining 
opportunities for achieving public happiness to the few; and ultimately devalues the 
knowledge and lived experiences of the majority of the citizenry as it is not allowed into 
the decision-making spaces unless a proxy –representative– deems it significant for 
making the decision or for maintaining his or her public position. The result is not a new 
conceptualization and constitution of democracy, but of a liberalism that legitimates its 
claim to power through an association with democracy.  
Democracy is birthed through the idea of an empowered people and “popular 
sovereignty” that in the liberal construction “is deemed to be obsolete.”1076 The outcome 
that this form of governance and its deception has produced is “a ‘democratic deficit’.” It 
is this deficit that necessitates a popular, democratic proposal to reclaim or privilege 
democratic principles within society. For a full flourishing of democracy, citizens need a 
political space in which they have the opportunity to engage in democratic rhetoric. 
Democracy that acknowledges, enables, and achieves equality, liberty, power, 
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identification, and public happiness through participation requires governance to manifest 
a rhetorical democracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC AS RHETORICAL 
DEMOCRACY: TRANSLATING ATHENIAN DIRECT DEMOCRACY INTO 
CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE 
 
The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with 
their bodies. ... In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or 
of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and 
stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose 
as well. 
–Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience 
Introduction: Democratic Rhetoric as Rhetorical Democracy 
Machines perform functions that accomplish ends for purposes determined by 
active human beings. Human beings, when they do not engage their inherent capacities 
for self-rule in order to constitute their world(s) can be reduced to mere machinery; 
performing ends determined by others who do participate in making the world. Yet, as 
Henry Thoreau argues, society does not need only one or a few participating and 
constituting the in-between spaces that form the social world. Society needs individuals 
who are not clay figures, who do not actualize the capacities that distinguish humanity 
from inanimate objects. It needs individuals who are not mere subjects or denizens who 
only know how to be ruled and do not know how to rule or are not empowered to rule. 
Citizens are societal members who understand and participate in the “free exercise … of 
… judgment”;1077 embodying their rights of liberty, equality, and self-rule or power. For 
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subjects to be transformed into citizens they must be empowered to enact their rights 
through meaningful participation within the public sphere in ways that employ their 
knowledge of contextualized particulars, in order to constitute identifications that lead to 
a collective will productive of collectively binding decisions representative of the 
common good. The means through which a societal member is acknowledged as a citizen 
involves not only the recognition of being a citizen, but also the ongoing engagement of 
becoming a citizen. To be a citizen entails acting out one’s citizenship. 
Citizenship, how one is empowered to be a participant in society, can be enacted 
through an endless variety of manifestations depending on the ideology of governance 
society accepts.  For democracy to function as a democracy its citizens have to be 
continually empowered to employ their knowledge as active participants in the 
collectively binding decision-making process. Through democracy, a space in which the 
citizenry is empowered to embody and achieve their natural, innate human rights must be 
constructed. Human beings naturally have a right to pursue the ends that they desire and 
punish those who interfere with attaining and retaining those ends. They also have a 
desire for acting-together politically through identifications that constitute in-between 
spaces where individuals realize their liberty. When individuals congregate in order to 
accomplish their collective needs and wants through cooperative behaviors –society– 
they must decide how their liberties will be limited and to what end. Democracy proposes 
that these individuals will be equal collectively binding decision-makers. For a 
democracy to even approach accomplishing such ideals societal members must construct 
a place for its citizens to enact democratic rhetorical engagements. Consequently, 
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democratic rhetoric requires a political space –a rhetorical democracy– in which 
empowered participants can produce a strong sense of democratic accountability and 
response. 
Democratic rhetoric rests upon the nature of human communication. Coming 
together, individuals posit meanings for certain objects that they then assign a symbol to 
in order to represent the meaning –attitude and action– those individuals consensually 
agree upon. These symbols, whether found in the words and phrases of a language or a 
culture’s material codes, then act as arousal agents that call forth particular responses 
from those who share in that particular meaningful symbolic order. To elicit cooperative 
behaviors for the common good through collectively binding decisions, participants in the 
decision-making process have to be able to engage each other through one another’s 
symbolic orders. This means that those individuals who address the citizen participants 
need to invent throughout the preparational phase and during the actual rhetorical 
engagement. In doing so, individuals of one micro-culture will take on the role of others 
who are from relevant oppositional micro-cultures. Yet, concrete and creative invention 
through the symbolic orders of others only becomes necessary when the collectively 
binding decision-making space is inclusive of society’s micro-cultures and fosters strong 
rhetorical accountability through the possibility of immediate rhetorical response. As 
multiple engagements expressive of public wills transpire the citizenry produces a 
collective will that is productive of a particular reality. This reality is generated through 
the mutual communicative event, as well as the cooperative behavior the collectively 
binding decision results in for societal members. In this way, democratic rhetoric creates 
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richer understandings across different micro-cultures and is transformational of 
individuals and society. 
Key to a rhetorical democracy then, is a functional space that brings the citizenry 
together in a way that the force of democratic rhetoric moves the participants beyond 
their prejudices and personal preferences or will. Gadamer describes a prejudice as “a 
judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been 
finally examined.”1078 In a sense, a prejudice is formed through expectations in relation to 
certain contexts –expectations that are developed through how the individual sees and 
relates to their perception of reality; a reality consensually constructed through his or her 
symbolic orders. To move individuals beyond their prejudices, a rhetorical democracy 
has to constitute a space of political participation in which citizens “enter into the ruling 
principle of [their] neighbors’ mind, and suffer him [or her] to enter into [their own].” 1079 
For this to occur, a rhetorical democratic space must bring together the full range of 
participants from the citizen members of society’s micro-cultures.   
A rhetorical democracy also needs to create a place in which the citizen 
participants are functionally equal. Even though a human constructed space “in which 
every man and every woman shall have equal weight in society, is a chimera,”1080 a 
rhetorical democratic place in which people are equal in liberty and power is essentially 
possible. Such a functionally equal political space is only possible when participation is 
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not restricted according to any criteria based on capacities or determinations –birth, 
inheritance, race, or symbolic orders– that individuals are born into or which emerge 
throughout the course of life events. To be functionally equal recognizes that each citizen 
has the right to participate in agenda setting for those contextualized particulars 
considered, the process of determining the collective will, and effectively contributing to 
the provisional closure of a collectively binding decision. 
In democratic rhetoric the core criteria –those mentioned here and previously– for 
the function of a rhetorical democracy have already been established. To manifest these 
functions in the governing process certain structures that enable and achieve a political 
space need to also be constituted. Just as the Athenian ideology of democracy provides a 
productive means for understanding the nature of authentic governance, it also offers a 
ground for constructing the structures of a rhetorical democracy. Ideology invites 
individuals into supportive individual and collective acts, which in turn most often 
necessitates institutional infrastructures that provide spaces conducive for the 
performance of those acts. Called into a democratic subject position the Athenians 
organized their political spaces so as to be able to enact the ideals, values, and practices 
the ideology required for reification. The institutions of Athenian democracy should not 
be viewed as separate from their ideology of democracy, in that these institutions are 
material manifestations congruent with that ideology. An empowered people, who 
considered themselves to be functionally equal, desirous of being able to enact their 
liberty and employ their knowledge in order to make collectively binding decisions 
concerning contextualized particulars, needed institutions and infrastructures that would 
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facilitate their practices and performances of self-rule through rhetorical engagements. In 
ancient Athens these institutional structures were developed and honed over time and 
therefore it is their governing apparatuses that provide a basis for concretizing rhetorical 
democracy into the contemporary societal context. The concerns related to direct 
democracy should not be discounted though; it is here where the insights of the founders 
and framers of American governance also guide in the projection of the institutions and 
institutional infrastructures necessary to bring a rhetorical democracy to fruition.  
Direct Democracy in Ancient Athens: A Sketch 
We are unique in the way we regard anyone who takes no part in public affairs: 
we do not call that a quiet life, we call it a useless life. We are all involved in 
either the proper formulation or at least the proper review of policy, thinking that 
what cripples action is not talk, but rather the failure to talk through the policy 
before proceeding to the required action.
 
 
–Pericles, The Peloponnesian War 
Ancient Athens and its people produced an ongoing legacy that reaches across the 
expanse of time to remain influential for contemporary thought and practices. This is 
especially true in relation to democracy, as, contends Lipson, “it was the Athenians who 
created democracy … by theorizing about its principles and inventing its institutions.”1081 
While ancient Athens is long removed from today’s world, it is not only time that 
separates the Athenians from the here and now but also their culture and material 
practices and situations. It could be argued that this distance makes it difficult to 
incorporate their contributions. While acknowledging this contention, John Rawls argues 
that the use of historical examples can be beneficial. A right interpretation, according to 
Rawls, of “the conceptions and principles … for the basic historical questions … should 
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be widely applicable to our own problems.”1082 To develop a right interpretation of the 
answers provided to historical questions by a people of a different time and place a 
thorough investigation into their material practices and contexts is warranted. By 
examining the practices, instead of just the conceptions and principles, the underlying, 
emergent premises can be translated for practical, concrete, contemporary application. 
Theory practiced faces the harsh realities of real world situations and therefore, the 
enacted manifestation refines the theoretical principles into workable solutions. 
The Funeral Orations by Pericles was given decades after the democratic reforms 
–the Kleisthenic reforms– of 508/7 B.C. and yet it encapsulates the democratic 
sensibilities engendered through those reforms. Democracy in Athens evolved as “the 
Athenians improved their system”1083 of governance. For the Athenians “the defining 
characteristic of their democracy” was their “capacity to change laws, and generally, to 
confront contingency with new institutional solutions.”1084 Even though they had a 
propensity for “modifying institutions in light of new information or changing 
circumstances,”1085 four institutions formed the relevant foundational institutions and 
institutional infrastructures for Athenian democracy: citizenship, the Boule, the 
Assembly, and the navy. 
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Those Who Ruled Themselves: Athenian Citizenship 
Aristotle defined a citizen as a person “who has the power to take part in the 
deliberative or judicial administration of any state.”1086 While this definition comes 
significantly after the major Athenian reforms shifted their political institutions to 
democracy it speaks directly to what Athenian citizenship entailed following the reforms 
of Kleisthene.
1087
 These reforms, which provided for “the orderly and standardized 
definition of all shareholders in the community,”1088 are considered the genesis of 
Athenian democratic citizenship and institutions.
1089
  
 The Athenian polis, “a composition of elements – the citizens”1090 was not 
limited to Athens but was inclusive of all of Attica.
1091
 The boundaries of Attica spanned 
1000 square miles, which meant that “people in the farthest corners lived about 30 miles 
… from the city.”1092 Athens, as Attica, meant that citizenship was largely constituted as 
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“an imagined community, a polity in which most members did not know each other.”1093 
The geographical extent of Athens was home to “a total population of around 250,000 to 
300,000.”1094 This total included members of the population who were excluded from 
citizenship: women, children, slaves, and metics or immigrants conducting business in 
Athens.
1095
 With citizenship restricted to adult males, the number ranged “between 
30,000 and 50,000.”1096  
The right of Athenian citizenship was carefully regulated through the law and 
entailed rights and obligations. An adult male over the age of eighteen, who had his 
petition for citizenship accepted by the Assembly of his ancestors’ deme –a 
social/political institution based on territorial districts– was protected by the law.1097 A 
citizen was afforded a trial in capital cases, he could not be tortured, authorities had to 
sanction any intrusion of his home; his property rights were secured, and he had the right 
to speak and vote in the Assembly.
1098
 With these rights came the responsibilities of 
citizenship: A citizen was to live in obedience to the law, render military service when 
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called upon, pay taxes, and participate in the political institutions.
1099
 These rights and 
obligations “were exercised without any exclusion based on wealth, profession or 
appearance” and conjoined the elite as equals in citizenship with those “struggling to 
make ends meet.”1100  Reaching beyond the definition of the citizen the reforms of 
Kleisthene also reconstituted the political institutions of Athens; two of which are of 
particular interest. 
The Executive Arm of Athenian Governance: The Boule 
The institution that proposed the agenda for the Assembly, the Boule, functioned 
as the executive arm of Athenian democracy.
1101
 It was comprised of fifty members from 
each of the ten trittyes –artificially constructed tribes or political districts (totaling 500)– 
that incorporated the demos from the three population regions of Attica: the coast, inland, 
and Athens proper.
1102
 Membership in the Boule, according to Thorley, was restricted to 
male citizens, thirty years of age or older, who were at the minimum members of the 
zeugitai class (landowners with a certain annual income), and had presented themselves 
before their deme, which then either could validate or deny their eligibility.
1103
 If the 
number of qualified citizens was greater than the number of citizens allowed from a 
particular deme, the representative was selected through the casting of lots. Service in the 
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Boule was limited to a one year term and could be held only twice over the course of a 
lifetime.
1104
 
In setting the agenda or probouleuma, the Boule provided both specific and 
general issues and policies to be addressed by the Assembly. After the Assembly had 
reached its decisions on those items the Boule was then responsible for publishing those 
decisions and ensuring that they were enacted. In addition, the Boule oversaw duties that 
included the state’s financial, administrative, and judicial responsibilities.1105 These 
duties included managing the collection of tribute,
1106
 administration of “public works 
and services,”1107 and diplomatic functions.1108 Through the Boule, Kleisthene provided 
an institution that afforded the Athenian an instrumental organ of representatives that 
acted as a rudder to the state through its oversight and attention to the day-to-day 
administrative operations. While Boule served the state through these means, the 
Assembly embodying Athens most democratic institution, is where the citizenry engaged 
in the collectively binding decision-making process. 
“The Assembly,” according to Thorley, “always felt that it was definitely in 
charge – and so it was.”1109  It was in the Assembly that every Athenian citizen had the 
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privilege and opportunity to engage in the collective rule of the city. The effect of 
Kleisthene’s reforms were to make the citizens “accountable for the welfare of [the] 
polis”1110 or Athenian state. In the Assembly, citizens produced the collectively binding 
agreements for which they “not only voted for … but were also the people who carried 
them out.”1111 As such the people were ultimately responsible for those decisions. This 
fact of collective accountability for the judgments rendered likely contributed to their 
“attachment to the progressive ideology of pragmatic innovations”1112 that guided the 
evolving nature of Athenian democracy. Throughout the fifth century this ‘progressive 
ideology’ led to slight modifications in the operation of the Assembly and how it was 
constituted. With this said though, again it was the reforms of Kleisthene that formed its 
foundation as a democratic institution. 
Where Citizens Ruled: The Athenian Assembly 
Ekklesia involved the citizen’s right to speak in the Assembly and is the most 
significant element of Athenian democracy. As Woodruff notes, in Sparta its citizens 
were allowed to vote on proposed policies, but they were not able to either propose 
policies or address them in the Assembly.
1113
 In the Athenian Assembly the citizen not 
only voted on solutions to contextualized particulars but could also rhetorically engage 
each other over which solution should be implemented. As discussed previously the 
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Boule would set certain issues for the attention of each Assembly,
1114
 but in addition the 
Assembly could direct the Boule to propose issues that it deemed significant for the next 
meeting.
1115
 The power of the Assembly extended over a broad range of concerns and 
interests: religious buildings; sanctioning of new cults; public religious festivals; 
expenditure of surplus revenue to beautify public properties; sanctioning of state 
approved weights and measures for trade; official currency; areas of foreign policy; 
construction of triremes; and appointments to key positions like the generals, the “city 
architect, the superintendent of the water supply, and the board of naval architects.”1116 
Annually a citizen typically had forty opportunities to take advantage of his right 
to practice ekklesia in Assembly.
1117
 While citizenship could be registered for at the age 
of eighteen, to participate in the Assembly a citizen had to be twenty years of age or 
older. Another restriction on a citizen’s participation in the Assembly that impacted a 
citizen’s ability to speak encompassed two factors. First, the holding capacity for each 
Assembly was limited to six thousand, which meant that not all of the citizens in Attica 
could attend at one time.
1118
 With this many people, even though all had the right to 
address the Assembly, there was not enough time for everyone to speak. Due to this 
limitation, members of the Assembly regulated those who spoke, through their attention 
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to and even interruptions of the speeches given. If a speaker was not considered as having 
specific knowledge in regards to the issue under review, the audience could heckle the 
speaker until he gave up the podium.
1119
 On the other hand, speakers, who had specific 
knowledge or had developed trust with the citizenry through past participation, were 
given latitude as long as they held to the general norms governing speakers. Aeschines 
provided a synopsis of these norms:  
[The speaker] must keep to the matter at hand, must not deal with two separate 
matters together, and must not speak twice on the same matter at any one meeting. 
He must not engage in slanders or scurrility, or interrupt others. He must speak 
only from the platform, and must not assault the presiding officer….1120  
After the speakers had addressed a specific topic the Assembly was then called upon to 
vote. The process, especially when the issue was complex, could span more than one 
Assembly meeting.  When the process had been completed and the vote rendered, the 
decision was then “recorded and published.”1121 Thus, the democratically arrived at 
collectively binding decision could be publically reviewed by the rest of the citizenry. 
This completed the democratic circle: the citizenry could propose the contextualized 
particulars to consider, the citizens would rhetorically engage the Assembly, the citizens 
voted on the proposed solutions, and then the people were publically informed of the 
decision so that they could review the decision.  
One other important factor contributing to participation in the Assembly was that 
the Athenians eventually instituted pay to “ensure a high degree of popular 
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participation.”1122 Citizens for whom a day of service in the Assembly meant an 
economic hardship received a financial stimulant to attend the Assembly and maintain the 
vitality of their democracy. The significance of citizenship is demonstrated in that the 
Athenians chose to increase the pay for participating in the Assembly throughout the 
fourth century, while no pay was granted for service in the army and the pay for manning 
the triremes of the navy was considered inadequate.
1123
 
The effect of these democratic reforms for Athenian citizens was a broadening of 
the distribution of power. Thus with Pericles, each citizen could echo the claims that he 
made during his famous funeral oration commemorating the fallen soldiers of Athens:  
[The] administration [of the Athenian constitution] favours the many instead of 
the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford 
equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement 
in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being 
allowed to interfere with merit; while as to poverty, if a man is able to the state, 
he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.
1124
 
Every Athenian citizen had the right to participate in the decision process of the 
government. As a consequence, these reforms also dictated that each citizen was now 
“accountable for the welfare of [the] polis”1125 or Athenian state. At times this meant that 
Athenians had no one truly to blame for policies that lead to disaster as was the case 
when the Assembly approved the catastrophic Sicilian Expedition of 411 B.C.
1126
 On the 
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other hand, it also meant that the collectively binding decisions they lived by were those 
that they had the ability to propose, shape, decide upon, and enact. 
Democracy’s Training Ground: The Athenian Navy 
…the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in 
the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to command of the sea, 
strengthened democracy. 
–Aristotle, Politics 
Athens’ transformation to democratic rule, in part, also emerged when their 
method of waging war transitioned from protecting their lands to dominating the seas. 
With this change the thete –lower– class was elevated socially and politically due to the 
role they played in Athens’ emergence as a dominant, imperial sea power. When 
Themistocles recognized that “becoming a seafaring nation was the key to the [Athenian] 
acquisition of power”1127 he persuaded the Athenian citizens to use public funds, which 
were initially to be distributed equally among them, to build a fleet of one hundred 
triremes –warships.1128 Upon the completion of this new fleet, the Athenian navy 
numbered one hundred and seventy ships, a number to which Athens continued to add 
until at the height of its power it had some three hundred triremes in its armada.
1129
 With 
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a crew of two hundred “sailors, officers, and marines,”1130 one hundred and seventy of 
which were rowers,
1131
 the manpower requirements were in the tens of thousands.
1132
 
Since the Athenians manned their ships with free men and primarily with citizens these 
numbers necessitated that the “citizens of the lowest class, the thetes”1133 had to be 
engaged in military service. 
The sailor’s experience on a trireme was intense, all encompassing, and educative. 
A trireme was a unique ship that inaugurated “a new era of warfare.”1134 While there 
were different positions on the ship that commanded higher rank, it was the rowers who 
were the heart of the trireme. The majority of oarsmen were positioned within the hull of 
the ship and therefore they had to row blindly.
1135
 In battle an opponent was defeated 
through maneuvering the trireme into position and then driving its forward ram into the 
side of an enemy ship. “Raw courage counted less,” according to John Hale, “than 
technique and the orderly execution of mechanical maneuvers.”1136 Success in an 
engagement involved precision and power that was provided through the efforts of the 
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rowers. To master the skills necessary for a successful engagement, the crews had to 
“learn how to row in synchronization … [and] become accustomed to the crash and roar 
of battle.”1137 “Order and unity,” according to Hanson, “were critical on board ships amid 
the distractions of the loud swishing and the piper’s tune to guarantee good rowing 
time.”1138 Seasoned rowers then, were “premium military assets who took months to 
train.”1139 The form and function of the trireme dictated training, execution, and 
experiences that demanded precision, cohesion, camaraderie, and community. Upon the 
quality of their training and the training of the fleet rested not only their lives, but the 
success and prestige of Athens as well.  
As the extent of the Athenian empire grew, its reach throughout the 
Mediterranean Sea included places that the thetes had only heard about through stories. 
The crew members saw where the Trojan War was fought and won by the Greeks. They 
journeyed to the shores of Egypt and traveled up the Nile. They “would follow the sea 
routes hallowed by the legends of Odysseus, Theseus, Jason, and Cadmus.”1140 These 
voyages brought a knowledge of the world to which only the elites of Athens previously 
had access. The shift to the sea then “provided Athens with [a] unifying principle and 
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cohesive spirit”1141 that was vital to its success on the seas and ultimately for its 
democratic institutions. 
The connection between serving in the Athenian navy and democracy is found in 
the development of the thetes’ confidence as societal and political members. “The navy 
was,” according to Hale, “the origin of Athens’ extreme … democracy,”1142 The thetes, 
after the Kleisthenic reforms, did not exhibit a belief in themselves, nor did they have the 
knowledge to capitalize on their new found political position as citizens.
1143
 To truly be 
empowered citizens, the thetes needed to develop “self-confidence, a knowledge of the 
world, and less tangibly, the ability to imagine themselves as part of an active political 
community.”1144 Through their experience on the trireme the thetes formed a “social 
imaginary”1145 that informed their political consciousness and awoke them to their critical 
role in the maintenance and advancement of Athens. Now as an essential member of 
Athens’ military, Strauss argues: “Athenian thetes gained a new outlet of prestige, a new 
way to fight for their country, a way to make a military contribution as important, if not 
more so, than that of their wealthier neighbors.”1146 Due to this new military orientation 
many of the successes and the failures of the policies voted on in the Assembly largely 
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depended on the thetes. As a member of a ship that was part of a coordinated and ordered 
fleet, a thete learned the importance of working in unison through “a communitarian and 
egalitarian effort.”1147 The trireme then acted as a school where the thetes “forged a thetic 
ideology”1148 that included equality, order, freedom, and solidarity: all of which were 
imperative for the development of their political consciousness. In other words, service 
on a trireme fostered the indispensable belief that provided the impetus for their 
sensibilities and practices within Athens’ political institutions as democratic citizens.1149 
Application to the American Political Landscape 
While the Athenian structures of democratic governance evolved over time to 
meet their conceptual and material needs and strengths and limitations their answers, 
practices, institutions, and institutional infrastructures have to be transformed to provide 
the same in a contemporary societal context. Their structure and procedures for the 
Assembly clearly provided for strong rhetorical accountability and response, but what 
about the other factors; like how the Athenian Assembly would incorporate the mass 
populations of large scale cities and what institution would perform the role of the 
Athenians’ Boule. Additionally, the Athenians gained valuable training in the ways of 
cooperative behaviors, constructing shared symbolic orders through their experiences at 
sea. How would the average contemporary citizen procure this type of democratic 
instruction? The answers are not simple, but the proposals made here should provide for 
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productive possibilities where typically, instead of seeking solutions to these concerns, 
past and current political theorists have sought alternatives that either dismiss direct 
democracy as a necessary and viable collectively binding making space or negate its 
benefits.   
Answering the Critique of Structure: Assembly Boundaries and Adding Forums 
A structural critique of direct democracy holds that its requirement for meeting in 
person makes it untenable due to the citizenry’s numbers and their dispersal over great 
distances.
1150
 As a city-state, even the furthest inhabitants of Attica –Athens– could 
feasibly attend the Assembly. Today’s nation-states generally incorporate territorial 
distances that would make travel to and from a national or state Assembly highly 
problematic. In addition, due to high urban density and large populations, the act of 
bringing together people to participate in an Assembly would also be highly difficult;
1151
 
made more difficult “the larger the scale.”1152 These practical concerns lead Young to 
claim: “Democratic politics must respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of 
people related to one another through democratic institutions.”1153 Yet, even though 
political theorists typically present these critiques to dismiss direct democracy, they also 
acknowledge the contexts in which it does work. For instance, Gutmann and Thompson 
state that “the advantages of direct democracy can be realized only in local units or 
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subunits in the political system.”1154 Young, when advocating that “regional governance 
institutions … should, be designed so as to preserve or create neighbourhood and town 
voice and participation” warns against “metropolitan fragmentation”1155 in which certain 
individuals constitute exclusive political enclaves in the midst of interdependent, closely 
associated, yet different others. For direct democracy to be a viable form that structures 
the functions of governance in order to foster and facilitate democratic rhetoric –to 
realize authentic governance– these questions regarding scope, size, and infrastructure 
need to be addressed.  
Limiting the scope of a direct democracy to the boundaries of a metropolis would 
provide a means for addressing the concern of distance. Young describes the boundaries 
of a metropolis as “include[ing] all those who dwell together within structural relations 
generated by processes of interaction, exchange, and movement that create unavoidable 
conditions of action for all of them.”1156 Obviously, Young’s notion is the ideal and as 
such while it should be pursued, if the citizens of a city incorporated in a metropolitan 
area decided to employ the structures outlined here the ideal should not constrain their 
decision to do so. In limiting the political jurisdiction to the metropolis or even a city the 
citizenry would attend an Assembly associated with their place of residence; in which the 
results of their self-rule, productive of collectively binding decisions, would be practical 
and contextually situated to the citizenry’s primary lived spaces. Practically, this would 
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limit the number of possible participants, but it also would constrain the scope of the 
Assembly’s political jurisdiction to the affairs of a particular polity. Even this restriction 
of political jurisdiction though, could eventually be lifted for key State and National 
contextualized particulars. For instance, one reason for “the self-discovered democratic 
consciousness” of the Athenians, according to Manville, was that “once the dēmos saw 
the power of its own judgments, its desire to take on more and more authority and to 
implement changes that promoted its rule grew stronger.”1157 Likewise, after 
demonstrating their ability to rhetorically engage in collectively binding decision-making 
processes generative of quality judgments for their own polities, Assemblies across 
contemporary states or the nation could be employed to express the will and judgment of 
the citizenry. While this expansion is an imaginative possibility, the following discussion 
will be restricted to the political jurisdiction of a metropolis or city. 
The problem of size –too many citizens to meet together at one time and at one 
place– that is inherent in a major metropolitan context certainly seems to create a 
significant problem for participation in direct democracy. This is true only when the 
Assembly’s forum is considered as a singular entity. In Athens, the Assembly functioned 
fruitfully for a total population of 250,000 to 300,000, with 30,000 to 50,000 of those 
being citizens. These numbers allowed for the full functioning of Athenian democratic 
institutions. Therefore, when the citizen population exceeds these numbers, the answer is 
not to expand the capacity of an Assembly, but to multiply its forums. For example, in a 
city of one million citizens, twenty forums for twenty different citizen districts –like the 
                                                 
1157
 Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, 199. 
 318 
Kleisthenes’ trittyes– would provide today’s citizenry with equivalent opportunities to 
participate in self-governance. While twenty forums in a city with one million citizens 
correspond to the Athenian model of six thousand participants, it is an arbitrary number. 
For instance, an alternative could be to reduce the number of participants assigned from 
each citizen district to their forum. Or the number of citizen participants could be 
reduced, while the number of forums increased. Another possible solution would be to 
alternate the days on which the forums met. As a result, this proposal and alternatives 
would not necessarily necessitate huge public works initiatives in order to build each 
citizen district a meeting place.  
Just imagine six thousand citizens gathering together to rhetorically engage others 
over contextualized particulars in order to collectively decide upon issues important to 
the vitality of where they live forty times a year. Such a structure would shake up the 
contemporary political imaginary in fascinating ways. The solution to scope, size, and 
infrastructures concern simply lies in limiting the scope of participants to the boundaries 
of a city and increasing the number of forums associated with an Assembly. 
The Boule in the Modern Context 
When collectively binding decisions are made they need to be enacted. Every 
decision-making body is mirrored by an administrative arm that carries out the decision-
making body’s desires. In ancient Athens the Boule was its administrative arm, executing 
the policies sanctioned by the Assembly, overseeing the day-to-day operations of the 
polis, and composing the Assembly’s agenda. To oversee the day-to-day operations the 
Boule was managed by five hundred administrators. In executing the policies of the 
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Assembly the Boule had to bring to concrete fruition what was dictated in abstract terms 
by the Assembly. It also provided the Assembly with a president, who “convened and 
presided over the … assembly” and “received messengers, envoys, and applicants who 
wished to address the dēmos”1158 in the Assembly. By composing the Assembly’s agenda 
it ensured that the issues it viewed as significant, as well as those dictated by the 
Assembly, would be addressed in a timely manner. The Boule, or council of 500, was a 
powerful entity that is not unlike the representative leadership of a contemporary 
metropolis.  
Elected city officials today are in the position of the Athenian Boule, with two 
important differences. In addition to seeing that laws and policies are enacted, they 
largely set the agenda without authoritative input by the citizenry and then they deliberate 
and decide how to address those agenda items. These are important distinctions, 
identifying key differences, but there are also noteworthy similarities. The selection of 
these officials predominately originated from a similar class as those who filled the 
Athenian Boule. In addition, city council members typically represent particular districts 
of a city much as a Boule member represented his deme –administrative centers of the ten 
trittyes.
1159
 Consequently, the functions of the Boule could be enacted by the elected 
officials of today. The significant differences would be that their agenda-setting function 
would be shared with the Assembly and the decision-making capacity they have now 
would be shifted to the forums of the local Assembly. 
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Assembly Procedures: Structuring Self-Rule 
It is not feasible to reach back in time to the functions and structures of ancient 
Athens’ direct democracy in order to lift them out of their cultural and material context to 
insert them into the contemporary world of governance. Athens’ Assembly allowed for 
the self-rule of the Athenians over all of the affairs of their city-state and empire. Just the 
extensive boundaries of the nation-state’s political jurisdiction negates the ability of the 
citizenry to meet face-to-face; the core structural characteristic of Athenian direct 
democracy. Yet for authentic governance, which is only actualized through democracy, to 
be realized in a nation-state it is the face-to-face self-rule of the citizenry that must 
actualized. To bring Athenian direct democracy into the contemporary context of 
governance involves an act of translation, which highlights certain structures in order to 
transform them in ways that allow for democratic rhetoric to flourish. To empower the 
citizenry for self-rule, so that they experience liberty and functional equality and employ 
their non-contingent knowledge, a rhetorical democracy must first facilitate the face-to-
face participation in the collectively binding decision-making process.  
Assembly Procedures: Populating the Assembly with Citizen Participants 
To populate the Assembly, the contemporary system of filling juries, provides a 
feasible system for selecting a diverse citizen audience. Following the model of the 
current jury system, those selected to fill the Assembly would be required to participate 
in their citizen district’s forum. Notifications would be sent out to registered voters 
according to membership in the designated citizen districts. If necessary, just as jurors are 
paid to offset their loss of pay for their service, so could the citizen participants. Even if 
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participation is voluntary –in essence violating the obligation of citizenship– once the 
citizenry realized that involvement was a means for self-rule –that they could be a part of 
the collectively binding decision-making process productive of society’s laws and 
policies and was generative of public happiness– the interest of the citizenry would be 
provoked so that the forums would be filled. Either way, required or voluntary 
participation would be structured in the similar manner for selection and notification for 
each citizen district.  
One possible area of concern related to populating multiple forums of an 
Assembly in large metropolitan areas would be the diversity of each citizen district and 
their related forums. It is plausible that entire citizen districts could be composed of 
individuals coming from a particular ethnic, racial, or economic background. Such 
forums could become individually polarized and cause discord along these ethnic, racial, 
and economic lines. Such homogeneity of forums would negate the citizen participants 
need to employ the full range of the inventional process for their rhetorical engagements 
and would also lessen the vitality of rhetorical accountability and response. To offset this 
possibility Kleisthenes’s formulation of arbitrary tribes –trittyes– that pulled citizens 
from the city, coastland, and inland populations provides a solution. Instead of simply 
blocking off sections of the city to draw participants from the constitution of each citizen 
district could be intentionally formed in order to ensure that each forum was populated by 
participants from the breadth of micro-cultures inhabiting the polity. The guiding 
principle for the formation of these citizen districts would be to ensure that they 
incorporated the heterogeneity found within the bounds of the metropolitan area. In this 
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way, the citizen districts and forums would constitute spaces for contestation, but even 
more importantly spaces in which citizens are brought face-to-face with member of the 
various micro-cultures that make up their community.  
Assembly Procedures: Range of Assembly Authority 
Another real practical concern would be the range of issues over which a modern 
day Assembly would have authority for self-rule. What areas would an Assembly be able 
to set policy and declare laws for? Starr claims that “the issues [the Athenians] faced, to 
be sure, were much simpler than those in the modern world, and in the marketplace they 
could gain information and misinformation on which to base their judgments….”1160 Starr 
presents two concerns here; one about the range of issues and the second regarding the 
quality of information used to make decisions about those issues. Perhaps his first 
concern would a true assessment if the political jurisdiction was not limited to the city, 
but at the level of local polities it is incorrect. In fact, while the Athenian Assembly did 
not address the full range of issues a nation-state does today it did set laws and policies 
for an extensive empire. Issues of national defense, foreign policy, currency, and 
approved weights and measures for trade that the Athenians attended to would not be 
under the purview of a local Assembly, as national and state entities would still retain 
authority in these areas. Moreover, even though contemporary politics is unconcerned 
with public religion, the maintenance and performance of religious rituals, and the 
construction of religious buildings it is concerned with civic events that are conducted on 
public premises and the construction of new public buildings and spaces. Like the 
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Athenian Assembly, local Assemblies in a contemporary context would have authority 
over areas of civic events, civic spaces, policing, local transportation, welfare, 
development and redevelopment of economic areas and endeavors, waste, and a number 
of other interesting issues.  
In addition, whether the decision-making body of a metropolis is composed of 
better (wo)men or of the citizenry there is no control over the quality of the information 
they take up and employ in the collectively binding decision-making process. The true 
hedge against the influence of misinformation is the strong versions of rhetorical 
accountability and response only available through a rhetorical democracy. Just like the 
Athenians, the citizen participants of these local Assemblies would be empowered to 
bring to bear their non-contingent knowledge relevant to contextualized particulars in 
order to envision and constitute their lived worlds through their collectively binding 
decisions. 
Assembly Procedures: Norms for Speaking 
The procedures or norms for speaking to the citizen audiences of the Assembly 
should adhere to one absolute principle: that how a citizen addresses the forum should not 
favor a particular communication code or symbolic order of a micro-culture. Beyond this 
principle, the norms that the forums of an Assembly could follow are open to the 
imagination and need of the citizenry. A practical starting place for these norms, are those 
that guided the Athenian Assembly as articulated by Aeschines. Aeschines’ claimed, as 
previous explicated, that to address the forum an Athenian had to stay on topic, focus on 
one matter at a time, and speak no more than twice on the same subject. The speaker also 
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could only speak from the designated speaking platform, be civil, and respect the 
authority of the presiding official –a mayor?– who conveyed and facilitated the rhetorical 
engagements.  
The key norm that the Athenians employed was that each individual could speak 
only twice regarding an issue. This is a powerful motivating norm, because it compels an 
individual to carefully reflect on –invent– what s/he would say. Definitely, it is difficult 
to imagine a functioning Assembly of this type, but that difficulty points to a true 
deficiency in the contemporary political imaginary. For the Athenians though, decade 
after decade, their Assembly followed these norms to effectively rule their community 
and empire. What is lacking in today’s political imaginary is the belief and will that the 
people can rule themselves –a trust in their knowledge and capacities for making 
judgments that will instantiate the common good. What truly hinders the political 
imaginary from conceiving of, constituting, and enacting self-rule is the power of those 
who rule now and their resistance to relinquishing that power. 
Assembly Procedures: Transparency through Prior, Concurrent, and Post Publicity 
In setting the agenda for Assembly meetings, members of the Boule would decide 
on the issues, in addition to those the Assembly directed the Boule to include, that needed 
to be addressed. After setting the agenda, the Boule was then responsible for publicizing 
the agenda four days prior to the meeting. Today, elected officials would serve a similar, 
but expanded role. In addition to composing and publicizing the agenda, elected 
representatives would compile and distribute prior to the Assembly relevant and 
necessary information –contingent knowledge– for the citizen decision-makers. 
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Information distributed to those citizens selected for participation in a particular 
Assembly –or even better to all members of the metropolis– would offer the citizenry 
access to the contingent knowledge germane for addressing the contextualized particulars 
on the agenda. This official information could be augmented by other public or private 
entities that desired to emphasize competing perspectives that they believed were not 
fully conveyed or developed. In addition, communicating the agenda and these various 
informative sources would be enhanced in today’s context because, even though the 
current major metropolitan centers are much larger than ancient Athens, current 
communication channels collapse this space, allowing for more efficient conveyance of 
information throughout the populace. In performance of these roles, both the official and 
alternative sources of information would enrich the knowledge base, concerning the 
issues, of societal members in general and specifically for the citizens participating in the 
Assembly.  
Prior publicity and distribution of contingent knowledge in today’s context would 
facilitate and enhance the societal benefits of a rhetorical democracy far beyond that 
achieved by the Athenians. For instance, a meeting of the Assembly would become a 
local news event, providing the various news outlets with multiple stories to investigate 
and publicize. Besides running stories about the contextualized particulars under 
consideration for an Assembly, the media could also serve as a check on the issues that 
the elected officials placed on the agenda. If the elected officials were not addressing a 
certain public problem, then the news media could inform the citizenry, so that if the next 
Assembly deemed it of value they could instruct the elected officials to place it on the 
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next Assembly’s agenda. As a result, the impetus the Assembly would provide the news 
media would acknowledge, attend to, and enact Jefferson’s admonishment “to give [the 
people] full information of their affairs thro’ the channel of the public papers, & to 
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.”1161 In addition, 
publicity of the actual meetings of the Assembly, as they were being conducted, would be 
a newsworthy event that local media could cover. Local rhetorical democracy would 
then, not only empower the citizenry for self-rule and foster their identification and 
public happiness; it would also reinvigorate the fourth estate. 
When it is the citizenry who rules, it is especially imperative that collectively 
binding decisions are publicized so that those citizens not part of the Assembly can judge 
if the decisions made reflect the common good, know the cooperative behaviors the 
public has been committed to enact, and hold the administrative body accountable for the 
implementation of those decisions. Certainly these roles are important for any form of 
governance, but become even more significant when the decisions made by the Assembly 
are the means by which the viability of rhetorical democracy will be judged. In Athens, 
the Assembly’s collectively binding decisions were formalized and then publicized in 
order for all societal members –citizens, metics, subjects, and slaves– to know what was 
required of them and of their administrative representatives. In the contemporary context 
post-publicity would serve the same purpose. 
Concurrent and post-publicity also contributes to the legitimacy of the collectively 
binding decision-making process. Young argues that legitimate collectively binding 
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decisions “cannot take place in closed fora from which potentially affected parties are 
excluded.”1162 The Assembly itself opens up the process significantly. Concurrent 
publicity further extends the transparency of the decision-making process. By opening up 
the forums to local coverage, the people –citizens, denizens, and subjects– would have 
complete access to their proceedings. Post-publicity would then serve to convey the 
Assembly’s outcomes to those who did not have the opportunity to participate or watch 
the concurrent coverage. Consequently, through the structure and functions of the 
Assembly and concurrent and post-publicity, the collectively binding decision-making 
process and decisions would be fully transparent. Through this transparency a rhetorical 
democracy meets practically Young’s necessary, yet insufficient, qualification for 
legitimate governance. 
The Assembly: Educating the Democratic Consciousness 
A democratic consciousness does not inherently reside in the minds of human 
beings. As argued previously, consciousness is a result of the symbolic orders a person 
ascribes to in that how one conceives of one’s self is a product of the meanings –attitudes 
and actions– s/he accepts about him/herself. As ideologies are systems of meaning, the 
ideology of rhetorical democracy, just like all other ideologies, must inculcate a particular 
subject position within societal members and instantiate material practices reflective of 
its core constructs. In ancient Athens the experience in the navy, the ideology developed 
and learned from the practices necessary for success in warfare, fostered the thetes’ 
uptake and belief in their abilities for self-rule as empowered, democratic citizens. In the 
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contemporary functions and structures, resultant from the American ideology of 
governance, the contemporary citizen lacks a similar democratic institution, in which 
democratic practices call him or her to a democratic consciousness and subject position. 
This is not to say that there are not established current institutions that can in part perform 
this role. For instance, a reorientation of the education system that reinvigorates its role in 
teaching democratic principles and practices could serve to inculcate future citizens to be 
prepared for self-rule. Learning about the core constructs and practices of rhetorical 
democracy are rendered impotent though without a space in which the citizenry is 
empowered to actualize them. Without an Assembly that provides future citizens with the 
opportunity to observe the positive consequences of participating in self-rule –functional 
equality, liberty, public happiness, and identification– there is little impetus to invest in 
learning about how to participate in functions and structures that are generative of 
rhetorical democratic collectively binding decision-making processes. Therefore, while 
the institutions of the education system would be valuable, necessary contributors to a 
rhetorical democratic consciousness and subject position, it would not be sufficient. As 
John Stuart Mill argues, individuals need opportunities that are productive of “the 
practical discipline which the character obtains, from the occasional demand made upon 
the citizens to exercise, for a time and in their turn, some social function.”1163 In other 
words, to constitute a rhetorical democratic citizenry that can participate in democratic 
rhetorical engagements, citizens do not need to just learn about core constructs and 
practices; they need to be empowered to enact them. When “circumstances allow the 
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amount of public duty assigned [to a citizen] to be considerable, it makes [that person] an 
educated [citizen].”1164 In the Federalist Papers, Madison made a similar claim when he 
contended that to “be a competent legislator” required that the knowledge necessary to 
rule, in part could “only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience 
in the station which requires the use of it.”1165 It is then, in the contemporary context, 
only the Assembly that can provide the necessary and sufficient conditions through which 
the citizenry is sufficiently educated and called into being rhetorically democratic citizen 
empowered for self-rule.   
The Far Reaching Benefits of a Rhetorical Democracy 
The results of such a system would be dramatic and not only at the local level. 
The most important possibility would be the transformation of the political imaginary of 
the people. Cohen discusses a relevant concept that pertains to the political imaginary: the 
“accommodationalist preferences.”1166 To explicate this concept Cohen refers to Stoic 
slaves who matched their political imagination to their existing power relations.
1167
 
Expected to be good slaves these individuals conceived how to be good slaves instead of 
imagining and working toward being free. In general then, it could be argued that 
individual and societal preferences are accommodated to the power relations in which 
they exist. This concept reflects the argument concerning the training ground that service 
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on the triremes for the thete class of Athenian citizens was educative of a democratic 
consciousness. Therefore, conditions in which individuals practice citizenship shape their 
constitution as political beings. 
If Cohen is correct about accommodationalist preferences then by empowering 
the citizenry through participation in a rhetorical democracy they would not only become 
more involved in their own metropolitan contextual particulars, but also the public 
problems addressed and decided upon at the state and national levels. Motivated through 
their empowered involvement in an Assembly the political imagination of the citizenry 
would be accommodated to the preferences of self-rule. In experiencing authentic 
governance through enacting democratic rhetoric in a rhetorical democracy the citizenry 
would come to see that they could collectively decide –rule– how to constitute their 
social and material world(s). This would affect the citizenry’s interests and involvement 
in local governance, as well as their attention to the governing of state and national 
representatives. For instance, the citizenry’s desire to hear their state and national leaders’ 
reasoning for collectively binding decisions would be inculcated and enhanced. Another 
possibility is that citizens, with expectations for rhetorical accountability, response, and 
forum transparency, would push for more open collectively binding decision-making 
processes at these levels as well. 
Participation in the Assembly or even as elected officials of a rhetorical 
democracy could also have additional, real aleatory ideological effects on state and 
national governance. The ideological effects of a rhetorical democracy would call its 
citizens into a democratic subject position for their lived experiences at home. State and 
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national representative As such, local governance would become a breeding ground for 
shaping participation in all forms for ruling society. Through participation in the 
Assembly, citizens who were selected to rule over society as state and national 
representatives would identify more strongly with a rhetorical democratic ideology. 
There are a number of possible beneficial results: potential candidates for state and 
national office would find it difficult to secure these positions without first being 
successful in an Assembly; a candidate’s exposure to the voting public would be 
enhanced through their participation in the Assembly, which could offset in part the cost 
of campaigning; and a representative, who could not adequately defend and justify his or 
her position, would find it difficult to remain an elected official. Local elected officials, 
even if they had not participated in an Assembly could also become more democratically 
minded. If such an elected official attained a state or national position, s/he would likely 
bring with him or her a strong belief that as a representative s/he was accountable to the 
citizenry and to be responsive to their collective will.  
Conclusion: The Most Humanizing Endeavor 
Call democracy a dream, if you will, but keep dreaming democracy.  
–Paul Woodruff, First Democracy: The Challenge of an Ancient Idea  
Society is a space in which individual acts that flow out of a person’s capacities 
are conjoined to that of other individuals in order to realize a social and material world 
that is only feasible through cooperative acts. When individuals give up their liberty, 
found in the state of nature, they submit to the imposition of a collective power over their 
lived endeavors. How this power is constituted for ruling is dependent in large part by 
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what is seen as possible through the symbolic orders of a particular society’s culture. If 
that culture’s webs of significance are undergirded with ideologies –a particular people’s 
systems of meaning that articulate core symbolic constructs pertaining to certain 
contexts– that do not foster democratic governance the power of the people for self-rule 
is given over to some other(s). On the other hand, if the ideology associated with 
governance empowers the citizenry to rule –to propose the contextualized particulars for 
agenda items that the citizenry rhetorically engage over within a functionally equal space 
so as to generate collectively binding decisions that determine society’s cooperative 
behaviors– then the people enjoy authentic governance through the only legitimate means 
for ruling societal members, rhetorical democracy. Authentic governance and democratic 
rhetoric rises up from the most human and humanizing endeavor, meaning construction.  
When a meaning is ascribed to an object, whether physical, social, or abstract, it 
only is rendered powerful when other societal members consensually agree with that 
meaning. These meanings form the purpose of communication, thereby shaping a 
perceptual screen through which one’s being and seeing the world is constituted. To offer 
up and negotiate the meaning of some object with others is then the most humanizing 
endeavor in which a person can engage in the construction of the lived world. When an 
individual endeavors with another over what something should mean or through acts that 
are demonstrative of a particular attitude toward an object that meaning has to be 
accepted outright or negotiated over before it is incorporated into their shared symbolic 
order. In many ways, then meaning construction that is humanizing –recognizing the 
participants’ capacities of knowledge, equality, liberty, and power as conceived by the 
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Athenians– is a democratic process. Such a process is a rhetorical engagement with the 
participants attempting to convince each other that their meaning or particular nuance of 
the meaning best fits the object. In this microcosm of self-rule over the collective good of 
a meaning construct also employs weak and strong versions of rhetorical accountability 
and response. Individuals present at the meaning’s inception, negotiation, or uptake are 
able to employ a strong version of both, while those removed from the process 
experience little or no ability for either.  
On the other hand, when meaning is dictated by one or the few its effects can be 
one of the most dehumanizing endeavors in which humanity can engage. For instance, 
one of the most dehumanizing cooperative acts of meaning construction in American 
history was a result of the rule of a few. When the white, male, state representatives at the 
Constitutional Convention decided that “all other Persons” –slaves– were to be counted 
as only “three fifths” of a human being, in order to determine the number of 
“representatives and direct Taxes … apportioned among the several States,”1168 the 
original Constitution of the United States constituted a portion of the population as less 
than human. In doing so, the attitude and acts of the national government and many of its 
citizens and subjects were shaped to allow for dehumanizing, reprehensible collective and 
individual behaviors towards subject who were denied their inalienable right for self-rule. 
If the Constitutional Convention was conducted as a rhetorical democratic Assembly, 
slaves would have been functionally equal participants with the liberty and power to 
rhetorically engage in the meaning construction of their personhood. These individuals 
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would have been able to hold those who desired to dehumanize them accountable in the 
moment by responding to –rhetorically confronting– the construction of their humanity as 
being less than human. To get at the heart of this problem though, one step back in 
meaning construction is warranted. Citizenship is a symbol that was narrowly defined 
prior to the Constitutional Convention by similar representatives, thereby excluding the 
majority of any members of micro-cultures living within the boundaries of the 
Confederated States. This means that the space of the Constitutional Convention was one 
that excluded not only women and   slaves, but also any other habitus or communication 
community that would have compelled the representatives to rhetorically invent through 
their private wills in order to generate public wills that would have been meaningful to 
the members of those micro-cultures. Due to this lack of democratic rhetoric in a 
rhetorical democratic context these men were able to justify the privileging of the union 
of the few over the denial of human rights to the many. And as the analysis of the 
ideology of American governance has demonstrated their denial was not constrained to 
the slaves or Native Americans who were not incorporated into the established system of 
taxation,
1169
 it included those whose power deputized better men to rule over them.  
Rhetorical democracy as meaning construction is not only the most authentic 
form of governance, it is the most humanizing. When governance distorts one or more of 
the core constructs in the ideological chain of meaning for authentic democracy, that 
government is no longer functionally a democracy. How the core constructs, entailments, 
institutions, and material practices are articulated together is indicative of the meanings 
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of power, liberty, equality, public happiness participation, and knowledge through 
identification that structure the ways in which that particular government is conducted. 
When governance is conducted by individuals who are viewed as having superior 
knowledge and the collective knowledge of the citizenry is dismissed that government is 
not democratic. When a government does not allow a citizen the liberty to speak into the 
collectively binding decision-making process that governance is not democratic. When 
the space in which governance is conducted does not constitute the citizenry as 
functionally equal that government is not democratic. When the entire citizenry is not 
empowered to participate in self-rule, then that government is not democratic. 
Democratic governance entails the citizenry being able to apply their capacities to 
governing through empowered, active participation in the collectively binding decision-
making process. For a government to claim to be democratic, while not creating a 
political space in which the citizenry can engage each other through democratic rhetoric 
that fosters rhetorical accountability and rhetorical response is merely a mirage of 
democracy. Like the mirage in the desert when the ideals of democracy are employed by 
such a government to construe itself as democratic; what one finds when examining this 
type of government is that its governance is not for the elevation and empowerment of 
the citizenry, but to preserve the power of the one or the few over the many. The people –
all people– thirst for democracy, dream of democracy and it is only through their 
participation in a rhetorical democracy that their longing for authentic governance –
empowered, equal self-rule through which what divides individuals from each other is 
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bridged together for their collective, common good– is constituted and experienced as 
their reality. 
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